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This PhD explored the role of rape myths and cultural narratives in serious sexual offences
trials in England. The relationship between rape myths and cultural narratives that reflect
structural oppressions such as sexism, classism, and ableism, is important to examine in the
context of trials because attrition evidence shows that minoritised and marginalised women
face particular barriers when accessing criminal justice.
Court observations were used because they provide insight into the overarching trial narrative
that is unaffected by participant recall (as would be the case in using interview and survey
methods). Data were analysed using an intersectional feminist frame informed by critical
discourse analysis, both of which focus on power structures.
The key findings were that rape myths continue to permeate trial narratives, that they are
re/produced by oppressive cultural narratives, and that these work together to undermine the
credibility of victim-survivors. Structural inequalities and systems of oppression are reflected,
often subtly, in the narratives deployed by barristers at trial and thus the credibility of victim-
survivors is undermined in relation to how they are perceived and portrayed.
These findings show that it is important to look beyond rape myths as an explanation for poor
justice outcomes for victim-survivors of sexual violence and that structural inequalities and
systems of oppression should be properly considered in future research, policy, and reform.
Key words: Rape; Rape Myths; Cultural Narratives; Criminal Justice; Court; Victim-survivors.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the research problem and sets out the objectives of the project. An
overview of the thesis is then given before key terminology and definitions are provided.
1.1 The research problem
It has been claimed that poor criminal justice responses to rape in England and Wales (E&W)
have resulted in the effective decriminalisation of rape (Bindel, 2019; Centre for Women’s
Justice [CWJ] et al., 2020; Siddique, 2020). Such claims stem from a rapid decline in
prosecution and conviction rates, which are currently at an all-time low (CWJ, et al., 2020).
This means victim-survivors who choose to make a report to the police have an incredibly low
chance of seeing their case result in a conviction. Whilst low prosecution rates mean a smaller
proportion of cases are reaching court than ever before, the courtroom remains a crucial area
for research because assumptions about what may happen in court inform earlier decisions
in the criminal justice process, such as the decision not to prosecute (Brown et al., 2010a;
CWJ, 2020; Smith and Daly, 2020).
Rape myths are commonly used as an explanatory model for low conviction rates (Temkin
and Krahé, 2008; Dinos, et al., 2015; Willmott, Boduszek and Booth, 2017). Indeed, evidence
has consistently shown that rape myths are frequently used in court as tools to undermine the
credibility of victim-survivors (Adler, 1987; Lees, 2002; Temkin and Krahé, 2008; Temkin,
2010; Smith and Skinner, 2017; Smith, 2018; Temkin, Gray and Barrett, 2018). But rape myths
alone cannot explain why the existing evidence suggests that victim-survivors from minoritised
and marginalised groups have a particularly low chance of seeing a conviction (Kelly, Lovett
and Regan, 2005; Lovett et al., 2007; Munro and Kelly, 2009; Hester, 2013; Hester and Lilley,
2017). For example, victim-survivors with learning disabilities or mental health conditions have
been found to have a lower chance of conviction in their cases (Harris and Grace, 1999; Kelly,
et al., 2005; Stanko and Williams, 2009; Hester, 2013), yet this cannot be explained by rape
myths alone. Indeed, court observations from 2012 indicated that rape trial narratives also




               
              
             
                
                
    
              
         
            
           
                
           
     
              
                
               
             
                
               
                
             
            
               
              
                
              
               
               
It is therefore imperative that there is current evidence which explores what is happening in
the courtroom and what mechanisms could be causing the disparity in chances of conviction.
I therefore carried out court observations of sexual offences trials, using an intersectional
feminist frame for analysis, in order to explore if and how cultural narratives are employed at
trial and the ways in which they may interact with rape myths. Specifically, the objectives of
this project were to:
 Identify whether legal practitioners use rape myths in serious sexual offences trials and
if so, the context in which these are used.
 Identify whether legal practitioners use cultural narratives in serious sexual offences
trials and if so, the context in which these are used.
 Analyse if and how the use of cultural narratives and rape myths reinforce one another.
 Outline potential avenues for improving the trial experience of victim-survivors.
1.1.1 Structure of the thesis
Before reviewing the relevant extant literature, I first provide some key definitions relevant to
the project. The reviewed literature is then set out in Chapter Two. The review begins by
outlining relevant aspects of the criminal justice system (CJS) in E&W before going on to
explore its responses to sexual violence by examining rape attrition research and literature
specific to the courtroom. The chapter sets out the gap in the literature that my thesis
addresses: that some groups of victim-survivors are less likely to see convictions in their cases
but that the existing court research does not adequately explain why or how this might be.
Chapter Three details my methodological decisions and processes, including an outline of my
intersectional feminist framework and the court observation method. Chapters Four to Seven
set out my findings, with Chapters Four and Five focusing on rape myth narratives and
Chapters Six and Seven focusing on the broader cultural narratives that intersected with the
rape myths set out in the preceding chapters. Finally, Chapter Eight sets out my argument that
rape myths are re/produced by oppressive cultural narratives in the courtroom and that this
has important implications for research, policy, and practice. In short, it is essential that we




           
 
      
             
  
  
             
              
                
               
  
             
                 
           
             
             
              
               
             
               
               
             
    
            
               
               
                  
the underlying structural inequalities and systems of oppression that shape courtroom
narratives.
1.2 Introducing key terms and concepts
The following subsections define and justify key terms and concepts used throughout the
thesis.
1.2.1 Victim-survivor
Throughout violence against women discourses there are differences in the way in which
women who have been subjected to men’s violence are framed linguistically. It is important
that researchers be mindful of the labels they use and the potential effects of that labelling
(Gavey, 1999; Papendick and Bohner, 2017); I therefore provide justification for my use of the
term ‘victim-survivor’.
The terms ‘victim’ and ‘survivor’ have separately been critiqued extensively with debate among
feminists over which is the most appropriate term to use. The term ‘victim’ was used in early
feminist activism and scholarship to acknowledge women’s oppression and challenge the
patriarchal society that cast misogynistic doubt over the legitimacy of women’s experiences of
male violence (Bourke, 2008), however during the 1980s there was growing concern regarding
the negative connotations associated with the term. Barry (1979) noted that the term ‘victim’
had come to position women as passive victims, implying an inherent vulnerability and to some
extent blaming them for their victimisation. Similarly, Kelly (1988) considered that the ‘victim’
label positioned women who had been victimised as powerless and damaged. This led to a
shift towards using the term ‘survivor’ (Barry, 1979), which was used to signify that women
have agency and are continually coping with, and resisting, men’s violent oppression of
women (Kelly, 1988).
Profitt (1996) argued that ‘survivor’ acknowledges both victimisation and strength and agency,
whereas Lamb (1999) is critical of the term, positing that it overstates the trauma experienced
because it intimates that the woman’s life was at stake. However, Kelly (1988) explains that




                
           
              
             
             
             
             
             
            
              
              
               
            
                
           
             
              
                 
             
                
                
               
              
             
                
                 
                   
              
and mental survival as well as the physical, and it also encapsulates that many women take
their own lives as a direct result of sexual violence.
The ‘victim’ and ‘survivor’ terminology were each viewed as valid but were positioned as
binaries (Kelly, Burton and Regan, 1996). This dichotomy has been viewed as problematic
because it does not acknowledge the complexities in navigating the victim and survivor
identities, which are not necessarily static nor are they mutually exclusive (Leisenring, 2006;
Papendick and Bohner, 2017). A person can hold the victim and survivor identities
simultaneously (Dunn, 2005; Dunn, 2010; Dunn and Creek, 2015). An alternative to the
individual terms that is seen quite frequently in contemporary feminist literature is
‘victim/survivor’. In writing, the virgule is used to indicate a choice between two things,
representing the word ‘or’ and signifying the interchangeability of two words. It does not
capture simultaneity. A hyphen can be used to indicate a connection between two words whilst
keeping their meanings separate. Indeed, Jean-Charles (2014) uses a hyphen between victim
and survivor to represent the process of surviving rape and West (1999) uses it to represent
the duality of women’s experiences of being victimised and of surviving.
Another benefit of using ‘victim-survivor’ is that it incorporates the advantages of Boyle’s
(2018) continuum thinking, which moves beyond a linear journey from victim to survivor. Victim
and survivor are placed at either end of a continuum, but unlike the linear journey, Boyle (2018)
stresses that “an individual’s movement across this continuum is not uni-directional or strictly
chronological” (p. 8). That is, as with Kelly’s (1988) original concept of the continuum of sexual
violence, women can be positioned at any point along the continuum at any point in time
regardless of the points they have been at previously. The concept of a continuum captures
the interconnectedness and fluidity of women’s self in relation to their experiences, that the
victim and survivor identities cannot necessarily be easily distinguished from one another. This
conceptualisation recognises that a woman can identify as a victim or as a survivor or both
simultaneously at any time in her life during or after victimisation; she can feel like a survivor
one minute and like a victim the next; she can feel like both at the same time. There remain




                
              
             
                 
              
                 
               
                  
                
               
               
               
             
              
               
                  
               
              
  
  
                  
          
                 
                 
                
               
                
      
been subjected to male violence, such as that it cannot easily capture those who reject both
terms or those who feel they have transcended survivorship (Young and Maguire, 2003). The
victim-survivor continuum is, however, flexible and can encapsulate a diverse range of lived
experiences. It thus seems least likely to impose unwanted labels onto the women I observed.
Consideration must also be given to the specific context of this research when choosing
terminology. This research is situated within the context of the CJS and so it is reasonable to
assume that the women observed will have, at least to some extent, labelled their experiences
as criminal. That is not to say that they will have necessarily chosen to identify as a victim,
because women can feel obliged to present themselves as a victim in order to seek justice,
regardless of the extent to which they identify with that label (Dunn, 2001; Leisenring, 2006).
Within the CJS women who have experienced sexual violence are referred to as victims, as
with any other crime, and within court specifically they are referred to as ‘complainants’ in
order to reflect the presumption of innocence with regards to the defendant. ‘Complainant’
does not reflect the prospect of secondary victimisation in court (Temkin and Kráhe, 2008;
Jordan, 2013) and so, given the focus of this research on the experiences of victim-survivors
in the courtroom, it does not feel the most appropriate term to use. The inclusion of ‘victim’ in
the term victim-survivor makes it suitable for the criminal justice context of this research whilst
at the same time recognising the complex lived experiences of women subjected to sexual
violence.
1.2.2 Defendant
A variety of terms can be used to refer to a person who has committed sexual offences. The
terms perpetrator, offender, accused, and defendant are used throughout criminological
research. Perpetrator is a broad term used to refer to a person who has committed a crime,
but whom may or may not have been identified, whereas an offender is a person who has
been convicted of a crime. Both of these terms therefore imply guilt, which is important to
consider because at the point at which I was observing guilt had not been established
(although in two cases the trials did end in conviction) and therefore would not be appropriate




               
                 
                
                
                  
             
            
    
                  
                
              
               
                 
                 
             
            
     
                   
                 
               
       
           
              
            
   
           
              
             
            
  
The term accused is also commonly used within the existing literature, however this term can
refer to any point in the CJS between charge and conviction, whereas defendant is a term that
specifically relates to trial (HM Courts and Tribunal Service, 2012). I will therefore use the term
defendant to refer to those accused of sexual offences. This is in keeping with the conventions
for the criminal trial context and reflects that guilt has not been established at that point in the
CJS. The use of the term defendant is consistent with other criminological research,
particularly court observation research (e.g., Carlen, 1974; Rock, 1991; Lees, 2002; Konradi,
2007; Darbyshire, 2011).
A similar argument regarding the use of the term defendant can be used to argue for use of
the term complainant in place of victim-survivor. However, it is not the victim whose guilt is
being established by trial. Use of the term victim is commonplace in criminological research
and it is common in court observation research in particular. Further, a defendant being found
not guilty does not mean that no crime has taken place, because the purpose of a criminal
trial is to establish whether there is enough evidence to convict a person of the crime with
which they have been charged, not to determine innocence (Davies, 2015). My previously
outlined argument for the use of the term victim-survivor therefore stands.
1.2.3 Rape and sexual assault
When referring to rape and sexual assault, I refer to them as they are defined in law in order
to remain consistent with the way the terms are used in the context of criminal trial. The
definitions of rape and sexual assault (including assault by penetration) are set out in the
Sexual Offences Act 2003 as follows:
“A person (A) commits [rape] if (a) he intentionally penetrates the
vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis; (b) B does
not consent to the penetration, and (c) A does not reasonably believe
that B consents.”
“A person (A) commits [assault by penetration] if (a) he intentionally
penetrates the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of his
body or anything else; (b) the penetration is sexual; (c) B does not





           
             
             
                
              
                
                
               
                
             
             
            
            
              
                
               
               
             
              
             
      
             
                
                 
           
             
            
              
“A person (A) commits [sexual assault] if (a) he intentionally touches
another person (B); (b) the touching is sexual; (c) B does not consent
to the touching, and (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.”
The SOA saw the introduction of a legal definition of consent, defined as being when “a
person…agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice”, and
stipulated that the belief in consent must be “reasonable”. The Act further provides a list of
circumstances in which it can be presumed that consent was not given, for example a person
cannot consent if they are asleep or unconscious. The definition of consent introduced in the
SOA put the onus on the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable belief in consent, as opposed
to the victim-survivor having to demonstrate an active denial of consent (Crown Prosecution
Service [CPS], n.d.(a)). Whilst the introduction of this definition marked a significant step
forward, the provisions regarding consent are problematic because key concepts, such as
reasonableness, freedom, choice, and capacity, are left open to interpretation (Elvin, 2008).
The requirement for reasonable belief in consent means that lack of consent does not
necessarily mean an offence has been committed, meaning that it is up to juries to decide
what reasonable belief is. This leaves the interpretation of consent open to prejudices held by
jurors (Simpson, 2016). This has a significant bearing on the types of narratives that barristers
can employ in the courtroom, as is demonstrated in Chapter 4. Additionally, consent-based
models have long been viewed by some as problematic because the vagueness of the
definitions fail to account for power dimensions and societal inequalities, which can often
constrain free choice (Munro, 2010).
Despite their limitations, using the statutory definitions for rape and sexual assault is
appropriate for this project because it means that my definitions are in line with those being
used at trial, and can consequently be presumed to be in line with the definitions intended by
participants. A possible exception to this could be witness participants, particularly victim-
survivors who may have chosen to define their experiences outside the legislative context.
Legislative categories for sexual offences do not capture the complexity of victim-survivors’




              
            
             
              
           
             
                
             
               
             
                
               
             
                
           
   
               
                 
                
             
               
                 
              
                  
                 
against but also because sexual offences are not mutually exclusive from one another nor
from forms of sexual violence not defined in law (Kelly, 2012).
According to Kelly (1988), sexual violence can be situated along a non-hierarchical continuum
where different forms of sexual violence bear the same common character—that is, acts of
“abuse, intimidation, coercion, intrusion, threat and force” (p.76)—and cannot necessarily be
easily distinguished from one another. The concept of the continuum of sexual violence
recognises that sexual aggression does not happen in a vacuum, rather it is an extension of
the backdrop of societal attitudes, beliefs and norms that produce and reproduce conducive
contexts for, what is primarily, men’s violence against women to occur (Kelly, 1988). Some of
these attitudes and beliefs are reflected in society’s response to sexual violence, particularly
rape and sexual assault, as what are commonly known as rape myths. It is widely believed
that rape myths have a serious impact on the CJS’s effectiveness in responding to sexual
offences and are therefore discussed throughout Chapter Two. Indeed, rape myths formed a
central part of my analysis, especially in Chapters Four and Five. It is therefore important to
first provide an introductory discussion to the concept of rape myths.
1.2.4 Rape myths
Rape myths are widely discussed within the literature and a range of definitions have been
offered over recent decades. The term ‘rape myth’ was first used in the 1970s and is usually
attributed to Brownmiller (1975) and Estrich (1976) as scholars who brought it to the fore in
academia. The discussions of rape myths focused on conceptualisation until Feild (1978) and
Burt (1980) began to develop an evidence base examining the influence of them on members
of society. The research on rape myth acceptance is extensive and it is beyond the scope of
this project to discuss in full. Therefore, aside from the present background discussion, rape
myths will be reviewed in relation to the CJS throughout Chapter Two, as this is the aspect of




            
    
               
           
              
            
                  
                 
    
           
          
           
         
                
              
                
               
                
             
            
               
                
             
                
             
              
               
 
          
                       
       
prevalent in courtroom narratives and that they are re/produced by oppressive cultural
narratives1 in the courtroom.
Rape myths have broadly been defined as widely held and generally false beliefs about rape,
rapists, and rape victim-survivors (Brownmiller, 1975; Burt, 1980; Lonsway and Fitzgerald,
1994). Gerger et al. (2007) compellingly argued that the reference to false beliefs is
problematic because falsehood cannot always be empirically supported and that defining rape
myths as widely held implies that they will cease to be defined as such if fewer people believe
them and will thus no longer be of concern. To address these issues, Gerger et al. (2007)
define rape myths as
“descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about rape (i.e. about its causes, context,
consequences, perpetrators, victims, and their interaction) that serve to deny,
downplay or justify sexual violence that men commit against women” (Bohner,
1998 cited in Gerger, et al., 2007, p.423).
This is the definition that will be adopted for this piece of research, particularly because its
focus on the function of rape myths seems most fitting for observational courtroom research
that seeks to explore the use of rape myths and their interaction with cultural narratives.
Rape myths are numerous and cannot easily be captured as an exhaustive and definitive list.2 
The function of rape myths is to blame the victim-survivor for the rape, express disbelief that
rape has occurred, and/or exonerate the perpetrator (Eyssel and Bohner, 2008). Rape myths
therefore legitimise sexual violence against women, and in doing so reinforce patriarchal
ideologies that position women as subordinate to men (Edwards et al., 2011). The ways in
which rape myths are expressed have changed over time as society has begun to take sexual
violence more seriously, however the functions have not changed. Modern rape myths are
worded more subtly than in the past in order for them to appear more socially acceptable
(Eyssel and Bohner, 2008; McMahon and Farmer, 2011). This had implications for this
research project because it meant that a prescriptive predetermined tick list of rape myths
would not have been sufficient in identifying rape myths within trial narratives. It is nevertheless
1 See section 3.5.3.1 for my conceptualisation of ‘cultural narratives’.
2 Appendix A lists some commonly identified rape myths however this is by no means an exhaustive list, its purpose is to give




                  
       
                 
                
               
               
               
                
                
                  
               
              
            
              
               
               
                
              
              
            
             
                 
            
                 
            
                  
                
               
important to explore some of the common myths and their impacts on the CJS in order to give
context to the discussions within this thesis.
The majority of the rape myths in Appendix A fit the ‘real rape’ and ‘ideal victim’ stereotypes.
Over 30 years ago Estrich (1987) outlined the ‘real rape’ stereotype as a rape perpetrated by
a stranger in an outdoor or public place using physical force and violence that the victim-
survivor actively attempts to fight. Estrich (1987) argued that this scenario was not the usual
reality of rape. Indeed, subsequent research has shown that in fact most perpetrators of rape
are known to the victim-survivor (Kelly, et al., 2005; Feist, et al., 2007; Ministry of Justice
[MoJ], Home Office and Office for National Statistics [ONS], 2013). As there is a stereotype of
what a ‘real rape’ looks like, there is also a stereotype of what an ‘ideal victim’ looks like.
Christie (1986) surmises that the ‘ideal victim’ is virtuous, blameless, and weak in relation to
the perpetrator. This can lead to victim-blaming attitudes when a case involves, for example,
a victim-survivor who wore revealing clothing, had consumed alcohol, had mental health
problems, or was involved in prostitution (Burt, 1980; Koss and Harvey, 1987; Lonsway and
Fitzgerald, 1994; Kelly, et al., 2005; Horvath and Brown, 2006; Sims, Noel and Maisto, 2007;
Grubb and Turner, 2012; Hohl and Conway, 2017). Some of Christie’s (1986) picture of the
ideal victim overlaps with Estrich’s (1987) ‘real rape’ in that the perpetrator is a stranger and
is physically strong or intimidating. Further beliefs about the ‘ideal victim’ include that they
report to the police immediately, that they remember the event clearly and can therefore
recount the experience with perfect consistency each time (Burt, 1980; Lonsway and
Fitzgerald, 1994; Lees, 2002; Gerger, et al., 2007). In fact, evidence shows that victim-
survivors often delay reporting to the police (Temkin, 2010), if they choose to report at all, and
that traumatic experiences tend to impair memory (Hohl and Conway, 2017).
Although the evidence base relating to rape myths is vast and widely accepted, it is not without
its critiques. Barristers Wolchover and Heaton-Armstrong (2008) argued that too much focus
is put on rape myths as a reason for low rape conviction rates. Their argument centres on a
conviction rate of 47% which is misleading as it ignores attrition points that come before a




               
              
              
              
               
              
               
                 
               
            
               
             
                
               
              
             
        
               
               
                   
                
                 
              
              
                  
              
              
             
acceptance of rape myths is irrelevant because most cases do not reach trial. This ignores
the wider cultural implications of rape myth acceptance because, for example, it ignores a
victim-survivor’s capacity to know that rape myths may impact trial outcomes and thus decide
not to seek criminal justice. The claims of Wolchover and Heaton-Armstrong (2008) were not
backed up by robust evidence, rather they used quotes from powerful men that showed no
critical understanding of the political nature of sexual violence. Their writing itself was filled
with rape myths, for example they referred to false allegations as if they are commonplace,
which has since been evidenced not to be the case (Kelly, 2010; CPS, 2013). They argue that
there is no evidence to support that jury decisions are influenced by myths and stereotypes,
using only criminal justice statistics to support this conclusion. Notably, however, recent
research from Thomas (2020), which was conducted with real jurors, claims that jurors do not
believe rape myths. Whilst this research is important and significant, the methodology used
cannot justify the sweeping claim that jurors do not believe rape myths. Section 2.4.2 gives a
fuller critique of Thomas’s work and argues that a consideration of the wider evidence base
developed from a range of disciplines does in fact strongly indicate that jury decision-making
is impacted by myths and stereotypes. Indeed, my conclusions in Chapter 8 demonstrate
further why Thomas’ (2020) claims are flawed.
Further critique of rape myths comes from Reece (2013), who argued that the prevalence and
effect of rape myths have been overstated. She argued that some of the commonly discussed
rape myths are in fact not myths because they cannot be proven to be false or can in some
instances be true. An example discussed in the literature relates to the ‘coffee myth’: that a
woman inviting a man in for coffee is an indication of consent to sexual activity. This posits
that a woman need not verbally consent. Reece (2013), and more recently Gurnham (2016),
argued that passive consent is possible and therefore there is an overlap between traditional
sexual scripts and rape, rather than the two being part of the same continuum. Whilst it is of
course true that some women may passively consent, the same situation can be experienced
as rape for other women. Indeed, as Smith and Skinner (2017) pointed out, Gurnham’s




              
              
              
               
           
              
               
           
consent to the initiation of sexual intercourse is not automatic consent to every conceivable
sexual act. Smith and Skinner (2017) further noted that a reasonable person might seek
clarification of consent in an ambiguous situation, such as one involving passivity. Critics of
rape myths question the robustness of the evidence of the existence of specific myths and
therefore their relevance in sexual violence research. However, numerous observation studies
have found that rape myths are frequently employed by legal professionals in the courtroom
(Adler, 1987; Burman et al., 2007; Lees, 2002; Temkin and Krahé, 2008; Smith, 2018) and




        
  
              
               
                  
                
              
             
             
                
              
      
             
             
             
                
                 
              
           
               
       
                    
                 
            
                 
           
                
Chapter 2 Sexual violence and the ‘justice gap’
2.1 Introduction
This chapter constitutes my review of the existing literature relevant to the research problem
and highlights the gap in knowledge that my research sought to address. The chapter begins
broadly by examining the CJS and reforms in relation to rape law. It then moves on to focus
on attrition stages for rape within the CJS, with a focus on the perceived credibility of victim-
survivors. Although the research project focused on courts, literature that looks at the earlier
stages of the process provides illumination as to what impacts perceived credibility of victim-
survivors. Finally, the court specific literature is explored. Overall, the review highlights that
some groups of victim-survivors are less likely to see convictions in their cases but that the
existing court research does not adequately explain why or how this might be.
2.2 The English and Welsh CJS
Criminal justice in E&W is underpinned by adversarial principles, as opposed to the
inquisitorial approach present in much of continental Europe. Inquisitorial CJSs tend to appoint
truth-seeking officials to investigate and determine the facts of a case, whereas adversarial
systems do not primarily seek to establish the truth of what happened, rather they aim to
ensure cases are dealt with justly at a fair trial in order to avoid wrongful convictions (Davies,
2015; Brants and Field, 2016). Whilst it is not possible to neatly distinguish between
adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems because many incorporate principles from both
(Jackson, 2002; Summers, 2007), it can still be useful in exploring a jurisdiction’s approach to
criminal justice (Field, 2009; Hodgson, 2010).
The adversarial system is based on a distrust of the state, which is why trial by a jury of peers
is seen as a fundamental part of ensuring a fair trial in E&W (Carrabine, 2014). The adversarial
system involves two separate parties presenting competing narratives, with a jury deciding
which side they believe and a judge overseeing the trial to ensure it is fair (Davies, 2015).
While defence barristers represent defendants, prosecution barristers represent the state; this




                  
              
             
              
                  
               
               
              
                 
                
              
                
               
                
       
           
            
                  
                
               
              
                
              
               
                
                 
                  
            
case on behalf of the state and thus the burden of proof lies with the prosecution rather than
the defence, with the standard of proof being 'beyond reasonable doubt'. This standard of
proof protects innocent people from conviction, but by consequence also protects the guilty
where there is not enough evidence to convict. Acquittal therefore does not equate to
innocence and as such at no point in the CJS in E&W is innocence established (Davies, 2015).
Adversarial and inquisitorial systems are diverse and tend to have parts of each other reflected
in them, so no two systems are identical and are neither purely inquisitorial nor purely
adversarial (Hodgson, 2010). Some argue that the adversarial nature of the justice system in
E&W may not be its dominant feature because only a small portion of crimes end up being
tried by a jury (Jackson, 2002). For instance, there were 1.51 million cases received by the
Magistrates’ Courts in 2017, versus 114,300 cases received by the Crown Courts (MoJ, 2018).
However, the possibility for jury trial shapes the preceding points of the CJS, such as police
investigation and gathering of evidence, and so the system in E&W can still be considered
broadly adversarial as a whole even though it has arguably moved away from the tradition in
some ways (Hodgson, 2010; Davies, 2015).
Adversarial trials see evidence presented and challenged in a question-and-answer format
between barristers and witnesses. Witnesses are limited to answering only the questions
asked of them; they are not allowed to provide a free narrative of their evidence and they are
unable to argue or question the content or manner of the questions posed by the barristers
(Brown, et al., 2010; Ainsworth, 2015). There have been concerns with the treatment of victims
and witnesses in court with regards to barristers’ questioning techniques, which can often be
used to confuse and intimidate witnesses and distort the witness’ evidence in order to suit their
own narrative (Jackson, 2002; Brown, et al., 2010). Smith (2018) discusses how the combative
nature of barrister conduct in adversarial trials, and the focus on winning, contributes to the
use of stereotypes in rape trial narratives. Barristers are entitled to use any means legally at
their disposal in order to serve their client to the best of their ability (Bar Standards Board
[BSB], 2020). This is often justified as being fair because both parties are able to act in the




                
                 
                
               
            
             
               
          
     
                 
                  
            
             
             
                  
            
              
              
             
      
           
              
             
              
               
                
            
             
challenge the use of rape myths and stereotypes by the defence and judges did not intervene
when they had grounds to do so. This is likely due to the importance the adversarial system
puts on judges having a passive role in the trial process, meaning judges could feel hesitant
to intervene even when they would be justified in doing so (Darbyshire, 2011; Davies, 2015;
Smith, 2018). Asserting that combative questioning techniques are fair because both sides
use and challenge them is therefore problematic, this includes invoking stereotypes and rape
myths that may mislead the jury (Lees, 2002; Ellison, 2000; Ellison, 2002; Smith and Skinner,
2012; Smith, 2018). This is discussed further in section 2.4.1.
2.2.1 Inequality in the CJS
Law is not made in a vacuum. As MacKinnon (1983) argued: “The law sees and treats women
the way men see and treat women” (p.644). That is, the legal system was created by men and
was thus founded on patriarchal masculine principles (Martin, 2005). The legal system
therefore serves to reinforce patriarchal hegemony because the law has been, and arguably
remains, predominantly made, interpreted, and applied by and for men (White and Easteal,
2016). It is not simply that men are the predominant actors in law, but that the lauded ideals
of neutrality and objectivity embedded within it reflect patriarchal values (MacKinnon, 1987),
and the law is therefore “an important signifier of masculine power” (Smart, 1989, p.2).
Importantly, Smart (1995) contends that analysing the law as gendered, rather than as male
serving, illuminates the practices reinforcing rigid gender norms rather than focusing on men
and women as homogenous classes.
Acknowledging the heterogeneity of men and women reveals further inequalities perpetuated
by and within the CJS. MacKinnon (2005) noted that legal procedures are established from
middle-class values and, similarly, Naffine (1990) and Hudson (2006) noted the salience of
white elitism in criminal justice discourses and practices. That is, classism and racism are
reproduced within the CJS and therefore the treatment of the men and women who encounter
it is determined by the extent to which they are perceived to resemble the white middle-class
male (Hudson, 2006). Indeed, research suggests that minoritised men and women are




              
                
             
             
           
             
              
              
              
             
   
                
               
             
                 
    
         
              
                
              
                   
                  
               
                
              
              
             
stereotyping (Cemlyn et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2009; Parmar, 2011; Quinton, 2011; Minhas
and Walsh, 2018) and they are more likely to be prosecuted and imprisoned for some crimes,
including domestic and sexual violence (Lammy, 2017). Some argue that this could be
because the legal profession is over-representative of white men and the educational and
social elite (McLaughlin and Muncie, 1996; Judicial Diversity Taskforce, 2012; Judicial
Diversity Committee, 2017; Justice, 2017; MoJ, 2020). Indeed, those working within the legal
profession have publicly noted the embedded racism within it, referring not only to those
encountering the system but also those working within it (Herbert, 2016; Kentish, 2017). This
was further reflected by Black barristers drawing attention to the frequency with which they
are mistaken for defendants by colleagues and court staff (Blackall, 2020; Bowcott, 2020;
Rhone-Adrien, 2020).
The reproduction of structural inequalities within the CJS is part of the reason it has been
argued that legal reforms, particularly in relation to male violence against women, can in fact
serve to reinforce oppressions in the long-term whilst appearing ameliorative in the short-term
(Wishik, 1986; Russell, 2016). It is therefore useful to explore some of the key reforms to rape
law in E&W.
2.2.2 Reforms to rape law – a brief history
Over recent decades there have been numerous reforms to policy and practice regarding rape
in the CJS. The treatment of rape victim-survivors in the English and Welsh CJS came under
intense scrutiny from feminist activists in the 1970s following the judgement from the House
of Lords in DPP v Morgan [1975] UKHL 3, where it found that a belief in consent must be
genuine and honest but need not be reasonable, as had been ruled by the judge in the original
case. This established the standard of mens rea for rape as subjective rather than objective,
making it a lower standard than for the majority of other criminal offences and prioritising the
rights of defendants over the rights of victim-survivors (Alexander, 1995). In response to the
increased feminist concern regarding the treatment of victim-survivors by the CJS, a rape law




             
             
                 
                  
             
              
               
               
            
          
              
            
               
             
          
               
           
               
            
                 
               
              
             
        
               
              
             
              
regarding the misuse of sexual history evidence at trial through the Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act 1976, but failed to address the Morgan judgement (McGlynn, 2010).
The 1990s saw three significant reforms to rape law in E&W. In 1992, it was recognised in
case law (R v R [1992] 1 AC 599) that husbands can perpetrate rape against their wives. This
was important because historically rape had been considered a crime against property, where
women were viewed as the property of their husbands (Bennice and Resick, 2003). The
second significant reform of the 1990s was the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994,
which, in addition to formalising the recognition of marital rape, gave legal recognition of male
victim-survivors and removed the requirement for judges to warn juries against convicting
based on uncorroborated evidence from the victim-survivor. Thirdly, following continued
criticisms and a Home Office review regarding the continued reliance on evidence relating to
victim-survivors’ previous sexual behaviour, section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal
Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA) restricted the use of sexual history evidence in rape trials, except
in exceptional circumstances. The effectiveness of this reform has been subject of much
research and debate and is explored further in section 2.4.1.1.
In 1999 a Sex Offences Review began which sought to provide advice on creating clarity
around sexual offences and ensuring appropriate punishment in compatibility with human
rights legislation. As a result of this review the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was introduced,
overhauling much of the previous rape legislation. The reformed legislation included an
extension of the definition of rape to include oral rape and the inclusion of a statutory definition
of consent specifying that there must be a reasonable belief in consent and that the victim-
survivor must have had capacity to freely give consent (see discussion in section 1.2.3).
Reception of these reforms has been mixed, particularly with regard to their effectiveness
(McGlynn, 2010; Horvath, Tong and Williams, 2011).
Whilst there has been success in as much as achieving reform, the reforms have been
piecemeal and the policy changes have generally not been reflected in practice (HM Crown
Prosecution Service Inspectorate, 2007; Payne, 2009; Brown, et al., 2010; Stern, 2010). Cook




              
              
               
               
              
                
          
              
               
      
                
             
             
                
            
            
             
          
              
              
           
              
                
               
     
        
               
             
improving responses to sexual violence. However, Brown (2011) argued that it is not possible
to discern how much policy reforms have improved criminal justice responses to rape and
sexual assault because there is not a strong evaluative evidence base with which to make
comparisons. Brown et al. (2010) noted that whilst, in theory rather than practice, the Sexual
Offences Act 2003 had been largely welcomed, there was significant confusion, both for the
general public and legal professionals, around the issue of drunken consent as it was not well
addressed in the legislation. Indeed, contemporary high profile cases involving victim-
survivors who had consumed alcohol illustrate that this confusion remains an issue (e.g., Ched
Evans in Wales, and Stuart Olding and Paddy Jackson in Northern Ireland where the consent
law mirrors that of E&W).
If measuring the success of reform by conviction rates, it is clear that reforms have been
unsuccessful because the number of prosecutions has dropped while the number of reports
has increased (ONS, 2018). Indeed, a Government review referenced by McGlynn (2010) and
Brown et al. (2010) found that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 has been ineffective in increasing
convictions for rape. However, when considering the broader victim-focused aims of reform,
small improvements have been made, though they have been unjustifiably slow (McGlynn,
2010); for example, reports of rape are increasing, however it remains a significantly
underreported crime with underfunded support and advocacy services for victim-survivors.
Furthermore, repeated calls for reform that would align legislation, policy, and practice in E&W
with other Westernised adversarial systems have been disregarded, such as the law on sexual
history evidence and the introduction of independent legal representation for victim-survivors
(e.g., Raitt, 2010; Smith, 2018). Carline and Gunby (2017) discuss the co-opting of political
feminist reforms by political parties to further their standing in the eyes of the electorate by
being tough on crime, which forgets the importance of, and fails to achieve, improvement to
the experience of victim-survivors.
2.3 Rape attrition in the criminal justice system
The CJS receives much criticism in relation to conviction rates for rape (Stern, 2010) because




              
                 
                 
    
      
        
            
               
             
              
                
             
                 
     
               
               
                   
                
                   
               
              
           
                
            
              
              
               
                 
2007; Lovett and Kelly, 2009; Walby, Armstrong and Strid, 2010). These criticisms are levied
at all stages of the CJS from police reporting to the courtroom. The process by which rape
cases ‘drop out’ of the CJS is known as attrition and this section explores the research that
investigates that process.
2.3.1 Rape prevalence and conviction rates
2.3.1.1 Prevalence of rape in England and Wales
National prevalence surveys aim to estimate the prevalence of particular phenomena (such
as rape) within the population. The Crime Survey England and Wales (CSEW) is used to
provide national data on crime victimisation. According to this data, the lifetime prevalence
rate for sexual assault is 12.1%, which is equivalent to approximately 4 million victim-survivors.
Of this, 3.4% (1.1 million) relate to rape or sexual assault by penetration (ONS, 2017b). The
CSEW also measures prevalence over the preceding 12 months. This measure shows the
rate for all sexual assault as 2% and rape or assault by penetration accounts for one quarter
of this (ONS, 2017b).
There are several limitations with the CSEW data, particularly in terms of sampling. The age
range of participants is limited to 16-59, which excludes the experiences of children and all
adults aged 60 and above, which is a large portion of the population in E&W. In the UK, 18%
of the population is aged 65 and over (ONS, 2017c) and though this parameter is different
from the CSEW in terms of age and nations of the UK, it goes some way to demonstrating that
the CSEW statistics on sexual violence are not representative of the population as a whole.
That said, despite the CSEW’s limitations, it gives the best available estimate of the
prevalence of sexual violence in E&W (Walby and Towers, 2017).
The CSEW data reveals that rape and sexual assault are not uncommon crimes in E&W, yet
comparing the data with police recorded crime data (ONS, 2017a) shows significant
discrepancies. The rates of police recorded sexual offences are far lower than the rates
reported in the CSEW. There are methodological differences such as age ranges and offences
included, however it is the police recorded crime data that has the wider parameters so




              
               
                
              
            
             
               
             
               
                  
            
        
              
                
                 
              
              
               
             
           
              
            
               
               
                
                
 
larger discrepancy. The police recorded crime data does not include incidents that have been
reported to the police but subsequently recorded as ‘no crime’, which means that the number
of reports to the police would be higher than the recorded crime rates. However, the difference
between CSEW and police recorded crime data cannot be explained by these factors alone,
suggesting that rape and sexual assault are grossly under reported crimes.
Indeed, multiple studies have drawn the same conclusion (Kelly, et al., 2005; Wolitzky-Taylor,
et al., 2011; Hohl and Stanko, 2015; Wilson and Miller, 2016). According to a government
review based on aggregated CSEW data from 2009-2012, only 15% of female victim-survivors
reported rape and serious sexual assault to the police (MoJ, Home Office andONS, 2013). Of
this small portion of incidents that do get reported to the police, few result in a conviction (Kelly,
et al., 2005; Temkin and Krahé, 2008; Hohl and Stanko, 2015).
2.3.1.2 Rape conviction rates in England and Wales
The most comprehensive way to measure conviction rates would be to calculate the number
of convictions against the number of crimes committed (Walby, et al., 2010). However, it is not
possible to do this accurately because, whilst many women who do not report to the police do
identify their experience as rape and consciously choose not to report it, research suggests
there are also a significant number of victim-survivors who do not recognise what has
happened to them as rape or assault (Payne, 2009; Jordan, 2012; Wilson and Miller, 2016)
and therefore would not have reported it. Although the CSEW questions for sexual
victimisation are behaviour-based, describing rape behaviours rather than asking whether a
person has been raped, victim-survivors who do not identify their experiences as rape or
assault still may not identify their experiences as such when asked behaviour-based
questions. This means that whilst the estimate presented by the MOJ, Home Office and ONS
(2013) is that only 15% of female victim-survivors reported rape and serious sexual assault to
the police, the true figure could in fact be much lower. Therefore, conviction rates are best





               
              
          
             
                  
              
             
       
                 
                 
            
                 
             
               
             
            
              
              
              
                 
                
               
        
 
                   
                  
                   
               
                
                 
                   
In the year ending March 2020 the police recorded 55,130 rapes (ONS, 2020) and according
to CPS data, 2,102 rape-flagged3 cases were prosecuted (CPS, 2020d) and there were 1,439
convictions (CPS, 2020d). The figures for rape-only-flagged prosecutions and convictions
were much smaller, with 711 completed prosecutions and 416 convictions (CPS, 2020d). This
shows that at best, the conviction rate for rape was 2.6% and at worst less than 1.3%. These
figures represent a significant drop from three years earlier, which has caused many women’s
organisations and commentators to call it the effective decriminalisation of rape (Bindel, 2019;
CWJ et al., 2020; Siddique, 2020).
A significant drawback of the national figures outlined thus far is that they can only tell the
story of victim-survivors as a homogenous group, yet it is known that factors such as age can
impact on prevalence rates. For example, victim-survivors aged 16-24 were significantly more
likely than other age groups to experience sexual assault in the 12 months up to March 2017
(ONS, 2018). Relatedly, students were more likely to experience sexual assault during that
same year compared to adults in any other occupation (ONS, 2018). A survey of 4,491
students and recent graduates from 153 higher education institutions found that sexual assault
victimisation was significantly higher for female and non-binary students than for male
students (48% and 46% versus 17%) and that 54% of disabled students had experienced
sexual assault (The Student Room and Revolt Sexual Assault, 2018). Although not all young
people are students and not all students are young people, statistics show that approximately
1 in 3 people aged 18-24 are in full-time education (ONS, 2016) and the number of students
aged over 25 declined between 2010 and 2016, with only a slight rise in 2016/17 (Universities,
2018). Thus, whilst student data cannot be correlated with age, it does still provide useful
insights into prevalence in relation to age.
3 According to the CPS: “The CPS records data in relation to ‘rape flagged’ cases. The data does not
constitute official statistics. The flag is applied to CPS files from the start of the case following an
initial allegation of rape. This flag will remain in place even if the decision is taken to charge an
offence other than rape, or where a rape charge is subsequently amended. Data on rape
prosecutions includes not only cases resulting in a conviction for rape, but also cases initially flagged
as rape where a conviction was obtained for an alternative or lesser offence” (CPS, 2018 [FOI letter]).




            
               
               
               
                 
             
               
            
                
            
              
          
                
                
               
               
               
         
                 
             
             
              
               
              
            
              
            
                
There is limited evidence available regarding sexual violence victimisation of older people
(aged 60 and over) because the CSEW only covers ages 16-59 on the intimate violence
module and it is an under-studied area in criminology. The evidence that is available suggests
prevalence rates of between 0.9% and 5.2% and suggests that white older women are more
at risk than older women of Colour; however because of the paucity of research in this area
there are significant limitations to these estimates (Bows, 2017). Research by Bows and
Westmarland (2017) using police recorded crime data showed that in the older population it is
overwhelmingly women who are victimised and that the perpetrators were usually known
males who were younger than them. They also found that there were a significant minority of
cases where the perpetrator was the victim-survivor’s carer (Bows and Westmarland, 2017),
which could be related to research with disabled people that indicates women in institutional
settings experience high levels of sexual victimisation (Balderston, 2013).
Relatedly, the age of the defendant appears to be a factor that impacts on conviction rates,
according to a freedom of information request made by Ann Coffey MP in 2018 which showed
that men aged 18-24 had the lowest CPS conviction rate compared to older men (Topping
and Barr, 2018), suggesting that juries are reluctant to convict young men of sexual offences.
This reluctance has also been reflected in high profile cases of lenient sentencing imposed by
judges in cases involving young men (Tierney, 2018).
A further significant drawback of the national crime figures is that they are not collated in a
way that enables researchers to explore underlying complexities and links to social inequalities
(Parmar, 2017). This makes it incredibly difficult to understand whether some groups of victim-
survivors find it harder to access criminal justice or experience lower conviction rates than
others. There have been some rape attrition studies that to some extent address this issue,
however this was usually not the main focus, meaning that discussions were limited. Such
studies have highlighted that minoritised and marginalised groups of victim-survivors do have
diminished chances of seeing a conviction in their case. For example, studies have shown
that Black and Asian victim-survivors see lower conviction rates than white victim-survivors,




                
               
            
           
             
             
               
             
         
               
                
                
             
                   
             
             
             
             
                
               
             
                
                
               
                
               
         
 
                    
(Munro and Kelly, 2009). Lovett et al. (2007) also found that Asian victim-survivors saw a lower
conviction rate than white victim-survivors (5.5 vs 7.5) and Munro and Kelly (2009) found that
80% of Asian victim-survivors’ cases resulted in attrition. These groupings provide limited
understanding, though, because it homogenises groups with significant diversities within them
(Aspinall, 2020). Such disparities in conviction rates are reflected in other marginalised groups.
For example, Lovett et al. (2007) found that unemployed victim-survivors saw lower conviction
rates as did victim-survivors who were classed as living in vulnerable housing, both of which
are often associated with mental illness (Savage, 2016; Trades Union Congress, 2017) and
could also be indicators of low socioeconomic positioning.
National statistics show that women with a long-term illness or disability are more likely to
have experienced sexual assault in the year up to March 2017 than were those without a long-
term illness or disability (ONS, 2018). It is worrying then that the conviction rate for disabled
victim-survivors has been found to be half that of their non-disabled counterparts, although
there was no detailed analysis of this figure, so it is unclear whether it was a direct result of
disability (Kelly et al., 2005). Similarly, Hester (2013) found that victim-survivors having a
mental health condition significantly lowered the chance of conviction. However, the impact of
mental health conditions4 on conviction rates does not appear to be straightforward because
Hester and Lilley (2017) found that for victim-survivors with mental health problems whose
cases were for historical child sexual abuse, conviction rates were higher than for other cases.
In contrast to the disparities set out above, a study examining attrition rates specifically for
victim-survivors who were involved in prostitution showed that their cases had a significantly
higher rate of conviction than for other victim-survivors (Lea et al., 2016). Lea et al. (2016)
surmise that this could be because there are high levels of underreporting and greater risk of
victimisation for women in this group. It may therefore be that rapes involving particularly high
levels of violence and serious injury were reported which could lead to a better criminal justice
response, especially given that the majority of the perpetrators were strangers, all of which fits
with the ‘real rape’ stereotype (Lea et al., 2016).




                
             
               
                
            
     
              
                
               
               
               
               
   
                 
              
                
                  
             
               
           
            
               
                 
               
              
              
             
              
The figures outlined throughout this section show that the CJS is failing to produce justice for
victim-survivors of rape and sexual assault, but conviction rates cannot explain how this
happens. The following two sections will further explore the rape attrition literature as a starting
point for explaining why conviction rates for rape and sexual assault remain low and why some
groups of victim-survivors experience worse outcomes throughout the criminal justice process.
2.3.2 Underreporting of sexual violence
Attrition research usually separates case exit points into distinct attrition points within the CJS,
which whilst valuable in examining the issues that could be causing it, does not take account
of the underreporting of sexual violence. Some therefore view the decision to report to the
police as the first attrition point (Brown, Hamilton and O’Neill, 2007; Munro and Kelly, 2009).
The prevalence research outlined in section 2.3.1 demonstrates that there is a very large gap
between the estimated occurrence of rape and the number of rapes reported to the police
each year.
Research shows that the decision to report to police is complex and is impacted by a wide
range of factors including fear of not being believed, fear of retraumatisation, shame or
embarrassment, and a lack of trust in the CJS (Myhill and Allen, 2002; Stern, 2010; Brown,
2011; Hohl and Stanko, 2015; Smith and Daly, 2020). The lack of trust in the CJS can be
exacerbated for minoritised and marginalised victim-survivors. For instance, lack of trust in the
police caused by a long history of institutional racism can have an impact on minoritised victim-
survivors’ decisions to report to police (Harrison and Gill, 2019).
Cultural factors can also play a significant role in victim-survivors’ decision-making. For
example, sexual violence is often not talked about in British South Asian communities and so
South Asian women tend to be less likely to disclose rape or sexual assault to authorities such
as the police (Cowburn, Gill and Harrison, 2015). A lack of cultural understanding within the
police (both perceived and actual) also presents a barrier for women from South Asian
communities (Gill and Harrison, 2016; Harrison and Gill, 2019). Munro and Kelly (2009) found
that Black victim-survivors were least likely to report compared to Asian and white victim-




             
                
             
            
        
            
                   
                  
                
                 
      
          
               
               
               
              
              
              
       
                
             
             
             
            
               
                
               
                
Asian victim-survivors were most likely to report may seem to contradict findings from
Cowburn et al. (2015) and Harrison and Gill (2019), it could be explained by the broad
categorisations of Asian victim-survivors, as this homogenises (as it also does with Black
victim-survivors) incredibly diverse groups within which there would be myriad differing cultural
factors at play that impact on decision-making.
Similarly, Jobe and Williams (2020) found that many victim-survivors with learning disabilities
are reluctant to make a report to the police, and fear of not being believed or listened to was
part of this. Likewise, it is worth noting here that, in relation to crime in general, people with
mental health problems can be cautious about reporting to the police because of a fear that
they will not be believed or will not be taken seriously due to their mental health problems
(Mind, 2007; Pettitt, et al., 2013).
2.3.3 The role of perceived victim-survivor credibility in rape attrition
A wealth of research exists exploring the gap between the estimated prevalence of rape and
the drastically lower rate of convictions, that is, the attrition mechanisms for rape and sexual
assault. This section will provide an overview of research exploring points of attrition with a
particular focus on the perceived credibility of victim-survivors. Focusing on the role played by
credibility in earlier points in the CJS helps demonstrate why researching court is important
despite incredibly low prosecution rates meaning very few cases reach that stage.
2.3.3.1 Victim-survivors’ fear of not being believed
Attrition at the police and CPS stages of the CJS is usually attributed either to victim-survivors
withdrawing complaints or police/CPS deciding not to progress the report. Hohl and Stanko’s
(2015) study, which examined 587 rape cases reported to the London Metropolitan Police
Service over a 2-month period in 2012, found that victim-survivors withdrawing their complaint
accounted for 48% of attrition, with victim-survivors most commonly making the decision
during the police investigation stage. Whilst the results from the study are not generalisable to
the whole of E&W, the case outcomes of the Metropolitan Police Service at that time were
average when compared with other English and Welsh police forces and the rates of attrition




                
                 
              
                
              
             
               
              
               
              
  
      
                
                
               
                 
                   
               
               
                 
                
               
                 
            
              
            
              
                  
to the national picture of attrition at the time (Hohl and Stanko, 2015). Hohl and Stanko’s
(2015) findings are similar to those of Kelly et al. (2005) who conducted an earlier study of
attrition in rape cases. The most commonly cited reasons for withdrawal were that the victim-
survivors feared that they were not believed by police, feared they would not be believed later
in the process, or felt revictimised by the questioning processes (Estrich, 1987; Myhill and
Allen, 2002; Stern, 2010; Hohl and Stanko, 2015). McMillan (2018) found that when victim-
survivors withdraw their complaints, police officers tend to view it with suspicion and as an
indicator of a ‘false’ allegation. Also of note in relation to victim-survivor withdrawal of
complaints is that they may not always formally withdraw the complaint, it can also occur
through disengagement with the CJS (i.e. ceasing any contact with police) (Brown et al.,
2007).
2.3.3.2 Police perceptions of victim-survivor credibility
Police decision-making can result in attrition in two ways, first in recording that ‘no crime’ has
been committed and second in deciding to take no further action in an investigation. In the
former, however, the withdrawal of a complaint by the victim-survivor can serve as the reason
for recording ‘no crime’ (Kelly et al., 2005). Another reason for a report being recorded as ‘no
crime’ is if it is deemed there is evidence to the contrary of the allegations (Kelly et al., 2005).
Indeed, police interviewees in Brown et al.’s (2007) study agreed that cases were only ‘no
crimed’ if the allegation was deemed false. Research by Hohl and Stanko (2015) found that
the police decision to record a case as ‘no crime’ accounted for 19% of attrition, whilst the
highest portion of attrition, 67%, could be attributed to the police deciding to take no further
action. This latter figure is significantly higher than has been found in previous studies, where
Gregory and Lees (1996) found a figure of 5%, Brown et al. (2007) found 14%, Harris and
Grace (1999) found 31%, and Lea et al. (2003) found 33%.
In Hohl and Stanko’s (2015) study, key factors in police decision-making were the presence
of evidence that appears to undermine the victim-survivor’s account, police doubting the
victim-survivor’s credibility, and there being a record of a previous false allegation made by




                 
                
                
            
            
            
               
             
         
              
              
             
             
            
              
           
                 
            
     
      
               
                 
                 
             
             
                 
                 
                
record of a false allegation was accurate, and it is worth considering that the rate of false
allegations recorded in the sample of police case files in Hohl and Stanko (2015) is significantly
out of line with the national and European evidence on false allegations (Kelly, 2010; Hohl and
Stanko, 2015). Furthermore, the practice of recording of false allegations is problematic
because research has consistently shown a significant disparity between estimated rates of
false allegations in research studies and police officer estimates of false allegations
(Saunders, 2012), with Kelly et al. (2005) describing a “culture of scepticism” (p.83) within the
police. Indeed, Jordan (2004) pointed to an underlying, deeply embedded misogyny within the
police resulting in the disbelief of rape victim-survivors.
As well as these attitudes of disbelief, the disparity between assumed and actual false
complaints has also partly been attributed to differing ideas about what constitutes a ‘false’
allegation (Saunders, 2012). Indeed, McMillan (2018) noted that her case file analysis showed
there were numerous reasons police categorised allegations as ‘false’, few of which were
malicious. Interviews with officers revealed that factors those officers associated with ‘false’
allegations, such as inconsistencies, a lack of detail, and level of alcohol consumption, largely
reflected common rape myths (McMillan, 2018). Thus, the perceived credibility of victim-
survivors appears to play a key role in the early stages of attrition. Indeed, Maddox, Lee and
Barker (2011) found that police officers considered a victim-survivor’s credibility as a
significant factor in attrition.
2.3.3.3 CPS perceptions of victim-survivor credibility
The perception of limited victim-survivor credibility has also long been found to be a significant
factor in CPS decisions to take no further action (Gregory and Lees, 2002; Lovett et al., 2005;
Brown et al., 2007; Hohl and Stanko, 2015). In the most recent of these studies (Hohl and
Stanko, 2015), CPS decision-making could be attributed to 14% of attrition. This continued
focus on victim-survivor credibility reflects Temkin and Krahé’s (2008) finding that both the
police and CPS chose to take no further action because they believed that the case would not
result in conviction at trial. That is, they based their decisions on what they believed a jury




               
            
                
             
                
              
        
             
              
            
              
            
             
                 
              
              
              
              
            
              
               
     
          
                
               
           
            
             
EWHC Admin 106 regarding the proper application of the CPS’ evidential test led to the
introduction of a merits-based approach, which sought to ensure prosecution decisions were
based on the evidential merit of a case rather than being based on assumptions about jury
decision-making. However, it has been argued that the significant drop in prosecutions since
2017 (see section 2.3.1) is a symptom of a return to risk-averse CPS decision-making that is
based on predictions of jury responses (CWJ et al., 2020), thus making the perceived
credibility of victim-survivors a focal point once again.
Evidence suggests that the police and CPS seek to gather extensive evidence about victim-
survivors to establish whether their credibility can be undermined (Smith and Daly, 2020). This
usually involved accessing private data from victim-survivors’ digital devices and social media,
as well as records held by third-parties such as medical, third-sector, and local authority
records (Smith and Daly, 2020). An investigation by the Information Commissioner’s Office
(ICO) criticised police and CPS practice regarding digital data, finding that properly informed
consent from all parties for whom data is held on private digital devices is not possible (i.e.,
friends and family of the victim-survivor as well as the victim-survivor herself) and therefore
data should only be requested when it is strictly necessary—with an emphasis on “the
challenge of the high threshold, i.e. ‘strictly necessary’ is more than ‘necessary’” (ICO, 2020,
p.37). Furthermore, the ruling in Bater-James and Mohammed v R [2020] EWCA Crim 790
stated that speculative searches of victim-survivors’ private records do not constitute a
reasonable line of enquiry. It is worth noting, however, that previous similar rulings regarding
accessing victim-survivors’ data did not appear to have an impact on police and CPS practice
(Smith and Daly, 2020).
2.3.3.4 Are some victim-survivors perceived as more credible than others?
Whilst the above factors are illuminating in a general sense, they do not explain the disparity
in outcomes for some groups of victim-survivors. There is a paucity of research on how
decision-making within the criminal justice process may be impacted by victim-survivor
demographics or characteristics. The data discussed thus far centres on the perceived




             
                
                 
              
             
              
               
                   
            
                 
              
           
            
             
            
           
              
               
            
            
             
      
              
              
              
                
              
               
outcomes identified in section 2.3.1 suggest that some groups of victim-survivors may be
deemed more or less credible than others. That police and CPS decisions to take no further
action is so tied up in the perceived credibility of victim-survivors is not surprising. In light of
the differences in conviction rates for minoritised and marginalised women, it is pertinent to
explore whether these groups are perceived as less credible by legal practitioners.
Stanko and Williams (2009) and Ellison et al. (2015) found that victim-survivors with a
recorded mental health condition had the highest attrition rate, with them being more likely to
have their cases drop out of the CJS as a result of decisions made by the police or CPS
compared to victim-survivors without a mental health condition recorded. The research by
Ellison et al. (2015) strongly indicates that this is likely a result of increased factors that would
cause practitioners to view them as a non-credible witness, suggesting that they are influenced
by stereotypes and prejudices regarding mental health and misconceptions about credibility.
Indeed, Hester (2013) noted that police officers commented on the credibility of victim-
survivors with mental health conditions, stating that they perceived them as “difficult to
understand, confused or even delusional” (p.13). Likewise, McMillan (2018) found that police
officers in her sample often referenced victim-survivors’ mental health when considering
whether a complaint was a ‘false’ allegation. Earlier studies also found similar references to
mental ill health, delusions and ‘unstable females’ (Lees and Gregory, 1996; Lea et al., 2003),
demonstrating the persistence and pervasiveness of such narratives. This is an embedded
notion that has long been reflected across multiple Westernised jurisdictions, often reflected
through ‘unstable women’ narratives (e.g., Minch and Linden, 1987; Aiken, 1993; Raitt and
Zeedyk, 2003; Ellison and Munro, 2010).
Similarly, disabled victim-survivors in Kelly et al.’s (2005) study were twice as likely as non-
disabled victim-survivors to have their report recorded as false. Harris and Grace (1999) found
that victim-survivors with a learning disability or mental health condition who had their cases
dropped at the police stage did so because they were deemed to have made false allegations
or would not make a credible witness. Similarly, Hester (2013) found that cases for victim-




              
               
              
           
            
           
     
            
            
         
           
           
            
   
            
                
              
             
             
              
            
              
                
             
                
 
                
                
           
                
     
as crimes by the police. That victim-survivors with recorded mental health conditions have a
lower chance of their case reaching a conviction is concerning, given that women with serious
mental health conditions are more likely to experience sexual violence in their lives than
women without serious mental health conditions (Khalifeh, et al., 2016). Nuanced
understanding is crucial though, because research has also indicated that particular case
characteristics may impact positively on attrition for victim-survivors with mental health
problems (Hester and Lilley, 2017).
More recent research (Jobe and Williams, 2020) demonstrates that issues persist for victim-
survivors with learning disabilities, who face numerous barriers throughout the criminal justice
process including inadequate consideration of disabilities, inadequate communication, and
poor access to appropriate adults5 and intermediaries.6 Significantly, the problematic notion
that victim-survivors with learning disabilities cannot make credible or reliable witnesses
remained persistent and impacted the quality and progression of investigations (Jobe and
Williams, 2020).
As with disabled victim-survivors, evidence outlined in section 2.3.2.1 showed that ethnically
and racially minoritised victim-survivors can be less likely to report to police in the first place.
Worryingly though, for those minoritised victim-survivors who do choose to make a report to
the police, evidence suggests that victim-survivor race and ethnicity impacts on police and
CPS decision-making, with victim-survivors of colour being less likely to have their case
progressed to court than white victim-survivors (Hohl and Stanko, 2015). A study exploring a
wider range of gender-based violence similarly found that Black and other minoritised victim-
survivors were less likely than white victim-survivors to see an investigation and charge in
relation to their complaints (Gangoli et al., 2020). It is worth noting that neither study is
statistically generalisable, however no such data currently exists so these provide the best
insights. Relatedly, suspects of colour have been found to be more likely to have a case
5 Appropriate adults support and safeguard the interests and rights of children or vulnerable adults who
are being detained or questioned by the police because they are suspected of committing a crime.
Intermediaries facilitate communication between any vulnerable witnesses and the police,
prosecution, defence, and the court in order to ensure that the communication is as complete, coherent





             
               
            
            
               
           
            
              
                
               
              
               
               
           
                  
            
           
                
                 
                
              
                 
             
                  
               
                  
            
              
progressed against them than white suspects (Hohl and Stanko, 2015). Indeed, the Lammy
Review (2017) found that Black and ‘Chinese and Other’ suspects were more likely to be
prosecuted for domestic and sexual violence. This demonstrates myriad impacts of embedded
institutional racism. Research examining the impact of victim-survivor race or ethnicity on
criminal justice proceedings is sparse, as most research relating to race and the CJS focuses
on the latter point; that is, suspect/defendant race and ethnicity.
Interview data from Gangoli et al. (2020) suggest that some minoritised victim-survivors
consider that institutional racism had tangible impacts on their ability to access justice, and
those with insecure immigration status felt this more acutely and said that their status was a
barrier to criminal justice for them. Indeed, Mason et al. (2009) found that victim-survivors with
insecure immigration status are significantly limited in their ability to access justice by their
confusion about their legal status. Research from the US has noted that the perception of
racially minoritised victim-survivors as being likely to make false reports is also tied up with
their socioeconomic positioning (Belknap, 2010; Armstrong and Hamilton, 2013; Loya, 2014).
Whilst this cannot simply be applied to the context of E&W, it does in part reflect Phipps’ (2009)
assertion that working-class victim-survivors are viewed as less credible than those from
higher socioeconomic backgrounds. This is particularly notable because social class remains
a significant system of oppression in the UK (Marshall et al., 1988; Payne, 2013; Savage et
al., 2013) and often plays a role in the policing of women’s sexual behaviour (Skeggs, 1997).
As noted earlier, in deciding whether to take a case forward, the police and CPS make
judgements on jurors’ likely perceptions of the victim-survivor and the impact that might have
on securing a conviction (Brown et al., 2007). This in turn can impact on future attrition rates
at earlier stages because the reluctance to prosecute those cases means that victim-survivors
who do not conform to the ‘ideal victim’ stereotype or rapes which do not conform to the ‘real
rape’ stereotype are not being brought to public attention, meaning that the public (who are
potential jurors) continue to see the same ‘type’ of victim or ‘type’ of rape being tried at Crown
Court, and only sometimes resulting in conviction (Munro and Kelly, 2009). Non-conforming




               
              
              
              
              
             
              
            
       
              
             
                  
             
                   
         
    
             
               
             
              
               
              
             
              
            
           
               
            
stereotypical view of a ‘real’ or ‘good’ victim-survivor-witness to be challenged. If it is left
unchallenged the cycle will not be broken and these victim-survivors will remain obscured from
the public conscious and the ‘real rape’ and ‘ideal victim’ archetypes remain the public
prototype for sexual violence (Munro and Kelly, 2009; Hohl and Stanko, 2015; Carline and
Gunby, 2017). Prosecuting only cases that fit these archetypes also sends a message to
victim-survivors that they will not receive justice and could therefore discourage them from
reporting to the police when they otherwise may have, thereby impacting on attrition rates
(Rossetti, Mayes and Moroz, 2017; Cowan, 2019; Smith and Daly, 2020).
2.4 Victim-survivor credibility in the courtroom
As has been established through the rape attrition research outlined in section 2.3.3, perceived
victim-survivor credibility is central to the decision-making processes by the police and CPS.
The literature also revealed that this extends to the final stage of attrition as well, that is, the
courtroom. As will be outlined throughout this section, the credibility of victim-survivors is
undermined at trial in myriad ways and it is widely believed that rape myths play a key role in
these processes (Brownmiller, 1975; Burt, 1980; Temkin, 2010).
2.4.1 Cross-examination of victim-survivors
Cross-examination is considered a fundamental element of adversarial trials because it is the
process by which the opposing party can test a witness’ evidence (Evans, 1995). Thus, the
main purpose of cross-examination is to undermine evidence which damages the other party’s
argument and to draw out evidence which supports their own arguments (Choo, 2018). Fear
of this process is a common reason for victim-survivors withdrawing from the CJS (Feist, et
al., 2007; Stanko and Williams, 2009). Indeed, high profile stories in the media have
highlighted the devastating impact giving evidence in court can have on victim-survivors of
sexual violence (Cramb, 2002; Burman, 2009; Walker, 2013; Storey, 2015) and this has also
been observed in academic research (Smith, 2018; Hester and Lilley, 2018). Victim-survivors
often report feeling silenced, confused, and humiliated by cross-examination, leading to
retraumatisation and claims that victim-survivors feel that it is them on trial rather than the




             
               
                
              
       
           
           
               
          
               
                
              
                
               
             
          
           
              
              
               
           
            
         
              
               
              
               
            
Wheatcroft, Wagstaff and Moran, 2009; Smith and Daly, 2020). Similar feelings have been
highlighted in relation to people with mental health problems who have been victims of assault
more generally (Pettitt, et al., 2013) and interestingly the majority of the victims quoted in Pettitt
et al.’s (2013) research in relation to negative court experiences were female and were
referring to sexual or domestic violence.
Accordingly, cross-examination of victim-survivors in rape trials has received much criticism,
particularly regarding questioning practices which are often manipulative and aggressive and
draw heavily on rape myths (Adler, 1987; Lees, 2002; Taslitz, 1999; Raitt, 2010; Smith, 2018).
Cross-examination typically involves looking for inaccuracies and inconsistencies and using
them to undermine the credibility of a witness (Evans, 1995; Choo, 2018). This is particularly
significant in relation to cases of sexual violence because of the myth that ‘true’ victims should
be able to provide detailed accounts that remain consistent over time. This means that victim-
survivors are held to an expectation of consistency and detail that is known to be unrealistic
because of the effect trauma has on memory (Conway, Justice and Morrison, 2014; Howe and
Knott, 2015; Hohl and Conway, 2016). Indeed, Segovia, Strange and Takarangi (2017) found
that trauma memories are susceptible to suggestive cross-examination questioning, which
demonstrates that standard cross-examination tactics are not compatible with best evidence.
For example, a favoured tactic for cross-examination is the use of closed, leading questions
because they are known to contaminate memory and lead to answers more consistent with
the question as opposed to fact (Loftus, Miller, and Burns, 1978; Sharman and Powell, 2012).
Furthermore, Kebbell et al. (2007) found that cross-examination of victim-survivors often
focuses on very minute details, again demonstrating reliance on the unrealistic expectation
that victim-survivors have highly detailed memories of the event.
In mapping changes over time (1950s compared to 1990s-2000s) in the use of questioning
styles in sexual assault trials, Westera et al. (2017) found that prosecution use of open-ended
questions had increased over time, perhaps indicating an awareness of the body of evidence
suggesting this style is most conducive for accuracy of memory recall. Despite this, Kebbell et




              
          
             
              
          
             
          
               
               
              
            
            
              
             
             
               
                 
             
              
              
               
             
                 
              
              
               
                
             
evidence-in-chief, and that they were not given opportunity to give their full account, especially
during cross-examination. Despite open-ended questions being regarded as the most
accurate and best approach for evidence-in-chief, Kebbell et al.’s (2003) finding that closed
questions were frequently used in this context could be explained by assertions that longer
victim-survivor testimony increases opportunity for defence barristers to find inconsistencies
and inaccuracies (Burrows and Powell, 2013; Stern 2010; Westera et al., 2016).
Questions asked of victim-survivors during cross-examination are regularly deemed irrelevant
to the facts and intrusive in nature (Lees, 2002), often focusing on accusing the victim-survivor
of lying (Lees, 2002; Smith, 2018). An exploratory analysis in the US found that defence
lawyers use similar strategies across type of assault trial (i.e. sexual and non-sexual assault),
but that the sexual assault trials involved implicit suggestions of victim-survivor impropriety
and unreliability, whereas the non-sexual assault trials tended to make such suggestions
explicitly (Gales and Solan, 2017). The authors suggested that this reflected the existence of
laws restricting the questions defence counsel can ask about a victim-survivor’s sexual history
(sexual history evidence is addressed further in section 2.4.1.1), suggesting barristers are able
to circumvent such laws with relative ease through drawing on rape myths. Whilst Gales and
Solan’s study was based on only one sexual assault trial transcript, the findings are in line with
rape trial studies elsewhere, including E&W, which found subtle and implicit deployment of
rape myths in trial narratives (Smith, 2018). Smith (2018) also found that defence barristers
used questioning and ‘logical reasoning’ to manipulate the jury by using language that implied
what they were stating was fact by presenting their argument as the only ‘logical’ conclusion,
often by drawing on ‘rational’ ideals and rape myths in their arguments.
Rape myths, explicit and implicit, have long been found to be a key element in the formation
of defence barristers’ narratives in trials (Adler, 1987; Lees, 2002; Smith and Skinner, 2012,
2017; Temkin et al., 2016; Smith, 2018). Court observation research has shown that barristers
invoke rape myths in order to portray victim-survivors as irrational and suspicious, as well as
to impugn their sexual character (Adler, 1987; Lees, 2002; Burman et al., 2007; Temkin et al.,




            
             
                
            
           
          
                 
            
            
             
             
                
              
             
             
              
               
           
              
            
           
           
               
            
          
             
             
             
(Temkin, 2000; Carline and Gunby, 2011). These studies highlight that commonly deployed
rape myths relate to delayed reporting and the expected consistency of the victim-survivor’s
accounts, as well as their level of resistance, their sexual behaviour, and their moral character.
A small body of observational research goes beyond exploring rape myths in cross-
examination, taking an intersectional feminist approach to explore how minoritised and
marginalised victim-survivors may be differently undermined through defence counsel drawing
on a range of stereotypes. Powell et al. (2017) observed child sexual assault trials in the US,
identifying courtroom narratives that drew on established gender, race, class, and age
stereotypes in order to undermine the credibility of victim-survivors. Their analysis drew
attention to the role of structural inequalities and systems of oppression in courtroom
narratives. Powell et al. (2017) identified three core cultural narratives in their observations:
invisible wounds, rebellious adolescents, and dysfunctional families. Each of these
narratives were interwoven with rape myths. For example, when drawing on the notion of
rebellious adolescents, defence counsel were relying on the myth that false allegations are
common and the associated gendered cultural narrative that women lie about rape.
In E&W, Smith (2018) carried out an intersectional analysis of her trial observations. Like
Powell et al. (2017), she found that rape trial narratives were permeated by oppressive cultural
narratives. Although Smith’s (2018) analysis did not highlight common narrative themes
across the sample, it did delineate individual trial narratives related to social class, disability,
race, ethnicity, and nationality stereotyping. Again, the stereotyping identified by Smith (2018)
interlinked with rape myth narratives to bolster defence counsel’s undermining of victim-
survivors’ credibility. For example, Smith’s (2018) observations reflected the intersections of
class and gender described by Anthias (2014), Phipps (2009) and Skeggs (1997). That is, the
notion of respectability. For Skeggs (1997, 2005), traditional femininity was constructed based
on middle-class ideals of ‘respectability’ and working-class women’s purported excessiveness,
regarding both sex and alcohol, was therefore viewed as deviant (Lawler, 2005; Anthias,
2014). These undermining narratives at the intersection of class and gender, linking alcohol




          
             
            
              
             
         
                 
               
            
            
          
            
               
             
          
             
           
            
            
            
   
           
              
              
               
             
              
            
               
Beyond the narratives employed through questioning, another noted cross-examination tactic
is to confuse victim-survivors (Matoesian, 1993; Konradi 2007), for example through the use
of complex syntax, double negatives, and multi-part questions (Ellison and Wheatcroft, 2010;
Kebbell et al., 2010; Henderson, 2015). This enables the defence to undermine the credibility
of the victim-survivor by positioning her as unreliable. Additionally, closed questions are used
frequently throughout cross-examination to constrain victim-survivors’ testimony (Kebbell et
al., 2003; Zajac and Cannan, 2009). A noted tactic for defence barristers is the use of closed
questions to subtly build manipulative arguments tied up through the use of rape myth rhetoric
in closing arguments which presents manipulated testimony as fact (Matoesian 1993; Smith
2018). Furthermore, Smith’s (2016) commentary outlined that closed questions can be used
to stress victim-survivors during cross-examination. Similarly, both Smith (2018) and
Matoesian (1993) found that barristers frequently interrupted witness testimony in order to
control and direct their accounts to suit the defendant’s version of events. In her court
observations, Smith (2018) found that victim-survivors were constrained in every trial and that
repetitive questioning led to victim-survivors changing their testimony through diminished
denials. Likewise, Zajac and Cannan (2009) found that both adult and child victim-survivors
changed their testimony when pushed with credibility challenging questions and leading
questions (see Cossins, 2020, for a detailed review of cross-examination of child victim-
survivors). Their findings also showed that victim-survivors were highly compliant with leading
questions and did not usually seek clarification when asked complex, ambiguous, or
nonsensical questions.
Cross-examination styles have remained consistent over time, with leading questions forming
the bulk of questions and with victim-survivor compliance with this type of question remaining
high (Westera et al., 2017). Analysis of court transcripts has shown that questioning tactics
employed by defence barristers have changed very little since the 1950s and continue to utilise
common rape myths as a tool for undermining victim-survivors (Zydervelt et al., 2016).
Questions aimed to undermine the plausibility of the allegations as well as the credibility,
reliability, and character of the victim-survivors (Zydervelt et al., 2016). Additionally, Westera




              
  
            
            
              
               
                
                
          
              
                 
              
           
             
            
               
             
              
               
  
            
              
             
              
             
             
             
               
victim-survivors were exposed to a higher proportion (34%) of questions, most of which were
leading.
Prosecutors are encouraged to challenge rape myths that are deployed through defence
cross-examination (Burrowes, 2013), but court observation research has found that this often
does not happen (Durham et al., 2016; Smith, 2018). Temkin (2010) exemplifies how some
common rape myths are easily challengeable in court and that acquittals based on some of
them would arguably be a contravention of the law because, for example, there is no legal
requirement for a woman to attempt to fight off the perpetrator. Whilst Smith (2018) found that
prosecution counsel did occasionally challenge manipulative questioning, she observed that
interventions were not made at the time of the questioning and that interventions usually
related to points of law rather than addressing the defence use of rape myths. It appeared that
judges were more willing to make challenges of the defence’s questioning tactics than were
prosecutors, with examples of judges’ interventions related to repetitive, manipulative, or
confusing questioning (Smith, 2018). Smith’s (2018) observations showed that in one case a
judge intervened because the victim-survivor became very frustrated at the manipulation of
her words by the defence barrister. Barristers rely on judges to intervene if their questioning
becomes inappropriate, however as was observed by Smith (2018), this rarely happens. In
defence of the nature of cross-examination in rape trials, Smith (2016) noted that prosecutors
who do not challenge or intervene also bear some responsibility for the poor treatment of
victim-survivors.
Carline et al.’s (2020) interviews with barristers revealed a perception that cross-examination
has become ‘more restricted’ over time, which the authors contended may have resulted from
developments in practice guidance relating to vulnerable and intimidated witnesses as well as
a broader shift in legal practice culture. Interestingly, these interviews also revealed a belief
that this shift in practice disadvantaged victim-survivors as well as defendants because it
limited their ability to offer explanations for inconsistencies and limited space for impactful,
emotional answers (Carline et al., 2020). Elsewhere, research suggests that barristers do not




            
              
             
                
              
                 
           
               
             
            
       
           
               
             
              
              
            
           
              
               
              
               
                
             
            
             
 
                
   
their responsibility to protect the victim-survivors (Temkin 2000). This is likely because
barristers value adversarial principles, such as winning at any cost, and thus view intensive
and upsetting cross-examination as an inevitable part of trial (Ellison, 2001; Smith, 2016;
Carline et al., 2020). This is not to say that all defence barristers are insensitive to victim-
survivors’ needs (Smith, 2018; Gunby and Carline, 2019; Carline et al., 2020), however the
fact remains that it is the defence barrister’s job to advance the defendant’s case by any means
legally available to them (BSB, 2020). The barrister’s ‘performance’ during cross-examination
shows the defendant, their client, that they are doing their job effectively. Even though there
are more effective ways of doing cross-examination in terms of achieving accurate evidence,
such methods are not effective for demonstrating effort to lay people.
2.4.1.1 The use of sexual history evidence
Cross-examination regularly focuses on victim-survivors’ past sexual behaviours in order to
undermine their credibility and influence juror decisions (Brown et al., 1993; Kelly et al., 2006;
Payne, 2009; Smith, 2018). It is widely believed that this happens because victim-survivors’
sexual behaviour is linked to rape myths and other gendered stereotypes around consent and
normative sexual behaviour (Kelly et al., 2006). This is because historically the purpose of
introducing previous sexual behaviour was to imply consent through the victim survivor’s
involvement in prostitution or ‘promiscuous’ behaviour (Temkin, 1984), which implied that
women who are sexually active are less credible and more likely to consent—these are
commonly referred to as the ‘twin myths’ (McGlynn, 2017). There has been much debate on
the issue of relevance and admissibility of sexual history evidence, usually centring on the
defendant’s right to a fair trial versus the victim-survivor’s right to privacy (McGlynn, 2017).
There have been attempts to reform the law in relation to the permissibility of sexual history7 
evidence, however these are widely viewed to have been unsuccessful. Restrictions to the
use of victim-survivors’ sexual history evidence were introduced in the Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act 1976; however the restrictions fell short of those recommended by a





            
             
              
              
        
                 
                 
                 
                  
             
           
                  
          
               
                  
              
                  
              
                
               
               
                
            
             
               
                 
  
preceding government review (McGlynn, 2017) and research in courts showed that such
evidence continued to be frequently introduced (Adler, 1987; Gregory and Lees, 2002; Lees,
2002). Following continued criticisms and a Home Office review, section 41 of the Youth
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA) prohibited the use of sexual history evidence
in rape trials, except in exceptional circumstances.
Section 41 of the Act applies when evidence is relevant and does not relate to consent (s.41
(3)(a)); or it relates to consent and the sexual behaviour in question took place at or around
the same time as the alleged offence (s.41 (3)(b)); or it relates to consent and the sexual
behaviour in question is so similar to the behaviour at the time of the alleged offence that it
cannot reasonably be explained as coincidence (s.41 (3)(c)); or the evidence rebuts or
explains prosecution evidence relating to the complainant’s sexual behaviour (s.41 (5)).
Applications must be made to the judge in writing in advance of the trial and should include a
list of the questions to be asked (YJCEA 1999).
Shortly after its introduction s.41 of the YJCEA 1999 was challenged under the Human Rights
Act 1998 in R v A. It was ruled that sexual history evidence relating to behaviour with the
defendant did not need to be ‘unusual or bizarre’ because otherwise the requirements could
be so narrow that they impinge on the defendant’s right to a fair trial. This ruling resulted in
greater judicial discretion in deciding when to allow sexual history evidence into court. This
ruling has been criticised by McGlynn (2017) for relying on the ‘twin myths’. She argues that
previous sexual behaviour is irrelevant to the issue of consent because consent is an ongoing
process that is specific to each encounter and each act within an encounter. Similar arguments
have been made by Smith (2018) and Pisconti (2013). Dent and Paul (2017) argue that this
assertion misunderstands the law regarding consent in rape cases because previous sexual
behaviours can point to a defendant’s reasonable belief in consent. However, McGlynn (2018)
points out that laws in Canada prohibit the use of sexual history evidence to demonstrate





               
                  
            
             
                
            
           
            
             
            
                
       
                
                
                 
             
              
               
           
               
                 
             
                  
           
               
              
                
               
McGlynn (2017) contends that R v A was misinterpreted in a subsequent ruling in the high-
profile retrial of Ched Evans in 2016 (R v Evans [2016]). It was ruled that evidence relating to
the victim-survivor’s sexual behaviour with third-parties could be adduced because it was
sufficiently similar as it showed the victim-survivor had used similar phrases and sexual
positions with other sexual partners. This ruling is criticised because R v A was not intended
to relate to third-party sexual encounters (McGlynn, 2017). Further criticism has come
because the sexual behaviour in question is unremarkable when considered against
pornographic tropes and popular sexual behaviours (Smith 2018). This broadens the meaning
of “unusual and bizarre” to become relevant for everyday sexual encounters because the
behaviour in question could reasonably be considered a coincidence (McGlynn 2018). Thus
McGlynn (2017, 2018) considers R v Evans has widened the scope of evidence that can be
adduced under s.41 of the YJCEA.
This assertion has been criticised by Dent and Paul (2017) who use case law to demonstrate
that the ‘floodgates’ have not been opened with regards to what evidence can be adduced on
the grounds of similarity, however as McGlynn (2018) pointed out, not a great deal of time had
passed for concerns to be rebutted and their comparisons were problematic because of
differences in the type of evidence. Thomason (2018) also asserts that concerns about the
‘floodgates’ are unfounded, arguing that the Court of Appeal’s rationale is so unclear in Evans
that it is unlikely to be useable as case law.
There is little contemporary research relating to the use of sexual history evidence in court.
Kelly et al. (2006) evaluated the use of sexual history evidence and found that the YJCEA was
ineffective, with rules and procedures often not being properly followed by legal personnel.
This evaluation is widely cited but is now dated and has been criticised for its narrow focus on
rape and female victim-survivors only (Hoyano, 2019). Whilst subsequent studies have
supported the findings of Kelly et al. (2006), the methodologies have not been as robust
(Hoyano, 2019). Where Kelly et al. (2006) used a multiple method approach specifically to
examine the use of s.41, most subsequent studies (Durham, et al., 2017; Temkin, et al., 2018;




            
              
               
      
             
             
               
              
             
              
                
           
             
             
            
              
               
                
              
            
            
              
                
               
              
              
              
               
Research from other jurisdictions, however, demonstrates that the use of sexual history
evidence is a widespread problem that remains pervasive despite a range of attempts at
reform (Burman et al., 2007; Burman, 2009; Hanly et al., 2009; MacDonald and Tinsley, 2011;
Spohn and Horney, 2013; Cowan, 2020).
Temkin, et al.’s (2018) observations found that third party sexual history evidence was
admitted without application in four of eight trials. Conversely, Smith (2018) found that
applications were made in 90% of trials where sexual history evidence was adduced, but that
the applications were not usually made in advance. A court observer scheme introduced in
Northumbria found that applications were rarely made despite the use of sexual history
evidence being commonplace in their observed trials (Durham et al., 2017). This study was
heavily criticised by Hoyano (2019) who contended that the use of lay people led to a
fundamental misunderstanding of s.41, confusion between s.41 and s.100 (SOA 2003)
applications and the adversarial trial procedure in general. The observational findings that s.41
rules were circumvented were defended by Hoyano (2019) as a misunderstanding of informal
trial practices which are intended to ease pressure on Crown Courts.
Hoyano’s (2019) survey of barristers who had practiced in sexual offences cases found that
respondents generally believed that s.41 “worked in the interests of justice” (p.29) and that it
should not be made more restrictive than it currently is. Hoyano (2019) argued that the study
provided no evidence to support claims that late applications are made tactically by defence
counsel, however this assertion failed to acknowledge the potential for social desirability
response bias (see Furr, 2012). Furthermore, barristers want to uphold adversarial principles
which means that they are unlikely to criticise the implementation of laws. Another significant
finding from Hoyano (2019) was that s.41 is a complex piece of law that even experienced
barristers need to re-read frequently and there was a strong consensus that it should be
redrafted for clarity. This is important because following the Evans ruling several proposals for
amending s.41 to increase its effectiveness were put forward but were unsuccessful due to
the political climate in E&W after the EU referendum (Thomason, 2018). Whilst Hoyano (2019)




                
             
               
  
              
             
            
             
            
              
       
       
              
              
              
               
             
              
             
           
             
            
            
             
     
               
              
            
(2018) and Stark (2017) who argue for redrafting s.41 because it is complex and unwieldly in
its current form. Thus, whilst the effectiveness and implementation of s.41 remains contested,
scholars from both sides seem to agree that s.41 should be amended, albeit for different
reasons.
It is worth noting that in April 2018 procedural amendments for adducing sexual history
evidence came into force (Practice Direction (CA Crim Div: Criminal Practice Directions 2015:
Amendment No.6) [2018] EWCA Crim 516). The amendments seek to ensure compliance
regarding sexual history evidence restrictions and that rules are applied consistently and not
circumvented (Brewis, 2018). The research and commentary previously outlined in this section
pre-date this change and there is currently no research available that examines what impacts
this change has had in practice.
2.4.1.2 The use of mental health records
Kelly et al. (2006) found that third-party evidence relating to victim-survivors’ health and social
care history is often sought, usually via records from social services, medical records, and/or
counselling records (see also, Smith and Daly, 2020). Concerns have been raised by multiple
charities, as well as within academia, regarding the use of mental health records by defence
barristers as a tool for undermining victim-survivor credibility (Temkin, 2002; Ellison, 2009). It
is argued that such records are used to portray the victim-survivor as ‘crazy’, damaged,
disturbed and untrustworthy, and thus someone who cannot be trusted to provide reliable
evidence (Temkin, 2002; Ellison, 2009). Indeed, precisely these attitudes have been
highlighted in research related to earlier stages of attrition (see section 2.3.3.4). These
portrayals play into rape myths regarding false accusations and stereotypes about ‘hysterical’
women. They also play into prejudices and misconceptions about mental health more
generally which are common in the English population (Mehta, et al., 2009; Evans-Lacko,
Henderson and Thornicroft, 2013).
Ellison (2009) outlined a case where a depression diagnosis was seemingly used to imply that
the victim-survivor was ‘emotionally unstable’ and was therefore likely to have lied. In another




                
             
              
            
         
          
                
   
                 
               
              
             
            
              
              
   
                
   
             
           
           
         
     
           
                 
               
                
             
       
imply that she deliberately sought out harm, thus consented to the incident in question. In both
these cases, the mental health problems discussed were historic rather than current (Ellison,
2009), arguably further adding to their irrelevance to the cases on trial. Repeat victimisation,
despite being common, is also used to undermine the credibility of victim-survivors.
International research has indicated that diagnoses of post-traumatic stress
disorder/syndrome have been used to suggest that victim-survivors were experiencing
flashbacks at the time of the assault and were therefore confused about the nature of the
encounter (Wilkinson-Ryan, 2005).
The Court of Appeal ruling in R v Tine (in relation to burglary) upheld that psychiatric history
was irrelevant to the credibility of the witness and was therefore disallowed, however it offered
no guidance as to determining relevance nor to the potential prejudicial impact of such
questioning (Ellison, 2009). This means it remains up to individual judges to determine
whether mental health history can be relevant for cross-examination. Ellison (2009) argues
that even where evidence regarding mental health history is disallowed during trial by the
judge, the prejudicial damage with regards to juror perceptions of credibility may already have
been done.
Notably, looking to Scots Law, the appeal court in Branney v HM Advocate [2014] HCJAC 78
asserted that:
“It is by no means clear that…a bare statement that a complainer had
suffered from severe depression as a result of the appellant's conduct
would have provided legitimate ground for exploring her mental health in
evidence. We are unaware of any automatic association between
depression and lack of credibility.”
This reflects Ellison’s (2009) argument “that cross-examination intended to impugn credibility
should be allowed only if it is shown that a witness’s capacity or disposition to provide reliable
evidence is negatively affected by a mental illness or disorder” (p.43), however this has not
been successfully taken up as a matter for reform in E&W so victim-survivors continue to have
limited protections with regards to mental health history being used to undermine their




              
            
               
              
                  
             
             
             
                
                 
               
                 
    
        
              
               
            
               
               
               
              
               
       
      
                 
              
                
              
In addition to the potential impact on perceived credibility and juror decision-making, the use
of third-party records relating to mental health can negatively impact a victim-survivor’s
recovery. This is because it is widely acknowledged within the CJS that these records are
regularly used at trial by defence barristers, so victim-survivors were often advised by police
and CPS not to seek therapy or counselling prior to trial because the defence could use it to
challenge the validity of their evidence (Temkin, 2002; Rossetti, Mayes and Moroz, 2017).
This limits victim-survivors’ access to support following victimisation and is counter to the
Government’s Victims Strategy (HM Government, 2018) which includes a promise to “make it
easier for people who have suffered a crime to cope, recover, and move on with rebuilding
their lives” (p.6). It is reassuring that new draft guidance made available by the CPS in October
2020 recognises and seeks to address this issue through the formulation of a toolkit for
prosecutors (CPS, 2020b, 2020c), however it is too soon to tell what the impacts of this change
will be going forward.
2.4.2 Impact of rape myths on jury decision-making
The impact of rape myths on jury decision-making has been subject of much academic
research. This is because it is believed that many jurors may hold prejudicial views that
influence their deliberations and verdicts (Conaghan and Russell, 2014). This notion is
strongly contested, however, as will be outlined later in this section (see also discussion in
1.2.4). There is a wealth of research that suggests rape myth acceptance is relatively high
within the general population (see, for example, Gerger, et al., 2007; Bohner, et al., 2009),
which is arguably relevant because jurors come from the general population, however it is
beyond the scope of this review to explore that body of evidence. This section therefore
focuses on literature explicitly related to juries.
2.4.2.1 Do jurors believe rape myths?
The Juries Act 1974 (s.20) was amended by s.74 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015
to provide that it is an offence to “disclose information about statements made, opinions
expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their




                 
             
              
              
          
            
            
            
                
            
  
              
               
              
              
              
             
                
                  
                  
           
             
   
              
               
                
                 
                 
 
               
     
the Contempt of Court Act 1981. Thus, research with real jurors is not permitted in E&W. An
exception to this was made for a recently published research project (Thomas, 2020).8 
Thomas’ (2020) research involved asking people who had just finished serving on a jury
whether they agreed with rape myth statements. Most jurors overwhelmingly said they did not
agree with the rape myth statements. Thomas therefore asserted that:
“the claim…that "Research shows that jurors accept commonly held rape myths
resulting in many incorrect not guilty verdicts" is incorrect. The research also
reveals that previous claims of widespread "juror bias" in sexual offences cases
are not valid. Jurors at court do not hold the same views on these issues as
reported in public opinion polls and "mock" jury research using students and
volunteers” (p.15).
This assertion is problematic, however. First, it flatly dismisses a substantial body of evidence
gathered over several decades across a wide range of disciplines using a wide range of
methods (outlined below). Whilst Thomas’ (2020) study is important, it does not invalidate the
existing evidence base. Secondly, there are a number of significant limitations to the study.
For example, Leverick (2020) argued that research with actual jurors would have inherent flaws
because it would rely on self-reporting. Moreover, the statements jurors were asked about
were clear rape myth statements that were void of any context, for example: “If a person
doesn’t physically fight back, you can’t really say it was a rape” and “If a woman sends seriously
explicit texts or messages to a man she should not accuse him of rape later on” (see Thomas,
2020, pp.12-15, for other example statements). Such statements have clear socially
acceptable answers (Leverick, 2020) and thus answers are subject to social desirability bias
(Fisher, 1993).
Decades of court observation research shows that rape myths are rarely deployed in such
plain terms by barristers (Adler, 1987; Lees, 2002; Temkin et al., 2018; Smith, 2018). Indeed,
the majority of Thomas’ (2020) jurors had not served on sexual offences trials and thus were
highly unlikely to have been exposed to rape myths in the context in which they are deployed
at trial. Furthermore, Ellison and Munro (2010a) found that even jurors who rated low on rape
8 Therefore, any reference to findings about juries/jurors within this section refers to mock juries/jurors




            
             
               
                
                 
                 
              
             
               
            
             
                 
              
            
          
             
               
                
               
  
        
                
                
            
               
  
              
               
myth acceptance scales voiced problematic views during deliberations. Indeed, it is well
established that asking people whether they believe rape myths in the abstract produces
different results to asking people about them in an applied context (Chalmers et al., 2019;
Leverick, 2020). To illustrate, Page (2010) found that 93% of police officers in her study said
they believe that any woman can be raped, yet 19% said they were unlikely to believe the
victim-survivor in a case of marital rape and 44% said they were unlikely to believe a woman
in prostitution who reported being raped. This highlights the nuances within narratives and the
complexity in how rape myths impact decision-making, which demonstrates that lists of myths
are not able to fully capture the wide range of ways in which beliefs manifest.
Quantitative-based mock jury research consistently shows that rape myths do influence jury
decision-making. A meta-analysis by Dinos et al. (2015) revealed that individuals who hold
mythic beliefs about rape are more likely to acquit. Leverick (2020) built on Dinos et al.’s (2015)
meta-analysis, adding a further 19 studies for analysis. Like Dinos et al. (2015), Leverick
(2020) found a significant relationship between rape myth acceptance and guilt judgements.
Leverick’s (2020) extensive analysis also overwhelmingly found a significant relationship
between high rape myth acceptance and victim-blaming attitudes in relation to the given
scenario in each study. Though the quantitative studies included in the analyses were on the
lower end of realism (e.g., no re-enactments (live nor video) and no group deliberations), it is
significant that they find abstract views do translate to views about a specific case (Leverick,
2020).
2.4.2.2 Do rape myths feature in jury deliberations?
As a consequence of the restrictions on jury deliberations, research on this topic tends to use
the mock jury method. The method itself has many variations within it, for example some use
vignettes whereas others use highly realistic reconstructions with real legal practitioners, and
not all studies include group deliberations (see Leverick, 2020 for a wider discussion of mock
jury methods).
Research has shown that jurors (on non-rape cases) tend to perceive witness testimony as




              
                
              
            
             
              
                
              
               
             
              
     
                
               
                
                
               
               
              
              
            
             
              
              
                
             
             
        
credibility is undermined if the witness cannot recall a specific detail when asked, regardless
of the insignificance of that detail (Bell and Loftus, 1989; Brewer et al., 1999; Potter and
Brewer, 1999; Brewer and Burke, 2002; Borckardt, Sprohge and Nash, 2003). Westera, et al.
(2016) have argued that detailed accounts from victim-survivors could be deemed more
credible than vague accounts, noting that ‘gruesome details’ are better. Indeed, Ellison and
Munro’s (2015) mock jury research specific to rape trials found that jurors considered the
consistency of a story to be an indicator of credibility. As previously discussed in section 2.4.1,
the expectation of consistent and detailed accounts is unrealistic because of the impact trauma
has on memory. Relatedly, Batchelder et al., (2004), Taylor and Joudo (2005) and Ellison and
Munro (2009a, 2013) found that jurors held strong expectations consistent with rape myths
about how much distress victim-survivors should show when giving their accounts; that is, that
credible victim-survivors show distress.
Ellison and Munro (2009a; 2009b; 2009c) also found that, contrary to the 'real rape' myth, their
mock jurors understood that most rape is committed by someone known to the victim. Whilst
this is a reassuring finding, that same study did however find that the jurors held persistent
beliefs around the level of resistance a victim-survivor should give and the level of injury they
should sustain in order for them to be deemed credible (Ellison and Munro, 2009a; 2009b;
2009c). The expectation of resistance and injury was also found in earlier (Taylor and Joudo,
2005; Finch and Munro, 2006) and subsequent (Ellison and Munro, 2013; Chalmers et al.,
2019) mock jury research. In addition to the expectation of resistance, Taylor and Joudo
(2005) found other juror attitudes consistent with rape myths relating to victim-survivors’
behaviour before, during, and after rape, such as delaying reporting and maintaining contact
with the defendant. Thus, when victim-survivors had not acted in congruence with the jurors’
expectations, it undermined the credibility of the victim-survivor and for some jurors served as
a rationale for delivering a verdict of not guilty (Taylor and Joudo, 2005). Indeed, Franiuk, Luca
and Robinson (2019) found that victim-survivor behaviour is the most important factor for
consideration for jurors and that consideration only moves to the defendant when the victim-




                
               
                
             
               
               
                
           
        
             
               
             
                
            
             
             
            
            
           
                
              
             
              
  
            
            
              
             
Batchelder et al. (2004) found that rape myths were a regular feature in deliberations in their
study, including the notion of regretted drunken sex. Indeed, Gunby et al. (2012) found this
was a common narrative in their focus group research, with it being linked to the common
misconception that false allegations of rape are widespread. Indeed, the notion of widespread
false allegations of rape was a common finding across mock jury studies (Ellison and Munro,
2009b, 2010b, 2013; Chalmers et al., 2019), even though false allegations of rape are rare
(CPS, 2013; Weiser, 2017). In addition to the idea of ‘regretful sex’, the narratives raised in
deliberations included references to scorned, vengeful, and vindictive women (Chalmers et
al., 2019, Ellison and Munro 2010a, 2013).
Additionally, Ellison and Munro (2009b, 2010a) found that jurors commonly referred to the
myth that men have uncontrollable sexual urges, and this was offered as justification for the
defendant’s reasonable belief in consent. This reflects Larcombe et al.’s (2016) assertion that
the test of ‘reasonable belief’ in consent can be interpreted widely and thus invites scrutiny of
victim-survivors’ behaviour and creates space for jurors to give consideration to extra-legal
factors (Rumney, 2001; Temkin and Ashworth, 2004; Finch and Munro, 2005). Indeed, mock
jurors have been seen to consider the victim-survivor’s past sexual history with third-parties
(Finch and Munro, 2005), the victim-survivor’s voluntary intoxication (Finch and Munro, 2005,
2007), and the victim-survivor’s pre-assault behaviour, such as perceived flirtations or lesser
sexual acts (Ellison and Munro, 2010a). Accordingly, interview research with barristers
highlighted the view that it is not difficult to establish reasonable belief in consent and that
barristers regularly reference rape myths and stereotypes in order to do so (Temkin, 2000;
Carline and Gunby, 2011). Similarly, research from Scotland highlighted that a key defence
tactic was to “create a smokescreen of immorality” (Brown et al., 1993, p.26) around victim-
survivors.
Rape myths were challenged by some jurors during deliberations, but such challenges
appeared ineffective in altering others’ opinions (Ellison and Munro, 2009a, 2013; Chalmers
et al., 2019). Similarly, Ellison and Munro's (2009c) research showed that beliefs about false




            
             
  
                 
            
             
               
               
               
             
               
                 
               
         
        
             
              
                   
                
             
              
              
                 
            
                
              
             
              
contrast, educational guidance did have an impact regarding beliefs around delayed reporting
and the demeanour of victim-survivors in the courtroom (see section 2.4.4 for further
discussion).
Ellison and Munro (2009b; 2010a; 2010b) found that jurors tended to 'fill in the gaps' in the
narrative provided in witness testimony with their own pre-existing understandings and beliefs
about what constitutes normal and acceptable socio-sexual behaviour. Indeed, this is in line
with Stygall’s (1994) research with jurors in the US where she found that jurors ignore
evidence and directions they do not understand and build their own narratives to surround the
evidence they have heard. Ellison and Munro (2015) found further support for this, using the
story model as an explanatory framework (see also Taslitz, 1999; Darbyshire, 2011). Willmott
et al. (2018) built further on the story model framework, developing the Juror Decision Scale
in order to empirically test the story model. Wilmott et al. (2018) tested their scale using a
mock rape trial with mock jurors, finding support for previous research that asserts that juror
belief in rape myths does impact their verdict decision-making.
2.4.3 Impact of cultural narratives on jury decision-making
Rape myths are not the only factors that can influence juror decision-making. Research
suggests that in considering witness testimony, jurors are influenced by factors such as gender
and age of the witness (Brodsky et al. 2010; Nagle et al. 2014), however there is a paucity of
research on these topics. There is, however, a small body of research that addresses the race
of victim-survivors in jury deliberations. Research has consistently found that white jurors were
more likely to deliver guilty verdicts and recommend harsher sentencing in cases where the
victim was white and the defendant was Black (Johnson, 1941; Bernard, 1979; Foley and
Chamblin, 1982; Hans and Vidmar, 1986). This has also been shown to be the case in studies
that specifically examined rape cases (Ugwuegbu, 1979; Klein and Creech, 1982). Later
studies have found this relationship to also be true for white defendants where the victim was
Black (Hymes et al., 1993; Dupuis and Clay, 2013). Conversely, George and Martínez (2002)
found that both Black and white victim-survivors were blamed more in interracial rape




              
                  
              
              
             
       
              
            
             
                
              
               
             
   
             
            
            
              
                
             
               
               
             
           
              
              
                 
            
culpable. Whilst the impact of victim-survivor race remains unclear, the studies do agree that
the impact of race is complex and that it is but one of many extra-legal factors jurors consider.
Thus, whilst research on juries demonstrates clearly that rape myths do impact on trial
outcomes, there is little that aids in understanding whether cultural narratives identified in trial
observations (Powell et al., 2017; Smith, 2018) impact on juror decision-making.
2.4.4 Ameliorative ‘special measures’ addressing victim-survivor retraumatisation
In an attempt to improve the experience of giving evidence for victim-survivors, the Youth
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 made provisions for special measures for victim-
survivors of sexual offences. These measures included, for example, the ability to give
evidence via video link or from behind a screen and were found to be helpful for victim-
survivors in a study by Hamlyn, et al. (2004). There are, however, practical disadvantages
associated with the use of special measures such causing delays at trial, due to faulty
equipment for example, which can add to anxiety experienced by victim-survivors in court
(Smith, 2018).
There have been some concerns raised regarding the potential impact of special measures
on juror decision-making, particularly pre-recorded video evidence, with fears that it could
unfairly impact victim-survivors and defendants (Temkin, 2000; Hamlyn, et al., 2004; Burton,
Evans and Sanders, 2007; Payne, 2009). Indeed, barristers tend to have a strong preference
for victim-survivors to give at least some of their evidence from the witness box, even if
evidence-in-chief is given via pre-recorded video (Carline et al., 2020). Mock jury research
has, however, indicated that pre-recorded video evidence is likely to have little to no impact
on juror decision-making (Ellison and Munro, 2014; Westera, et al., 2015) and as Carline et
al. (2020) point out, conviction rates remained stable over the time that pre-recorded evidence-
in-chief was widely rolled out. Nonetheless, barristers have expressed strong feelings
regarding what they believe constitutes the best way for victim-survivors to give evidence and
this can be seen reflected in their practice, for example by attempting to change victim-
survivors’ decisions on how they would like to give evidence (Carline et al., 2020). This is a




               
       
       
                  
          
            
             
               
                 
         
              
                
              
             
              
             
              
                
  
           
            
             
            
             
                
              
               
    
at a very difficult time, which could not only prove counter-productive but could also negatively
impact on their experience and recovery.
2.4.5 Ameliorative ‘myth-busting’ measures addressing rape myths
As a result of the recognition of juror beliefs in rape myths, efforts have been made to introduce
‘myth-busting’ measures into the courtroom. Suggestions for reform included informational
myth-busting videos or leaflets for juries, expert evidence, and judicial directions (Temkin,
2010). The option taken forward by the Solicitor General was judicial directions (Temkin,
2010). This means that judges can, but are not obliged to, give myth-busting judicial directions
to the jury and there are sample illustrations laid out in the Crown Court Compendium Part I
(Judicial College, 2020) to assist them with this.
The optimum time to deliver judicial directions has been questioned (Ellison, 2019) and the
Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 state that directions can be given at any point that will be
helpful to the jury in considering the evidence. Chalmers and Leverick’s review (2018) found
that instructions given before the trial improved jurors’ memory and understanding of the
directions. Reassuringly, then, Durham et al. (2016) observed that a number of judges in
Northumbria did give some myth-busting directions at the outset of trials. Other observations
(Temkin et al., 2018; Smith and Skinner, 2017) did, however, reveal that relevant directions
were not given in all cases. Indeed, this was also reflected in barrister interviews (Carline et
al., 2020).
More generally (non-rape specific), judicial directions are considered to be problematic
because research suggests that jurors struggle to understand and apply them correctly
(Darbyshire et al., 2002; Ellison and Munro, 2009c; Chalmers and Leverick, 2018). Adult
literacy, legal jargon, and complex language inhibit juror comprehension of judicial directions
(Steele and Thornburg, 1991; Dumas, 2000; Rose and Ogloff, 2001). This is problematic
because it is believed that if jurors do not understand complex legal directions, they will likely
rely on ‘common sense’ that is probably incorrect (Hans and Vidmar, 1986; Lieberman and





                
              
             
               
             
               
            
            
              
              
              
             
             
   
               
              
               
                
                 
               
                
             
               
               
              
            
 
                  
                   
    
Carline et al. (2020) found that there was near unanimity in barristers’ favourable views on the
use of myth-busting judicial directions, including the view that they are effective. Whilst Ellison
and Munro (2009c) considered judicial directions to be effective in addressing some rape
myths (but not others), Temkin (2010) was wary of their optimism, noting that their results
showed little impact on the outcome of deliberations. Thus, Temkin (2010) argued, judicial
directions are not an effective myth-busting tool at trial9 because some rape myths are too
entrenched (Cowan, 2019). Indeed, Smith and Skinner (2017) found that judicial directions
were easily undermined by defence closing arguments. Furthermore, Willmott et al. (2018)
posited that their mock jury study suggested jurors place more importance on their own
interpretation of the evidence than on the legal directions given by the judge. Interestingly,
however, Carline et al.’s (2020) barrister interviews revealed that there could be a deterrent
effect associated with judicial directions, which was reflected in comments from one participant
who stated it had become “pointless” to ask certain rape mythic questions during cross-
examination (p.55).
Temkin (2010) argued that the use of complex language in the sample illustrations risks jurors
misunderstanding instructions and may result in the rape myths being reinforced in the jurors’
minds. This is because repeating the myths can reinforce them and a highly credible source,
such as a judge, repeating it can strongly reinforce it (Temkin, 2010). Barristers share the view
that the judge’s words carry more weight with the jury (Carline et al., 2020), although this was
in regard to the positive effectiveness of myth-busting directions. The wording used by judges
should, therefore, be chosen carefully so that they do not repeat myths as they attempt to
dispel them (Temkin, 2010; Callandar, 2016). Indeed, there were calls for the original
illustrations laid out in the Crown Court Bench Book (Judicial Studies Board, 2010) to be re-
written in simpler English that can be more easily understood by lay people (Thomas, 2010;
Darbyshire, 2011). The most recent versions of the illustrations, found in the Crown Court
Compendium (Judicial College, 2020), are indeed markedly different from the originals and
9 It is worth noting, however, that judicial directions could form a useful part of dismantling rape myths
in wider society, by providing recognition that rape myths are wrong and thus do not have a place in




               
            
           
   
             
               
               
                 
                   
             
                
               
             
     
 
the language has been simplified. This is unlikely to be entirely effective though because of
the impacts of heuristics, sexual scripts, and hindsight bias when processing information
(Ellison and Munro, 2009c; Temkin, 2010; Bornstein and Greene, 2011).
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has reviewed the existing literature relevant to the research problem, highlighting
that some groups of victim-survivors of sexual violence are less likely to see convictions in
their cases. Some research on earlier stages of the criminal justice process has gone some
way to addressing why this may be, however there is a paucity of such research. There is
even less which addresses the issue in relation to the trial stage. There is a gap in the literature
because the existing court research does not adequately explain why or how some victim-
survivors are more likely to see a conviction than others. This is because scholars have tended
to look to rape myths as an explanation for the poor experiences of victim-survivors without
looking to underlying social structures. The present research project thus sought to develop




   
  
             
             
                  
               
         
              
         
            
           
                
           
               
          
              
                 
              
             
   
   
            
            
              
              
              
            
             
Chapter 3 Methodology
3.1 Introduction
There are multiple ways to approach a research question so researchers must properly
consider the theory and methods used to frame their project. Research methodology should
be informed by the aims and objectives of the research project. The aim of this project was to
explore if and how rape myths and wider cultural narratives are used in English sexual
offences trials. The objectives of this project were to:
 Identify whether legal practitioners use rape myths in serious sexual offences trials and
if so, the context in which these are used.
 Identify whether legal practitioners use cultural narratives in serious sexual offences
trials and if so, the context in which these are used.
 Analyse if and how the use of cultural narratives and rape myths reinforce one another.
 Outline potential avenues for improving the trial experience of victim-survivors.
Methodological decisions were made with these aims and objectives in mind as well as my
theoretical perspectives. Theoretical perspectives of the researcher influence their decisions
on which methods to use for data sampling, collection, and analysis. These theories and
methods impact on the outcomes of a project and so it is important for researchers to clearly
describe their methodology to allow for critical evaluation of their findings. This chapter outlines
my theoretical framework and research design and will also discuss research quality and
ethical considerations.
3.2 Theoretical framework
This research is underpinned by feminist theory because women and girls are
disproportionately affected by sexual violence (ONS, 2018b) and comprise the majority of
victim-survivors engaging with the CJS (ONS, 2018a). Whilst there are a range of differing
feminisms, there are overarching core principles that link them. As a general starting point,
feminist theories are concerned with the oppression of women and so feminist research seeks
to make women’s experiences within society visible and strives for social change




               
               
             
                
               
        
                
             
               
              
             
            
             
           
             
              
               
             
                
   
                
           
               
    
               
             
 
                       
                
theory it is important to be specific about which particular parts underpin this project. While
different types of feminism have distinct priorities, it can be difficult to draw clear borders
between them as there is much overlapping thought (Mackay, 2015). Mackay (2015) noted
that some feminists choose aspects from different types in order to form their own brand of
feminism, rather than being guided by a single school of thought. This project has been
influenced by both radical and intersectional feminisms.
Radical feminism forms part of my theoretical framework in that my point of departure is that
violence against women is the product of structural inequalities that subordinate women and
privilege men and that discrete acts of male violence against women, such as rape, sexual
assault, or a pattern of sexual violence, serve to reinforce the patriarchal gender order
(Whisnant, 2017). Westmarland and Bows (2018) assert that all violence and abuse research
should be informed by intersectionality. Intersectional feminist thought allows for an analysis
of oppression beyond gender, which is important because previous research has shown that
victim-survivors from minoritised and marginalised groups experience worse outcomes in the
CJS (see Chapter 2). McCall (2005) noted that ‘thick descriptions’ provided by qualitative
research are a good source of data for scholars interested in intersectionality and in-depth
case studies are an effective way to obtain such data. As such, intersectional feminist thought
formed the dominant basis of my theoretical framework and heavily influenced my data
collection and analysis and will therefore be discussed in more depth in the following section.
3.2.1 Intersectional feminism
It is first useful to outline the history of intersectionality in order to help contextualise the
discussions regarding contemporary debates and conceptualisations that follow. The ways in
which these discussions inform my data analysis strategy will be discussed in section 3.5.2.
3.2.1.1 A brief history10 
The term intersectionality was first used in the late 1980s and early 90s (Crenshaw, 1989,
1991) to name the interlocking systems of oppression experienced by Black women, whose
10 An extensive review of the origins of intersectionality is beyond the scope of this project, but for more thorough discussions of the




            
             
            
             
                
              
                 
               
              
             
        
                
                
              
               
                
              
                
               
           
            
            
              
           
                
  
            
             
needs and concerns were not articulated in dominant feminist and anti-racist discourses
(Matsuda, 1991; Grillo and Wildman, 1991). Feminist thought was concerned with issues of
sexism primarily affecting middle-class white women and race studies was concerned with
issues of racism primarily affecting Black men, thus neither discourse reflected the unique
oppression experienced by Black women as a result of the interaction of their sex and race
(Collins and Bilge, 2016). Racism and sexism combine and result in oppression that cannot
be explained by sexism or racism alone, nor by adding the two together. This is because the
interaction between identities has a multiplicative effect, not an additive effect. It is also the
interaction of systems of oppression (such as racism and sexism) that have an effect.
Addressing inequality and oppression cannot be achieved based on gender only, race only,
or class only analyses (Collins and Bilge, 2016).
It is crucial to note that the core conceptual ideas of intersectionality existed long before its
naming. Texts forming an analysis based on gender, race and class can be identified from the
19th century, throughout the American civil rights movement and into the 20th century (Potter,
2015; Collins and Bilge, 2016; Romero, 2018). The core ideas were born from activism and
social justice movements in the US and gained momentum during the latter half of the 20th 
century. Collins and Bilge (2016) discuss the 'elaboration' of the core ideas of intersectionality
by women of Colour in the US during the 1960s and 1970s, where shared oppressions based
on race and class were at the forefront, ignoring issues of gender. Black women, Native
American women, Chicanas, Latinas, Puerto Rican women and Asian American women
developed a shared framework for understanding their experiences of oppression that were
being rendered invisible within their dominant social movements (Potter, 2015; Collins and
Bilge, 2016; Romero, 2018). The Combahee River Collective, as a group of Black lesbian
feminists, notably extended this framework to include sexuality (Combahee River Collective,
1983) and work by Lourde has noted age as a further important category for analysis (Romero,
2018).
During the 1980s, civil rights-based social movements became less prominent and instead




             
               
            
               
             
  
     
             
             
     
         
          
          
          
              
           
              
              
                   
               
              
            
            
               
              
              
              
              
          
incorporated into academia as race/class/gender studies in the US (Collins and Bilge, 2016).
In the UK, studies of social division shaped what has now become known as intersectionality
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983; Anthias, 1998; Anthias, 2012; Yuval-Davis, 2016). Since the
early 1990s, intersectionality as a field of study has grown exponentially and has been defined
and conceptualised in varying ways throughout and outside of academia (Collins and Bilge,
2016).
3.2.1.2 Contemporary conceptualisations of intersectionality
Intersectionality has been defined and conceptualised in many differing ways by scholars and
practitioners and was thus subjected to increased debate throughout the 2000s and 2010s.
As Nash (2017) argued:
"nearly everything about intersectionality is disputed: its histories and
origins, its methodologies, its efficacy, its politics, its relationship to
identity and identity politics, its central metaphor, its juridical orientations,
its relationship to “black woman” and to black feminism" (p.118).
There have been attempts to refine intersectionality, for example McCall (2005) and Choo and
Ferree (2010) conceived typologies for intersectional approaches to analysis, while others
have formulated it as a paradigm (Collins, 2000; Hancock, 2007a), a heuristic device (Anthias,
1998; Lutz, 2015) or a framework (Garry, 2011). Davis (2016) noted that intersectionality has
been articulated in a wide variety of ways (as a theory, as a concept, as a heuristic device, as
an analytical tool) across a wide range of disciplines and questions why a seemingly vague
theory has become widely proclaimed as cutting edge in feminist scholarship, and whether it
needs a coherent methodology or conceptual framework. Davis (2016) therefore warned that
intersectionality’s ubiquity and popularity may have rendered it a buzzword and thus
something that has, by some, been referred to superficially in an attempt to show knowledge
of the latest developments in feminist theory without genuine engagement. This is a caution
also put forward by others, including Lykke (2016; see also Carastathis, 2016), who argued
that this lack of meaningful engagement can lead to an oversimplified analysis that focuses
simply on identity groups rather than an examination of power differentials and the mutual




            
          
               
              
            
          
              
        
            
              
               
             
             
            
              
           
        
           
             
              
             
           
            
             
             
    
            
                 
concerns, Cho, Crenshaw and McCall (2013) proposed a collaborative approach to the
advancement of intersectional theory across disciplines. Similarly, Lykke (2016) viewed
intersectionality as a discursive site for critical feminist thought and as a useful analytical tool
that should be celebrated whilst also being thought about critically. Bilge (2010) and Nash
(2016) argued against attempting a unified version of intersectionality, preferring to embrace
its open-endedness, transformations, and multiplicity. Similarly, Collins’ (2015) position was
that a finalised definition of or single framework for intersectionality is not possible nor
desirable, as it would ignore its complexities.
Despite the wide-ranging articulations of intersectionality, there does appear to be consensus
that it is a way of understanding and analysing the interconnected nature and mutual
constitution of social processes and identity categories and the ways in which these are linked
to systems of power and oppression which shape social inequalities (Bilge, 2010; Collins,
2015; Ferree, 2016; Collins and Bilge, 2016; Nash, 2016; Romero, 2018). Intersectionality is
concerned with challenging and dismantling the social inequalities that are perpetuated by
social, political, and economic systems of power (Romero, 2018). Of particular salience is the
recognition that social processes and identity categories are co-produced and mutually
transforming (Cho et al., 2013; Lykke, 2016).
There are concerns that some conceptualisations of intersectionality have become overly
focused on identity narratives at the expense of a structural analysis (Ehrenreich, 2002;
Christensen and Jensen, 2012). For Bilge (2010), this appeared to be a difference between
North American and European traditions in intersectionality, with the former carrying a stronger
focus on structural analysis. Crenshaw’s (1991) articulation noted the importance of
considering the interaction between macro and micro levels, that is, structural inequalities
(macro) and subjective experiences (micro). Thus, a focus on identity categories alone tends
to be seen as an oversimplification of intersectionality (Choo and Ferree, 2010; Christensen
and Jensen, 2012).
Some argue that theorising identity categories as mutually constitutive can be problematic




            
              
            
             
            
           
              
              
          
           
               
            
             
            
               
              
            
             
               
          
             
            
            
             
               
              
             
            
towards a strict focus on multiple-marginalisation without acknowledgment that a subject can
be privileged at the same time as being marginalised (Nash, 2008; Anthias, 2012; Christensen
and Jensen, 2012). Nash (2008) therefore suggested that identity categories be understood
as social processes that are both co-constitutive and distinct and are historically contingent,
meaning that these processes coincide to subordinate and privilege subjects in particular
social moments. Christensen and Jensen (2012) highlighted the importance of recognising
that the systems of domination (e.g. racism, sexism) associated with each category (e.g. race,
gender) are ontologically diverse, meaning they do not operate in identical ways. Whilst there
is agreement that intersectionality posits that multiple identities are experienced
simultaneously, there is disagreement between scholars over which categories should be
included for analysis. Some argue that categories should be limited to those present in the
roots of the theory—race, gender and class—because doing otherwise risks obscuring the
historical context of intersectionality and erasing Black women and other women of Colour
from its origins (Alexander-Floyd, 2012; Bilge, 2013). However, others argue that certain
identities may be more salient at different times or in different contexts and so analytic
categories can be extended to include those relevant to a given project, for example
nationality, ethnicity, age, (dis)ability, migrant status (Dill and Zambrana, 2009; Lutz, 2015;
Yuval-Davis, 2016). Anthias (2012) agreed that the saliency of categories is dependent on
context, with some becoming more or less important in different social times and spaces as
well as in different social practices and social institutions.
Some scholars have warned that simplistic and lengthy categorisation can lead to competing
assertions over which categories are more important or more oppressed (Ehrenreich, 2002;
Hancock, 2007a; Anthias, 2012). Ehrenreich (2002) pointed out that acknowledging that any
facets of identity can lead to marginalisation in certain contexts risks depoliticising inequality
because it can imply that everyone is oppressed, giving terms such as ‘honkey’ as much
credence as racial slurs against Black people for example, which ignores how systems of
subordination work to cause oppression for some and privilege for others. This demonstrates




              
               
              
              
             
             
              
              
                
            
           
            
           
             
           
              
              
             
            
            
              
           
            
              
             
             
               
               
Other scholars have cautioned that the listing of categories can become infinite and cause
analysis to become diluted to a point where no meaningful insight is gained (Ludvig, 2006;
Anthias, 2012; Carastathis, 2016). Further, a narrow focus in terms of categories can risk
viewing groups as homogenous and can thus fail to account for intra-group differences (Dill
and Zambrana, 2009; Christensen and Jensen, 2012). For example, some racial or ethnic
categories are problematic because they position a large group of women as homogeneous
when in fact their cultures, nationalities, or religions are heterogeneous. Thus, it is important,
where possible, to conduct an analysis that attends to differences and inequities within groups
as well as between groups (May, 2015). Indeed, Nash (2008) argued that it is important to
examine how people are privileged by one identity and oppressed by another.
Generally, intersectionality has excluded analysis of privileged identities, such as whiteness
or masculinity, in favour of highlighting multiple oppressions (Nash, 2008). Ehrenreich (2002)
argued that intersectionally analysing those who are not multiply-marginalised (e.g., white
women) can still provide important insights into how power works. Anthias and Yuval-Davis
(1983; Anthias, 2012; Yuval-Davis, 2016) suggest that an intersectional framework should
view all power dimensions as relevant for analysing complex webs of inequality and social
stratification, therefore viewing intersectionality as an analytic tool that can be used to explore
privilege as well as marginalisation. This is similar to the ‘majority inclusive principle’
(Staunæs, 2003), which posits that focusing only on marginalised groups leaves privilege
unexplored (Christensen and Jensen, 2012). Choo and Ferree (2010) also noted the
importance of analysing in both directions, from oppression and from privilege, as this can
highlight processes that are reproducing inequalities which may otherwise have remained
hidden. Intersectionality, therefore, does not only explore oppression, but also explores the
privilege that oppression creates for other groups and the underlying dimensions of power and
domination that interact to create and reproduce those oppressions and privileges (Dill and
Zambrana, 2009; Christensen and Jensen, 2012; Lykke, 2016). Analysing in this way might
reveal hidden ways in which, for example, gender and class work together to oppress some




            
          
            
             
 
           
             
             
          
     
               
          
   
               
           
             
             
            
                 
           
               
               
            
             
               
           
             
              
marginalised and groups that are privileged (Christensen and Jensen, 2012b; Carbado, 2013)
in order to avoid reproducing privilege within the analysis.
According to Potter (2015), criminological intersectional research does not require a new
method because there are plenty of existing methods that are appropriate for intersectional
analysis:
"Instead, it is possible to develop an intersectional methodology that determines
how a research project can be guided by issues raised by intersectionality and
then establishes the most appropriate methods to be used to answer the research
question while being mindful of an intersectional framework" (Potter, 2015, pp.77-
78, emphasis in original).
I will therefore indicate throughout this chapter, most particularly in section 3.5, the ways in
which my methodological choices were fitting for my intersectional perspective.
3.3 Data collection
Qualitative research methods are best positioned to provide rich data that can be used to
explore context-specific and complex social processes (Berg and Lune, 2014). Qualitative
methods are therefore best suited to my intersectional framework and to answering the
research questions of this project. An observational method was used for data collection,
specifically courtroom observations. Observations of six Crown Court trials were made from
the public gallery. The data collection period for this project took place over one year and in
three Crown Courts in England (see section 3.4 for further discussion).
Observational research is widely considered the best method for “getting at ‘real life’ in the
real world” (Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.320) as it provides an opportunity to gather data
that goes beyond participants’ stated opinions and interpretations (Gray, 2018) and thus
avoids participant biases such as recall bias and social desirability response bias (Robson
and McCartan, 2016; Gray, 2018). As Smith (2018) noted, this is particularly pertinent for court
observations because research has shown that barristers believe that questioning tactics
appropriately follow guidance in rape trials, however observation research has shown that this




           
              
             
             
             
             
             
   
              
             
             
           
             
               
             
              
               
          
              
               
              
              
             
                  
                  
                
              
            
understandings of complex interactions, subconscious or instinctive actions, and pressure to
conform to expected behaviours (Nicholls, Mills and Kotecha, 2014). This is important for court
observations in this context because biases and stereotypical views may be exhibited by
participants subconsciously and may be the result of influences of expected or normative
behaviour in wider society. Further, there are norms and behaviours that barristers are
expected to conform to within the context of the adversarial CJS. Importantly, observational
research provides rich and naturalistic data which is crucial for developing a robust
intersectional analysis.
A significant disadvantage to using observations is that they are time consuming (Crow and
Semmens, 2008; Robson and McCartan, 2016), however the research questions in this project
require rich data that enables a nuanced analysis, which justifies the time-consuming method.
Another disadvantage is that observations can only explore directly observable phenomena
(Crow and Semmens, 2008). For instance, I can observe an interaction between two
participants and record what happens and how it happens, but I cannot know the motivations,
meanings, or attitudes behind those actions. This means that researchers draw their own
inferences and can be biased by their theoretical perspectives (Gray, 2018). For this reason,
it is important for validity checks to be incorporated in the research design (Crow and
Semmens, 2008), which is discussed further in section 3.6.
The presence of a researcher can result in reactivity because the behaviour of participants
may change due to the presence of the researcher, which may impact outcomes (Robson and
McCartan, 2016; Gray, 2018). Smith (2014) and Kelly et al. (2006) noted reactivity during
sexual history applications at rape and sexual assault trials, but Smith (2014) found that
reactivity lessened over time, likely due to frequent participants becoming more familiar with
her presence. For this reason, I initially planned to spend blocks of time at each court as far
as was feasible, for example two months at one court, two months at another and so on. This
would also help ensure I understood the culture of each court and could take those cultures
into consideration when analysing my data (Smith, 2020). This was, however, not possible in




             
              
            
            
              
  
           
             
               
              
          
             
                
               
      
             
            
              
              
                 
               
              
                
              
                 
             
                 
              
Another way of avoiding participant reactivity is to use covert observations, however this
approach to research is usually considered unethical because it is not possible to gain
informed consent from participants (Gray, 2018). This research was not entirely covert,
because I explained my presence to court staff, however witnesses, including victim-survivors,
may not have been aware. Further discussion of covert research is therefore warranted (see
section 3.7).
Observational research generally takes either a formal or informal approach. Formal
observations are strictly structured, and the researcher will have a pre-determined protocol as
to what is of relevance and should be recorded (Robson and McCartan, 2016). This formal
approach provides high validity and reliability, but it does not allow for complexity or
adjustment, whereas informal observations allow for nuanced explorations (Robson and
McCartan, 2016). This research took an informal approach to observations because it enabled
rich data to be gathered, however a data collection schema (Appendix B) was also utilised in
order to ensure consistent records of key aspects of trial, for example the characteristics of
participants and the trial outcomes.
The researcher’s level of participation in observational research is usually viewed as occurring
along a spectrum from ‘complete participant’ to ‘complete observer’, with ‘observer as
participant’ and ‘participant as observer’ marking roles that fall in between (Nicholls et al.,
2014). For my observations, I arguably took an ‘observer as participant’ role because I
although I took no part in the activity and some participants were aware of my presence, most
participants were unaware. Indeed, from the view of witnesses, I was in a ‘complete observer’
role (Robson and McCartan, 2016). Robson and McCartan (2016) noted that it is disputable
whether the researcher in an ‘observer as participant’ role can ever be considered to be truly
observing from outside the activity because the researcher becomes part of the wider group.
For instance, in this project the court included the public gallery, of which I was part. Robson
and McCartan’s (2016) discussion of the ‘marginal participant’ role, which is characterised by
a low level of participation by adopting a passive role as an accepted participant, is useful in




                
               
 
             
             
               
            
             
               
              
                
              
              
           
             
       
  
               
              
               
                  
              
             
                 
               
             
               
to some degree as my presence would likely be accepted by witnesses because it is not
unusual for there to be unfamiliar people in the public gallery, for example journalists and
students.
There are practical limitations specific to observational research taking place in the courtroom
that need to be considered. Unfamiliarity with legal terminology could pose difficulties in
understanding, although Smith (2014) noted that this can be addressed by the use of legal
dictionaries and seeking clarification on interpretation of events wherever possible. Delays are
common in rape and sexual assault trials (Smith and Skinner, 2012), making observations
more time consuming, but Smith (2014) found that delays also provided an opportunity to talk
to legal practitioners as a way of enriching her understanding and perspective. The Contempt
of Court Act 1981 prohibits the use of recording equipment in court; therefore, data must be
recorded by hand. I recorded my data using speedwriting code to increase efficiency and
ability to record verbatim quotes from participants as much as possible. I predetermined the
focus for verbatim notes, for example focusing on defence barristers addressing victim-
survivors, and data collection proforma were used to ensure consistent recording of important
data (Burman et al., 2007; Smith, 2020).
3.4 Sampling
Sampling is an important part of research design because it impacts on the usefulness of
information available for analysis, and therefore on the value of the research findings (Ritchie,
et al., 2014). For this project, a combination of non-probability sampling methods was used. It
was not possible to obtain in advance a list of all sexual offences trials that would take place
during the data collection period. This meant that the trials for observation were selected
through availability sampling because the selection took place based on what was available
at the time (Ritchie, et al., 2014). This sampling approach is limited in terms of validity of
findings because it tends not to be representative of the population concerned due to the
inability to target specific characteristics of the population (Daniel, 2012). To mitigate against




             
       
              
               
           
            
         
   
               
              
               
            
              
                  
                
               
             
          
            
             
            
             
          
             
                
               
           
              
observations took place because it enabled strategic selection based on relevance to the
research questions (Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2018).
The non-probability approach to sampling does not allow for the generalisation of findings in
the same way that random sampling does, however it is better able to produce in-depth
understandings of complex human behaviour (Matthews and Ross, 2010; Gray, 2018).
Strategically selection can, therefore, provide more useful data than random sampling. To
improve validity in this project, sampling involved multiple sites.
3.4.1 Court sampling
Previous English and Welsh court observation research has tended to take place in a single
Crown Court (Smith, 2020), however the intersectional aim of this project required that the
sample of victim-survivors be diverse and sampling trials from a single court was unlikely to
be sufficient in achieving this. Further, research concerning processes that occur across
multiple locations, such as Crown Courts, should involve observations that take place at a
range of sites in order to increase validity (Nicholls et al., 2014). Kelly et al. (2006), Burman et
al. (2007), and Temkin et al. (2018) used multiple Crown Courts for their studies. Indeed, a
review by Smith (2020) demonstrated that between one and four courts has been the norm
for previous court observation research. I therefore chose to conduct my observations over
three courts, striking a balance between wider scope and feasibility.
According to Hancock (2007b), researchers should use intersectional theory to inform their
data collection strategies because this changes the information that will be available for
analysis. My literature review indicated that rape and sexual assault cases involving victim-
survivors from minoritised and marginalised groups have a lower chance of resulting in
conviction. The groups identified were Black and Asian victim-survivors, disabled victim-
survivors and unemployed victim-survivors. It was therefore important to try to represent these
groups in my sample. I could not know case details before the commencement of each trial
therefore to increase the chances of achieving a diverse sample I wanted to purposively select
three court locations based on population demographics. Originally, I followed Windsong’s




               
            
                  
            
                
                
          
                
             
                
             
                  
                
         
    
                
            
                
                  
               
             
                
                 
        
             
               
            
            
to identify local authority areas with diverse populations relevant to the findings in my literature
review. Three sites were chosen accordingly, however a change in personal circumstances
meant I was no longer able to travel the long distances that this required. This meant my court
sampling ultimately had to incorporate a convenience strategy also. Three alternative courts
were therefore chosen in the East of England, representing areas of diversity in terms of social
class, but not in terms of race and ethnicity. To help maintain anonymity of participants the
specific locations of the courts will not be named.
The change in court sampling meant I was not able to address some important elements that
were highlighted in my literature review. For example, all the victim-survivors and defendants
in my sample were racialised as white. This meant I could not explore narratives relating to
victim-survivors or perpetrators from minoritised racial or ethnic groups. This is an important
area for future research that deserves to be the main focus of a project design. That said, my
sample remains justifiable as it was still able to offer important insights into the operation of
narratives based on gender, class, age, and disability.
3.4.2 Trial sampling
Trials were observed if they involved any serious sexual offence and the main witness for the
prosecution was the victim-survivor. Court observations are time intensive for the researcher
because court proceedings involve a lot of waiting around and 34% of Crown Court trials crack
on the first day, meaning they do not take place as planned (MoJ, 2018). This can impact on
the efficiency of data collection, therefore I tried to mitigate against it by engaging with
independent support professionals to obtain court dates weeks in advance, rather than arriving
at court and hoping a relevant trial was taking place. Although this approach did not directly
limit the risk of cracked trials, it helped make trial sampling more efficient overall. All trials I
attended went ahead as planned and were completed.
While some previous court observation studies have used gatekeepers to access their trials
(Kelly et al., 2006; Burman et al., 2007), it should be noted that independent support
professionals are not gatekeepers because trials can be accessed without engaging with




            
              
                 
              
                  
                 
              
          
                
               
                 
                 
    
                 
                
                 
                 
             
                
               
                
              
                
               
              
    
              
               
have resulted in the sample being biased to victim-survivors receiving independent support.
For this project efficient data collection outweighed the potential sampling bias because it was
important to try to gain as large a sample as possible for the intersectional analysis. In total,
14 trial dates were provided by independent support professionals, however of these only 3
were observed. In some cases this was due to a clash with other court dates, some trials were
out of area, and some were cracked and/or re-listed prior to the first day of trial.
I therefore used opportunity sampling to bolster my sample, which lessened the bias towards
victim-survivors with independent support. This sampling strategy involved checking court
listings each week and hoping that there was a serious sexual offences trial taking place. I
used Temkin et al.’s (2018) technique which entailed phoning my selected courts on the Friday
of each week to determine any relevant trials for the following week. I observed a further 3
trials as a result of this strategy, one of which did have an independent support worker.
3.4.3 Sample size
My sample size of six trials was small due to the limitations of court observations identified in
the preceding sections. I took steps during my data collection period to try to increase my
sample size. For example, I twice extended my data collection period. First by a period of 3
months to the end of 2019, which resulted in one additional trial. I then decided to further
extend my data collection period to run concurrently with my data analysis, however
coronavirus quickly became a concern in 2020 and so no further trials were observed. All trials
were observed in 2019. This is significant because it coincided with prosecution rates for rape
falling by 52% over 2 years and reaching a 10-year low (CPS, 2020), meaning there were
fewer trials available for observation than for previous studies. This was particularly true for
the Eastern CPS region (the region covering the courts in this sample), which saw an almost
40% decline in rape charges for the year ending 2018, which was a significantly higher
decrease than any other region, with the next highest decrease at approximately 25% (CWJ
et al., 2020).
My small sample is justified because large sample sizes are not always necessary for




                 
                
              
              
             
           
               
              
            
               
             
             
            
               
                 
                 
                  
                
                 
                 
               
                 
               
               
               
                
               
        
in qualitative inquiry” (2002, p.244). Indeed, it is not unusual for a single text (or participant) to
be the only subject of an in-depth analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2013). This research does not
aim to make statements regarding incidence or prevalence and therefore does not require a
large sample size (Ritchie, et al., 2014). Further, observational research yields rich and thick
data that requires careful analysis, therefore keeping sample sizes small helps to ensure
timeframes and budgets are adhered to (Ritchie, et al., 2014).
There is a large variation in sample sizes in previous court observation research. Smith (2020)
provided a useful summary showing a range of samples, which, though not comparable by
number because of differences in design and scope, demonstrated the wide-ranging sample
sizes. Further justification for small samples can be found from looking to studies based on
court transcript analysis. For example, Matoesian (1993) based his analysis of courtroom talk
in rape trials on three trials and it remains an influential study.
Smith (2020) noted the importance of transparency in reporting court observation samples
because, for example, sample sizes can be inflated by the inclusion of cracked or ineffective
trials. All six trials I observed were completed and were therefore ‘full trials’. It is also important
to note the length of trials because this has a knock-on effect on data collection. This is
because trials are usually listed to start on a Monday, therefore if a trial goes into the following
week it removes a data collection opportunity from the researcher. Three of the trials in my
sample lasted five days, one lasted three days, one lasted six days and the final trial lasted
seven days. One of the five-day trials went into a second week because of a bank holiday.
This means that half of the trials I observed went into a second week.
My observations resulted in 670 pages of data for analysis, an average of 112 pages per trial.
This rich and thick data provided critical, analytical, in-depth insights that will help better inform
policy and practice. For example, I was invited to give evidence to the Government’s Rape
Review in February 2020 because court observation research is highly valued for its ability to
provide insight into practice ‘on the ground’. It is also useful for intersectional analysis to take
a smaller sample and robustly consider the rich data on the various oppressions and privileges




   
           
                 
            
             
               
             
                
          
              
             
           
       
    
             
             
              
            
               
           
            
             
  
           
              
             
 
                
          
3.5 Data analysis
Data analysis was influenced by intersectionality and critical discourse analysis (CDA).
Discourse analysis is useful because it is concerned not only with what is said but also with
the strategies and styles used in communicating (Robson and McCartan, 2016). Discourse
analysis is diverse with a range of approaches from varied disciplines and theoretical
perspectives (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). One such approach is CDA, which is well suited to
this project because it examines the relationships between power and discourse and ideology
and discourse. It can explore how language is used to empower or disempower people and it
can expose hidden or taken-for-granted ideological assumptions that reproduce inequalities
for and marginalisation of certain groups (van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 2001; Bryman, 2016). This
fits well with my intersectional framework because both are concerned with examining power
and structure. Like intersectionality, CDA is problem-oriented, focusing on social problems
and creating social change (Wodak, 2004).
3.5.1 Critical discourse analysis
Critical discourse analysis is itself a broad term covering a variety of methodological
approaches with similar theoretical perspectives and there is no specific formulaic way of
conducting a critical discourse analysis (Wodak and Meyer, 2016). I chose to draw influence
primarily from Fairclough’s (2016) dialectical-relational approach to CDA because it fits well
with my intersectional perspective in that it enables examination of the ways in which discourse
relates to cultural values and social identities. Meaningful engagement with intersectionality
requires an analysis of the relationships between power, structure and identity (Crenshaw,
1991; Ehrenreich, 2002; Bilge, 2010; Choo and Ferree, 2010; Christensen and Jensen, 2012b;
Lykke, 2016).
Fairclough’s (2010) dialectical-relational framework viewed semiosis11 as an integral part of
material social processes. Social life is viewed as being made up of diverse and
interconnected networks of social practices, and social practices are made up of dialectically
11 The term ‘semiosis’ is used to further define discourse within this framework. Semiosis refers to




            
            
            
               
             
              
             
             
            
                 
                 
              
              
               
            
              
             
               
              
              
             
             
       
              
            
                 
    
related elements, such as semiosis, cultural values, and social identities (Fairclough, 2001).
For Fairclough, CDA “is analysis of the dialectical relationships between semiosis…and other
elements of social practices” (2001, p.122). These relationships vary across institutions and
in different locations in place and time, hence the need for analysis. Because of these
differences, CDA must be theorised specifically for each individual research project. The aim
of the analysis is to determine how semiosis impacts on power relations, thereby offering
explanations for how dominant thought is challenged by social actors and enabling the
identification of ways to overcome obstacles to addressing social wrongs (Fairclough, 2010).
According to Fairclough’s CDA (2010), social practices networked in a particular way
constitute a social order. For this project, the English and Welsh CJS is the social order of
concern. The order of discourse within the CJS is made up of a structure of genres, discourses,
and styles (see Fairclough, 2010). There are genres, discourses, and styles within the CJS
that are particularly associated with criminal trials taking place at Crown Court. Heffer (2005)
considered the jury trial to be a complex genre, made up of sub-genres such as cross-
examination. Legal professionals, such as defence and prosecution barristers, and lay people,
such as jurors and witnesses, adopt particular styles in the performances of their roles.
Witnesses are constrained in their ability to provide their own narrative by the question-and-
answer tradition, and jurors are silenced (Stygall, 1994). Dominance is a key aspect of orders
of discourse because there are ideologies and discourses that are dominant in social orders,
and others that are marginal (Fairclough, 2010). The adversarial system is dominated by the
elite white ideologies it was developed under (MacKinnon, 2006), but there are alternative
ideologies that resist this and seek criminal justice reform, such as feminism.
3.5.1.1 Stages of dialectical-relational critical discourse analysis
Although there is no set method for undertaking CDA, Fairclough (2010) does offer some
practical guidance for carrying out dialectical-relational CDA. I have primarily engaged with
stage one as a basis for theorising my research problem and stage two as a basis for




              
            
                
                 
             
            
           
           
              
                
              
              
             
            
              
               
            
               
          
          
               
               
            
                
               
             
                 
Stage one of dialectical-relational CDA helped me to further theorise my research problem by
encouraging a wider consideration of relevant theories. This stage involves identifying and
theorising a social wrong and a research topic that relates to it (Fairclough, 2010). The social
wrong in this case had already been identified as sexual violence, with the related topic as the
treatment of victim-survivors at Crown Court trials for serious sexual offences. Theorising the
object for research involved identifying and exploring relevant theories from various disciplines
(Fairclough, 2010). This has included theories relating to intersectionality, adversarial justice,
victimology, rape myths, stereotypes and identity, and sociolinguistics and forensic linguistics.
Fairclough (2016) stressed that his steps are not necessarily sequential and can be attended
to more than once, therefore this step was returned to throughout the course of data analysis
to ensure engagement with additional theories relevant to the results of analysis. For example,
social class became a dominant theme throughout the trial narratives, therefore I sought out
additional literature and theory on social class to incorporate into my analysis.
Stage two involved identifying obstacles to addressing the social wrong (Fairclough, 2001).
This involved considering: the way social practices are networked together in the context of
trials; the ways in which semiosis relates to other elements of these social practices, for
instance linking gendered stereotypes to social/cultural contexts using theories of sexism and
patriarchy; and consideration of the features of the interactions within the chosen texts, in this
case transcripts from court observations, through interdiscursive and linguistic analysis
(Fairclough, 2001). Interdiscursive analysis involves exploring which genres, discourses, and
styles are drawn upon and how they are articulated together (Fairclough, 2001). I drew on
guidelines available in Fairclough’s (1992) earlier work as a practical guide to this aspect of
the data analysis (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Stygall’s (1994) analysis of discursive
formations in the legal genre at trial was a useful complementary tool here, as was Matoesian’s
(2001) work on linguistic devices used at rape trials. Similarly, Eades’ (2012) work on language
ideologies in the courtroom and the reproduction of social inequalities informed my analysis




             
      
             
              
                 
              
            
               
               
             
          
              
            
           
       
                 
               
             
               
                
            
             
            
              
            
               
     
different participant positions, including from the position of the jury as passive consumers
unable to speak, question, or clarify.
The final stages of Fairclough’s (2010) dialectical-relational CDA provided a useful way of
thinking about the results of analysis. Stage three requires the researcher to consider whether
the social wrong is needed to maintain the social order and whether it can be addressed within
the social order or only by changing the social order. Stage four involves identifying
possibilities within the existing social process for overcoming obstacles to addressing the
social wrong. This can be in highlighting gaps or failings within the dominant ideologies and
discourses of the social order, or it may be highlighting difference and resistance with the
social order (Fairclough, 2001). The potential for identifying resistance is another aspect of
dialectical-relational CDA that is complimentary to an intersectional framework because
resistance is viewed as a key way of destabilising dominant ideologies and disrupting power
and oppression (Hankivsky, 2014). I therefore considered the possible policy implications of
my findings and have explicitly related these considerations to my data.
3.5.1.2 Drawbacks of critical discourse analysis
It is important to note that there are disadvantages to using CDA, most significant of which is
that data is analysed according to the researcher’s own interpretations rather than that of the
creators or consumers of the discourse being analysed (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000; Vaara
and Tienari, 2010). Although arguably, I could also be considered a consumer in my position
in the public gallery. Another criticism of CDA is that researchers find evidence to support their
pre-existing beliefs, rather than being open to differing perspectives (Widdowson, 1995, 1998;
Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000; Vaara and Tienari, 2010). However, according to the feminist
approach to research, no research (especially qualitative research) can be truly neutral
(Westmarland and Bows, 2018), therefore some level of bias is inevitable regardless of the
methods chosen. These issues can be mitigated against through quality assurance measures
such as reflexivity, which is a key aspect of feminist research (Maynard, 1994), and is




      
              
              
                
              
          
            
             
                
                
               
              
                 
                 
   
              
             
              
             
             
             
          
            
          
              
             
               
             
3.5.2 Intersectional influences on analysis
The wide range of conceptualisations of intersectionality means there are a multitude of ways
it can be utilised in a particular project. To discuss all contemporary articulations of
intersectionality was beyond the scope of this project and I did not follow any particular one,
rather I was informed by the central tenets of intersectionality and a range of
conceptualisations, as discussed in section 3.2.1.2. Much like dialectical-relational CDA,
intersectionality should be theorised and moulded to the particular project (Potter, 2015).
As discussed in section 3.2.1.2, some of the common debates in intersectional scholarship
are around how many and which social categories to include in an analysis. I outlined the
benefits of using an intersectional framework that applies to all members of society in order to
develop an analysis of power in relation to both oppression and privilege, which will help
expose power dynamics that can remain hidden when only oppression is analysed. In practice,
this could mean, for example, asking not only what the impact of blackness is, but also what
the impact of whiteness is, and how that might differ for males and for females (Choo and
Ferree, 2010).
Selecting categories is a strategic choice for each project because the salience of categories
can depend on the social practices and institutions being researched (Anthias, 2012). This
keeps the categories limited and manageable, meaning that focus can be given to categories
deemed most important for a particular research question (Christensen and Jensen, 2012). It
is important to be specific about contexts and political genealogies within and between
different social movements, such as the disability rights movement or the civil rights
movement, therefore each project should thoroughly contextualise and reflect upon political-
theoretical genealogies of specific intersections (Lykke, 2016). This was done throughout the
analysis of my data as relevant categories were identified.
The categories included for analysis in this project depended on my data. Characteristics of
participants became salient at trial without the choice of the victim-survivor or defendant
because their perceived affiliation to a particular group was imposed on them by barristers, or




               
             
            
             
              
                
                
             
                  
             
             
              
               
   
               
          
                
               
             
             
               
             
              
           
            
           
           
      
know which characteristics would be drawn upon by barristers, and so I was open to
possibilities beyond the core intersectional categories of gender, race, and class. Indeed, as
discussed in Chapter 2, attrition research has indicated that (dis)ability, age, homelessness
and involvement in prostitution are factors that can marginalise victim-survivors within the CJS
(Harris and Grace, 1999; Gray-Eurom, Seaberg and Wears, 2002; Kelly, et al., 2005; Lovett,
et al., 2007; Munro and Kelly, 2009; Stanko and Williams, 2009; Hester, 2013; Ellison, et al.,
2015; Lea, et al., 2016; Hester and Lilley, 2017; Stacey, Martin and Brick, 2017). Further, rape
myth acceptance research shows that victim-survivors from some of these groups are likely
to be deemed to have more culpability in their own rape or assault by the public (who are
potential jurors) (Miller and Schwartz, 1995; White, Strube and Fisher, 1998; George and
Martínez, 2002; Donovan and Williams, 2002). That categories in this project were largely
dictated by the content of barristers’ arguments shows the importance of ensuring my analysis
went beyond the micro level and paid attention to wider structures of inequality and systems
of domination.
Throughout my analysis I focused on instances of semiosis that draw on aspects of identity
and personal characteristics, both implicitly and explicitly. Drawing on dialectical-relational
CDA enabled me to link these to wider cultural values and discourses to show what meanings
can be created by the narratives used. Identifying implicit data can be more challenging than
identifying explicit data, therefore Bowleg’s (2008) work was useful in offering guidance on
dealing with implicit intersectionality data. To help deepen my analysis I used Matsuda’s
(1991) ‘ask the other question’ technique, as is advocated by Lutz (2015) and Lykke (2016):
“When I see something that looks racist, I ask, "Where is the patriarchy
in this?" When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, "Where is the
heterosexism in this?" When I see something that looks homophobic, I
ask, "Where are the class interests in this?" Working in coalition forces
us to look for both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of
domination, helping us to realize that no form of subordination ever




    
                
                
                 
                 
              
               
             
            
             
              
                
         
              
              
             
              
                 
            
              
              
           
               
               
              
                
              
3.5.3 Analysing the data
My aim for data analysis was to identify patterns within the narratives whilst focusing on social
practices (see 3.5.1.1). For this reason, I began by immersing myself in the data by reading
and re-reading the transcripts. This enabled me to have an overall view of my data and begin
to notice patterns in the narratives. It is an important step in data analysis because it helps
enable analytic sensibility which in turns helps researchers see beyond the surface of their
data throughout the following phases of analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Next, I carried out
an inductive thematic coding of my transcripts to identify dominant themes and narratives.
Inductive analysis was appropriate here because it has an exploratory orientation (Guest,
MacQueen and Namey, 2012). I then analysed the narrative themes giving considerations to
the specific formations of language, as outlined in section 3.5.1.1. This approach allowed me
to, for example, note the key role of grammatical constructions of agency in the formation of
trial narratives. Furthermore, giving consideration to interdiscursivity and intertextuality
illuminated key findings about the role of digital evidence within the trial narratives.
To give a broad illustrative example, the first stage of analysis identified narratives around
alcohol, and subsequent stages of analysis identified that these narratives often linked to
cultural narratives around class, age, and gender. This enabled me to see beyond alcohol
consumption as a tool for undermining credibility in and of itself and allowed me to develop a
nuanced understanding of how broader cultural narratives (see section 3.5.3.1) allow alcohol
narratives to undermine or bolster credibility of participants in different ways dependent on, for
example, their gender and age, thereby showing how jurors could be influenced by explicit
and implicit references or use of cultural attitudes and values.
A limitation to this analysis strategy is that my transcripts are made from direct observations
rather than recordings, so it is not always verbatim. A combination of observation field notes
and official transcripts would provide a stronger basis for analysis strategies based on CDA,
however that approach is cost prohibitive in E&W. My strategy did not primarily focus on the




             
  
    
               
                 
            
          
                
             
             
             
              
              
                
                
               
          
              
            
           
               
  
             
                  
             
            
             
             
and therefore hand-written transcripts remained a suitable dataset from which to base my
analyses.
3.5.3.1 Defining cultural narratives
I used the concept of cultural narratives throughout my analysis; therefore, it is important to
be clear about my use of the term and its relationship to rape myths. Before defining cultural
narratives specifically, it is worth briefly addressing definitional issues with ‘narrative’ more
broadly. ‘Narrative’ has been variously defined and conceptualised across academic
disciplines (Ryan, 2007). It has broadly been defined within the field of narratology as an act
of representing a sequence of events, including events, actors, and locations with distinct
characteristics (Rudrum, 2005; Bal, 2009). Some critics surmise that through the narrative turn
in social science and the humanities, the term ‘narrative’ has become overused and
simplistically conflated with other concepts such as belief and experience (Ryan, 2007). It is
however widely agreed that narratives play a crucial role in people’s meaning-making of the
world, their own lives, and the lives of others (Ewick and Silbey, 1995; Ryan, 2007). Indeed,
for Herman (2007, p.3), narrative is “a basic human strategy for coming to terms with time,
process, and change”. The narrative turn has led to a wide range of theoretical and
methodological conceptualisations being used across the social sciences, including within
socio-legal studies and the field of violence against women. There have been varying terms
used throughout the literature, sometimes with the same term being conceptualised using
differing theoretical frameworks (Loseke, 2007; Lafrance and McKenzie-Mohr, 2014). It is
therefore necessary to define the use of ‘cultural narratives’ in the specific context of this
project.
According to Fivush (2010) cultural narratives provide a “shared understanding of the shape
of a life and how a life is to be understood” (p.90). They “describe those stories about persons,
places, or things that contain consistent storylines and thematic content across individuals and
settings” within a culture (Glover, 2003, p.193). These narratives provide frameworks for
understanding how people and places are embedded within a particular culture and enable




                
              
              
              
                
            
             
             
             
             
              
           
            
                
              
                     
     
            
             
                
             
            
              
             
              
                
             
            
et al., 2018). Cultural narratives are also a framework for understanding what it means to be
part of a particular social category, such as ‘woman’ or ‘heterosexual’ (McLean and Syed,
2016; Hammack and Toolis, 2016), and enable people to make sense of their positioning
within the world in relation to others (McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance, 2011). This is because
power and oppression play a crucial role in shaping cultural narratives (McLean, et al., 2018).
It is commonly understood that cultural narratives produce and reproduce power structures,
thereby helping to maintain the status quo for the powerful (Stanley, 2007; McKenzie-Mohr
and Lafrance, 2011; Lafrance and McKenzie-Mohr, 2014). For example, in writing about the
trope of the American Dream, Hsu (1996) and Pierre (2004) demonstrate how cultural
narratives of ethnicity serve to reinforce the dominant white middle-class ideology through the
production and reproduction of ‘cultural racism’. Following a similar vein, within this thesis I
conceptualise cultural narratives as narratives that reflect structural inequalities and systems
of oppression within our society. Myths and stereotypes permeate cultural narratives and
serve to subtly dictate the ‘proper’ way to behave according to the dominant ideology; that is,
cultural narratives are “designed to maintain and buttress the values and interests of the
dominant group, and to do so in such a way as to remove all but the most banal signs of the
center’s rule” (Hsu, 1996, p.38).
Some scholars have conceptualised cultural narratives as purely hegemonic. For example, for
Powell et al. (2017), cultural narratives are the “shared perspectives of dominant groups”
(p.459), which implies there are no cultural narratives available for those not part of a dominant
group. In contrast, other scholars understand cultural narratives as made up of master
narratives and counter narratives (Yamamoto, Haia and Kalama, 1994; Richardson, 1997). As
with other narrative terms, ‘master’ and ‘counter’ narratives are not always named as such
and are not necessarily consistently theorised. But broadly, master narratives are those that
frame the dominant understanding of or within a cultural group, and counter narratives are
those that oppose or are not congruent with master narratives. It is the master narratives which
are hegemonic because they are created by the powerful to maintain their interests




                
             
          
              
   
           
                
                
            
                
         
            
              
           
            
            
              
                
              
             
         
             
        
            
           
      
               
               
a life experience and what therefore comes to be taken for granted and accepted as truth
(Lafrance and McKenzie-Mohr, 2014; McLean, et al., 2018). This makes these narratives “both
more ‘tellable’ and ‘hearable’ than their marginalized alternatives” (Lafrance and McKenzie-
Mohr, 2014, p.3) because those who are marginalised in society are silenced and unheard
(Stanley, 2007).
These ‘marginalized alternatives’, or counter narratives, are narratives that provide an
alternative, or resistant, understanding of the world and of self to those who are oppressed by
master narratives (Nelson, 2001). The role of these narratives is to “expose the lies which hold
together the ideological armour of privilege, domination and oppression” (Harris, Carney and
Fine, 2001, p.14). This quality of resistance led some to refer to them as ‘resistance narratives’
(Fivush, 2010). These theoretical perspectives have emancipatory aims, therefore
consideration of resistance narratives is important because these narratives can play an
important role in cultural change (McLean, et al., 2018). Decades of feminist scholarship and
activism have produced resistance narratives, but some “remain heavily individualized and
medicalized through the language of trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder” (Lafrance and
McKenzie-Mohr, 2014, p.2). This demonstrates the rigid and persistent nature of master
narratives and the difficulty faced in forming effective resistance narratives. To view or produce
resistance narratives as a binary counter to a master narrative is simplistic and to construct a
resistance narrative as the opposite of a master narrative constrains its ability to counter,
which can lead to resistance narratives that both challenge and reproduce hegemonic master
narratives (Lafrance and McKenzie-Mohr, 2014; McLean, et al., 2018).
Cultural narratives, both master and resistance, cannot capture the complexity of how things
are experienced. As Brown (2013) puts it,
“no single story can encompass the richness of experience and much goes
untold. Women’s stories reveal gaps and contradictions in a selective process
about what information to include” (p.7).
Indeed, Loseke (2001) argues that what she calls the ‘formula story’ of wife abuse glosses




           
              
            
               
                
            
            
                 
             
               
             
              
              
            
             
             
            
          
 
            
            
         
             
      
           
              
             
                
        
heinous behaviour, depraved perpetrators, and helpless victims” (p.107). Formula stories are
theorised similarly to master narratives in that both “refer to narratives of typical actors
engaging in typical behaviours within typical plots leading to expectable moral evaluations"
(Loseke, 2007, p.664). Following Loseke (2001), then, rape myths can be viewed as part of
the master narrative for rape in that they reflect the notion of the distinctive actors of
‘aggressive man’ as perpetrator and ‘blameless woman’ as victim (O'Hara, 2012; Schwark,
2017; DiBennardo, 2018; Nilsson, 2019). The attitudes and beliefs expressed through rape
myths are reflected in the formation of the master narrative and are reproduced by it. This is
often conceptualised as ‘rape culture’, which refers to the multifarious societal attitudes and
beliefs that create a conducive context for sexual violence to occur and that normalise and
encourage said violence (Buchwald et al., 1993). The concept therefore looks beyond the
individual to the underlying cultural practices and narratives that act as cultural scaffolding for
rape (see Gavey, 2005). Rape culture is a symptom of a patriarchal, heteronormative society
(Brownmiller, 1975; Herman, 1984), and cultural narratives that re/produce rape myths serve
to perpetuate rape culture and thus reinforce patriarchal and heteronormative ideologies. It is
not only sexism and heteronormativity that are reinforced by rape culture, because rape
culture also produces and reproduces other oppressions along, for example, ableist and
classist lines (Fanghanel, 2020). Indeed, an intersectional feminist perspective recognises
that:
“although all women and girls are in some way subject to gender
discrimination, all women and girls are not discriminated against in the same
way…, hierarchical structures interact and intersect with gender inequality,
and [manifest differently] according to other markers of a woman’s or a girl’s
social location.” (Vera-Gray, 2017, p.128)
These ‘hierarchical structures’ are produced and reproduced in cultural narratives. Utilising
the concept of cultural narratives was therefore useful in exploring the research problem set
out in section 1.1 and was congruent with my intersectional feminist theoretical framework
because it enabled me to identify narratives at trial that drew on structures of inequality and




   
            
         
            
            
             
           
             
               
             
              
            
            
            
              
              
             
              
              
         
               
            
        
   
               
                
             
3.6 Quality assurance
Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose that qualitative research should be assessed using
alternative, parallel criteria to quantitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability
and confirmability. Ensuring credibility involves seeking confirmation from the members of the
group being studied that the researcher’s interpretations are accurate (Bryman, 2016). For
this project, findings were checked with representatives from the legal profession and the
specialist sexual violence support sector by presenting the findings at practitioner-attended
conferences. This reflects the process used in similar previous research (Smith, 2014). To
meet the transferability criteria, the research findings are described in rich detail in order to
enable others to determine the transferability of the findings (Bryman, 2016). Dependability of
research requires that detailed records of the project processes are kept and checked with
suitable peers, which in this case was achieved through regular supervisions. Confirmability
ensures that researchers have accounted for possible personal and theoretical biases and
can be checked in a similar way to dependability (Bryman, 2016).
Reflexivity is important in social research because it allows the researcher to consider their
own position within the research and the influence of their methods, decisions, values and
biases on the knowledge they produce (Bryman, 2016), which in observational research can
help to enrich a researcher’s understandings of what they are observing and their subsequent
analysis (Nicholls et al., 2014). A reflexive diary can aid researchers in mapping and
understanding their assumptions, biases, and decision-making throughout the research
process (Ortlipp, 2008). I employed this strategy in this project, and it proved particularly useful
in acknowledging my position of privilege as a white, non-disabled, middle-class woman
throughout my observations and into data analysis.
3.7 Ethical considerations
There are a number of ethical considerations that warrant discussion for this project. There is
a plethora of ethical guidance available in the literature, which has been used to guide my




                
       
              
              
              
             
                
         
             
               
             
            
            
            
              
             
             
               
             
               
           
                
               
           
           
           
             
           
recently been addressed by Smith (2020), so I have largely used her discussions to reflect on
the specific dilemmas of court research.
This research will involve observing human participants at Crown Court trials. The use of
human participants is justified because although court transcripts could be used to inform this
project, they would omit the non-verbal communications that are essential to the richness of
data and enable a quality, nuanced analysis of trial narratives (Matoesian 2008). The
participants were not contacted directly, and they did not take part in any activities they were
not already doing as part of the court process.
The data collection method used in this project required some ethical consideration. This
research might be considered covert because it was not always possible to gain fully informed
consent from everyone being observed during the trials. Spicker (2011) made an important
distinction between covert and deceptive research, where covert research can be ethically
justified and deceptive research cannot. I was not actively misleading participants; therefore
the research was not deceptive. Ethical guidelines from the British Sociological Association
(2017) and the Economic and Social Research Council (2015) note the importance of giving
full consideration to the circumstances and reasons for conducting covert research and state
that covert research can be justified in certain circumstances. Spicker (2011) argued that
researching and reporting on trials is “desirable” (p. 124) and forms part of the public
accountability of the CJS. Further, Smith (2020) posits that given the widespread public
criticism of the CJS regarding rape trials, neglecting to research courts in this way can
perpetuate the revictimisation of victim-survivors. Therefore, the benefits of covert research
can outweigh the potential harm to participants (Gray, 2018). I considered that to be the case
for this study because I had discussed the issue of harm versus informed consent with
specialist advocacy professionals whose views were that this research presented an
opportunity to improve court experiences for victim-survivors and that outweighed concerns
regarding the semi-covert nature of data collection (discussed further below).
Calvey (2017; 2019) views covert research on a continuum and delineates the extensive




             
             
            
              
                
              
             
             
           
             
             
               
                
     
            
                
              
                
              
               
               
                
              
                  
                
              
                 
     
considerations of this project were the debates Calvey (2017) set out around ‘informed
consent’. Many social science researchers argue that the concept of informed consent is
flawed because it can ultimately never be ‘fully’ informed, especially when researching
vulnerable groups and sensitive topics (see Calvey, 2017). Court trials fall within the public
domain (Baldwin, 2008) and as such it is not necessary to gain informed consent from those
involved in the trial. The specialist advocacy professionals I consulted advocate for the rights
of victim-survivors of sexual violence and provide them with support services, they were
therefore well-placed to consider the impacts this project may have had on victim-survivors
being observed in court. I considered using relationships with independent support
professionals to obtain informed consent from victim-survivors before trial. The impact of this
on the victim-survivors had the potential for both negative and positive consequences. A
potential positive was that asking for consent, even though it is not needed, gives the victim-
survivor the opportunity to say no, in which case I would have respected their decision and
not observed that trial.
The main potential negative discussed by the professionals was that victim-survivors would
be likely to consent but that the knowledge of my presence would increase their overall anxiety
about the trial. This could be especially true for victim-survivors making use of special
measures for giving evidence who would not otherwise even be aware of my presence. As the
trial experience is already a distressing event for the victim-survivor (Adler, 1987; Lees, 2002;
Temkin and Krahé, 2008), it was the professional opinion of the specialist advocates that the
covert approach posed the least risk of undue harm. Indeed, this was reflective of arguments
made by Griffiths (2008) that deciding not to seek informed consent can constitute an ‘ethic of
care’. As an additional consideration, when the victim-survivor was in the courtroom I paid
careful attention to them and if there had been signs of distress at my presence, I was prepared
to leave the public gallery and exclude that data from the research. Smith (2014) made similar
considerations but found her presence did not seem to cause distress to the victim-survivors
and so there were no occasions where she left the courtroom for this reason. The same was




              
                 
           
                 
               
              
              
                 
             
             
              
                  
              
        
               
                
                   
                  
               
             
             
               
             
             
             
                
                
           
In order to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of participants, the specific court locations
are not named and only a vague geographical indicator has been given: courts in the East of
England. Similarly, trial participants are not named and potentially identifying information
specific to the cases was omitted as much as possible, for example no dates or locations were
recorded. It should be noted that the aim of the research requires that certain personal
characteristics be mentioned, such as gender and disability. Therefore, there is potential for a
combination of personal and case characteristics to make it possible for a victim-survivor to
be identified. For example, a victim-survivor in the North East who is an Asian woman with a
physical disability and a mental health condition could potentially be identified from this
information when combined with case details more easily than could a white female non-
disabled victim-survivor. This is justified because the courtroom is a public space and trials
are often reported in local press, so the data collected is not private. I used a ‘marginal gains’
approach whereby as many small details were removed as possible to allow context but
remove a level of unnecessary identifying detail.
Consideration has been given to the risk of harm to those being researched. Participants must
be protected from undue harm and whilst the situation is likely to be distressing for the victim-
survivor, it is not a situation created by the research. That said, I was prepared to exit the court
if it appeared my presence was causing distress, but this was not in the end necessary for any
of my observations. I recognised there is a risk of harm to researchers investigating trauma
and violence and that support mechanisms and networks are therefore of high importance.
For this reason, an additional consideration when selecting courts was my available informal
support in those areas. My employment history provides me with a range of coping strategies
for emotionally demanding work and I have previously received training on vicarious trauma
and strategies for protecting against it. Supervision provided a space for debriefing and
discussion of any difficulties that arose. A background in supporting victim-survivors of sexual
violence means I had a good understanding of what to expect from the content of serious
sexual offences trials. I also had an awareness of the impact emotions could have on the




                
             
 
                  
              
               
               
            
                 
           
            
   
                  
   
   
     
      






















      
     
benefits to conducting research with a level of emotion. I kept a reflexive diary throughout the
data collection period, and beyond, to help provide transparency and credibility of data
analysis.
At the beginning of each trial, I sought permission from the judge, via court staff, to take notes
in the public gallery. Smith (2014) described her method for seeking informed consent from
the judge, barristers and defendant, but noted the limitation of how informed this truly was
because any discussion was brief and the barristers were disinterested. For this project, I had
an information sheet available for any participants who requested further detail, with
consideration given as to the level of detail provided so that reactivity as a result of demand
characteristics would be minimised. Ultimately, however, nobody asked any questions about
my presence and so I did not give a sheet to anyone.
3.8 Trial synopses
This section sets out synopses for each of the observed trials in order to give context for the
analysis chapters.
3.8.1 Trial 1
Indictment Two counts of rape
Verdict Not guilty on both counts












White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Victim-survivor special measures ABE, screens




     
  
 
   
               
             
            
            
              
             
             
   
               
      
 
   
     
   
         





















     
     
     
  
 
   
             
              
            
   
 
Defendant asked about sexual history Yes
with victim-survivor
Prosecution central arguments
The prosecution case was that on two separate occasions the defendant had sex with the
victim-survivor while she slept after they had been out drinking heavily together. The
prosecution argued that because the victim-survivor was asleep she could not have
consented, nor could the defendant have reasonably believed she was consenting, and
therefore it was rape. The victim-survivor resisted when she was roused from sleep and
the defendant stopped on one occasion and continued on the latter occasion. The victim-
survivor did not fully rouse from sleep because she was tired and drunk.
Defence central arguments
The defence case was that the sex happened but that it was consensual. Their arguments
centred on ‘regretted drunken sex’.
3.8.2 Trial 2
Indictment One count of rape
Verdict Not guilty
Victim-survivor/defendant relationship The victim-survivor and defendant were in a
long-term co-habiting relationship
Victim-survivor demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Female Early 20s White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Defendant demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Male Early 20s White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Victim-survivor special measures None
Defendant gave live evidence Yes
Defendant asked about sexual history Yes
with victim-survivor
Prosecution central arguments
The prosecution case was that the defendant initiated sex with the victim-survivor and
despite her verbal and physical resistance he continued, therefore it was rape. There was





   
               
           
        
 
   
        
       
       





















     
     
     
  
   
   
             
            
              
            
             
            
  
   




The defence case was that the defendant did not remember the specific incident but had
never had non-consensual sex with victim-survivor. They focused on undermining the
digital evidence and providing a motive for lying.
3.8.3 Trial 3
Indictment One count of sexual assault by touching.
One count of sexual assault by penetration.
Verdict Guilty (by majority) on both counts.
Victim-survivor/defendant relationship Online acquaintances.
Victim-survivor demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Female 30s White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Defendant demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Male 40s White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Victim-survivor special measures Screens
Defendant gave live evidence Yes
Defendant asked about sexual history Yes (digital messages)
with victim-survivor
Prosecution central arguments
The prosecution case was that under the pretence of massage sexually assaulted the
victim-survivor by touching her breasts and by digitally penetrating her vagina. The victim-
survivor acquiesced to the breast touching because she thought it was part of a
professional massage but did not consent to digital penetration. Because the defendant
had entered her home under false pretences as a ‘masseur’, the breast touching
amounted to sexual assault because the victim-survivor’s consent had been vitiated by
that deception.
Defence central arguments




   
      
         
   
      
        
      
      
  
       
       
         
      
          
     
      
       























   
      
     
     
  
 
   
              
                
                 
   
           




Indictment Six counts of rape.
One count of kidnap with intent to commit a
sexual offence.
One count of assault by beating.
Verdict Guilty on two counts of rape.
Guilty on assault by beating.
Crown offered no evidence on kidnapping
count.
Defendant also entered 4 guilty pleas to
charges of assault and criminal damage at
the outset of the trial (all in relation to
domestic abuse against the victim-survivor).
Victim-survivor/defendant relationship Ex-partners. At the time of the offences, the
defendant was subject to probation
conditions (for previous assaults against the
victim-survivor) which meat he was not to
have any contact with the victim-survivor.
Victim-survivor demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Female 40s White (not explicitly Learning disability
stated)
Defendant demographics
Gender Age Race Disability




Victim-survivor special measures Screens, intermediary
Defendant gave live evidence No
Defendant asked about sexual history N/A
with victim-survivor
Prosecution central arguments
The prosecution case was that the victim-survivor had sex (oral and vaginal) with the
defendant over the course of two days and that none of it was consensual because she
was scared of the defendant due to the domestic abuse he had subjected her to.
Defence central arguments
The defence argued that the victim-survivor consented, and that defendant could





   
         
       
   
        
        
      
         






















           
     
  
     
     
  
 
   
             
          
   
              
 
 
   
        
       
     
        
     
  
3.8.5 Trial 5
Indictment Two counts of sexual assault of a child
aged under 13, plus one additional ‘multiple
occasions’ count.
One count of causing or inciting a child
aged under 13 to engage in sexual activity.
Verdict Not guilty on all counts.
Victim-survivor/defendant relationship The defendant was a long-term partner of
the victim-survivor (a child) at the time of
the offences.
Victim-survivor demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Male Under 10 White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Defendant demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Male 40s White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Victim-survivor special measures Live link, removal of wigs and gowns,
introduced to counsel and judge
beforehand, intermediary.
Defendant gave live evidence Yes
Defendant asked about sexual history N/A
with victim-survivor
Prosecution central arguments
The prosecution case was that on several occasions the defendant had sexually assaulted
the victim-survivor (a pre-pubescent child) whilst in the child’s home.
Defence central arguments
The defence case was that none of the touching happened and the victim-survivor was
lying.
3.8.6 Trial 6
Indictment One count of indecent assault (SOA 1956).
Two counts of sexual assault, with one
additional ‘multiple occasions’ count.
Four counts of sexual activity with a child,





       
     
 
      
        
       
       
       
































           
 
            
 
     
     
  
 
   
               
          
      
   
             
               
                
 
One count of sexual assault by penetration
with an additional ‘multiple occasions’
count.
Verdict Not guilty on all counts.
Victim-survivor/defendant relationship There were two sister victim-survivors. The
defendant was the partner of their mother
around the time of the alleged offences.
The defendant was later in a relationship
with victim-survivor1 when she was
approximately 16.
Victim-survivor1 demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Female Early 30s White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Victim-survivor2 demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Female Late 20s White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Defendant demographics
Gender Age Race Disability
Male 50s White (not explicitly None mentioned
stated)
Victim-survivor1 special measures Live link, removal of wigs and gowns,
intermediary
Victim-survivor2 special measures ABE, live link, removal of wigs and gowns,
intermediary
Defendant gave live evidence Yes
Defendant asked about sexual history Yes
with victim-survivor
Prosecution central arguments
This was a historic case. The prosecution case was that the defendant had raped and
sexually assaulted both victim-survivors multiple times throughout their teenage years
whilst under the age of consent.
Defence central arguments
The defence case was that the allegations relating to victim-survivor2 were entirely made
up. In relation to victim-survivor1, the defendant’s case was that he had engaged in sexual




     
             
            
               
              
              
               
               
             
             
             
                 
            
                
              
               
            
     
 
 
3.8.7 Presentation of the data
Extracts from the transcripts are provided in support of the analysis presented throughout
chapters Four to Seven. These extracts include direct quotes and paraphrased quotes.
Paraphrased quotes are signified by box brackets and although I refer to these quotes as
paraphrased, it is more accurate to describe them as almost-verbatim. That said, a small
number of paraphrased quotes were edited beyond what was recorded in the transcript in
order to provide clarity of meaning; that is, where the quote became unclear when removed
from the wider context of the transcript. Extracts have been numbered for ease of reference
because the nature of the analysis, that is, the interlinked narratives, meant that cross-
referencing was required at times. Numbering the extracts therefore avoided the need for
repetition of data. The extracts are numbered according to chapter number with accompanying
letter(s) to denote order of appearance (i.e., 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 5b, 5c, and so on).
To help maintain anonymity, dates, locations, and other distinctive information have been
removed or changed, and names have been replaced either by the person’s role at trial (e.g.,
Prosecution) or their relationship to the participants (e.g., Friend), also in box brackets. Finally,
actions and tone are denoted by angle brackets. For example, where a barrister reads from
the evidence bundle or makes an obvious non-verbal communication, such as <clicked




         
      
  
              
                
              
            
             
             
    
                 
             
            
              
        
               
             
             
            
             
               
              
             
    
                
                
               
Chapter 4 Undermining the story of rape: consent
and ‘reasonable’ belief
4.1 Introduction
The following chapters outline the key themes revealed from analysis of my observations. This
chapter and Chapter Five focus on how ‘stories’ of rape are undermined through the use of
rape myths in courtroom narratives. Here, the ‘story’ relates to the allegations presented at
trial, which are constituted of conflicting accounts provided by victim-survivor and defendant.
Chapter Six then focuses on how the victim-survivors are undermined through reliance on
wider cultural narratives and Chapter Seven focuses on the bolstering effect of cultural
narratives for defendants.
A brief synopsis of each trial and the parties involved was provided in section 3.8. As outlined
in section 3.8.1, the analysis presented will include direct quotes and paraphrased quotes,
with paraphrased quotes signified by box brackets. To help maintain anonymity, distinctive
information has been removed or changed, and names have been replaced by the person’s
role at trial or relationship to the participants.
The rape myths observed can be categorised into four core groups, although there is inevitably
some overlap. This chapter and Chapter Five are organised accordingly, with this chapter
focusing on myths related to consent and defendants’ reasonable belief in consent and
Chapter Five focusing on myths relating to victim-survivors’ post-assault behaviour and the
expected consistency of their accounts. This chapter establishes that rape myths were used
in every trial, primarily by the defence, and served as a mechanism to undermine the victim-
survivor’s account of the allegations. This supports my thesis that rape myths remain prevalent
in serious sexual offences trials despite suggestions they are not a problem.
4.2 Myths about consent
Rape myths were often related to issues of consent. The model of consent in E&W is
discussed in section 1.2.3. To summarise, consent to a sexual act is given when a person




                
               
            
                
  
       
            
                
               
              
               
             
               
                  
   
                
             
               
                     
                  
              
              
              
             
                
               
               
model of consent employs what Dowds (2019) refers to as a mixed definition of consent that
has both positive (freely made choice) and negative (ways in which consent can be vitiated)
elements. Most commonly, myths about consent related to victim-survivors’ sexual history, but
two of the trials also touched on presumptions about the capacity to consent outlined in the
SOA 2003.
4.2.1 The use of victim-survivors’ sexual history
Narratives about victim-survivors’ sexual behaviour were common in the observed trials and
related to flirting, sexual history, or both. These narratives were present in all but T5, where
the victim-survivor was a child, however even in this case his mother’s sexual history was
used to discredit her. All trials therefore scrutinised the sexual behaviour of women. Narratives
about flirting as sexual behaviour are discussed in section 4.3.2 where they were used to
discuss the defendant’s reasonable belief in consent, however there is clear overlap between
that and the sexual history evidence discussed here. As my discussions in both sections will
show, it is therefore difficult to see where the line should be drawn on what ‘counts’ as sexual
history evidence.
The use of sexual history evidence is restricted in sexual offences through s.41 of the YJCEA
1999 (see section 2.4.1.1) and applications for the introduction of sexual history evidence
should be made in advance of a trial. In previous observation studies these applications have
been seen to be made at the time of the trial, rather than in advance, or not made at all (Kelly
et al., 2006; Burman et al., 2007; Durham, et al., 2017; Temkin, et al., 2018; Smith, 2018). In
contrast, my observations saw no applications being made during trial, which would be good
practice so long as applications were indeed made beyond the scope of these observations.
This change from previous research may be the result of Criminal Practice Directions 2015
(Amendment No. 6) [2018] EWCA Crim 516, which aimed to ensure consistent and
appropriate application of s.41 (Brewis 2018). Whilst it is not possible to say whether or not
applications were made in advance of all the observed trials, s.41 was explicitly mentioned in




                 
           
                  
                 
              
               
                
     
  
                
      
                
          
   
           
         
         
    
           
             
  
            
           
            
     
        
           
             
  
           
    
and in one trial (T3) an exchange between the judge and defence seemed to indicate that an
application had not been made (discussed further below, from extract 4k).
Good practice with regards to s.41 was observed in two trials, T1 and T6. In T6, there was
clear reference to a s.41 ruling and how to adhere to its parameters. In this case, defence
counsel wished to bring evidence of a third-party relationship of one of the victim-survivors.
The ruling had prohibited it but the defence wanted to ask about the relationship without
referencing anything sexual. The judge did not allow this because of the risk it could easily
unintentionally adduce sexual history evidence:
EXTRACT 4a
Judge [Section 41, we spent a great deal of time on and I ruled
on it.]
Defence Would I be able to put it to the witness that she was in a
relationship with [name] and that is why she knows bus
times and uniforms?
Judge No, because it’s still asking about what was a sexual
relationship … [What’s the link? Why can’t you ask…]
innuendo is so difficult to avoid [in these circumstances.
Prosecution, what’s your position]?
Prosecution [The way around it that I suggested to [previous defence
counsel] last time was to put it to her that she knows other
drivers well].
Judge Yes, and there can be no objection to that. [Defence, you
just have to be very careful to avoid any implications. Can
I just ask that you run the wording past me beforehand in
the absence of the jury]?
Defence Can I ask ‘you know [name]’?
Judge No. What is the relevance of the name?
Defence Well if I ask that she knew other drivers well and she
answers no.
Judge [Yes in that circumstance it’s okay. Please run the words




                
               
    
                 
                
               
            
 
   
           
  
            
          
         
   
              
               
   
   
          
 
    
      
        
       
      
           
                 
              
            
The line of questioning was ultimately not pursued by the defence so there was not an
opportunity to see how this might have played out in practice, but nevertheless remains an
example of good practice.
In T1, s.41 was mentioned in passing but it was not clear whether an application had been
made. There were however clear examples of good practice in relation to s.41 in the same
trial. For example, the judge questioned the defence when she thought he had raised sexual
history evidence from a previous sexual encounter between the victim-survivor and the
defendant:
EXTRACT 4b
Judge [[Defence], Section 41, did a previous judge make a ruling
on that?]
Defence [No, but I don’t think I crossed into that.]
Judge [Oh yes, you’re right, there’s no suggestion that anything
sexual happened on the night the photos were taken.]
Defence No. (T1)
This demonstrates a judge actively seeking to identify areas of questioning that could need
s.41 rulings. On another occasion the judge intervened to prevent a similar line of questioning
by the prosecution:
EXTRACT 4c
Prosecution …You said you remember him pulling your hand towards
him?
Victim-survivor Yes, several times.
Prosecution And you remember that?
Victim-survivor Yes. I didn’t want it to happen.
Prosecution Have you ever touched him-
Judge Not relevant.
Prosecution Ok. I am prepared to leave it. (T1)
Although s.41 does not apply to the prosecution in E&W, anything raised by them is open for
explanation or rebuttal by the defence under subsection 5. This means that by stopping




               
     
              
                
             
   
   
             
     
           
          
  
   
          
    
   
            
  
    
      
   
          
            
           
                 
              
             
              
              
              
         
irrelevant sexual history (see Smith, 2018, on the prevalence of s.41(5) as justification for the
introduction of sexual history).
Alongside these examples of good practice, however, there was another line of questioning in
the same trial that, even if allowed by a s.41 ruling, seemed entirely irrelevant. The defence
questioned the victim-survivor about whether she would usually keep her bra on during
consensual sex:
EXTRACT 4d
Defence Your knickers were removed but you kept your bra on.
Victim-survivor I don’t remember.
Defence Now, please don’t think I’m being rude because I’m not.
Did you have a complex about your nipples? <pause> You
look confused.
Victim-survivor Yeah
Defence Would you keep your bra on because you felt self-
conscious about your nipples?
Victim-survivor Yes
Defence But would you keep the bra on if you were having
consensual sex?
Victim-survivor Not necessarily.
Defence But you might?
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence I suggest that you had consensual sex… (T1)
This questioning was referring generally to the victim-survivor’s sexual encounters and was
therefore asking about third-parties. The defence’s implication was that the victim-survivor
might keep her bra on during consensual sex and so that it remained on during the alleged
rape could be taken to indicate that she consented. As McGlynn (2017) argued, sexual
encounters with third-parties has no bearing on the consideration of consent with someone
else, unless it is “so similar…that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a
coincidence” (YJCEA 1999 s.41 (3)(c)). However, the ruling in R v Evans took commonplace
sexual activities, namely ‘doggy style’ and a woman saying ‘fuck me harder’, as sufficiently




                   
                
                 
                
                
                
                
              
                
             
              
              
          
               
            
            
             
 
              
               
                  
             
               
     
   
            
   
           
     
There was no direction to the jury as to how they were permitted to use this evidence and it
was not referenced directly in either of the closing speeches. It is therefore unclear what the
relevance of this evidence was or why it was adduced. Whether a s.41 ruling was made or
not, it remains a line of questioning that is more prejudicial than probative and therefore adds
to the existing evidence base showing the inefficacy of the s.41 provisions (Kelly et al. 2006;
Temkin et al. 2016; McGlynn, 2017; Smith, 2018). A woman keeping her bra on during sex
should not constitute something so sufficiently out of the ordinary as to qualify as an exception
under the s.41 (3)(c) provision, particularly when related to third-parties. It is a standard
depiction of sex in television and film. Not only this, but the questioning here was needlessly
intrusive. The defence could establish the same facts without resorting to asking intimate
details about the victim-survivor’s body image. Arguably it may be beneficial for the defence
to make such remarks because it highlights an insecurity in the victim-survivor. Smith (2018)
found that defence barristers asked questions about victim-survivors’ emotional vulnerabilities
and linked these to narratives about mental health and women as pathological in order to
portray them as ‘damaged goods’. Drawing on this victim-survivor’s insecurity could therefore
have bolstered the defence’s narrative about this victim-survivor as “hysterical” and the
defendant’s characterisation of her as “crazy” and “psycho”, which are discussed in section
6.3.2.
Whilst in T1 the sexual history questioning related to the victim-survivor’s behaviour prior to
the alleged rapes, the questioning in T2 related to the victim-survivor’s sexual behaviour in the
aftermath of the alleged rape. There was no reference to s.41 during T2, so it is not possible
to know whether an application had been made. In the cross-examination of the victim-
survivor, the defence asked when she and the defendant, who had been in a long-term co-
habiting relationship, next had sex:
EXTRACT 4e
Defence I say it was consensual. Do you agree or disagree?
Victim-survivor Disagree.
Defence When was the next time you had sex?




          
      
              
               
                
                 
               
                 
              
               
                   
               
             
     
                  
               
               
                
                
            
                 
                 
              
                
            
        
Defence Couple of months later? Couple of weeks?
Victim-survivor I don’t know. (T2)
This questioning suggests that the length of time between an alleged rape and consensual
sex bears relevance to matters of consent or credibility. The implication made by the defence
was that because the victim-survivor did not end the relationship and that it continued to be
sexual she must be lying about her lack of consent. This drew on problematic ideas of rational
behaviour in suggesting that someone who was raped would not continue to have sex with
the person that raped her. Section 5.1 sets out that it is in fact not uncommon for victim-
survivors to maintain relationships with their perpetrators. It is irrelevant how soon after the
alleged rape she had sex with him again, especially considering that her evidence was that
she tried to forget about it, wanted things to be normal between them, and took a long time to
come to terms with it. Indeed, Redmayne (2003) argued that sexual history evidence can be
used by prosecution to argue non-consent because women in relationships are at an
increased risk of rape.
In T3 it appeared that no s.41 application was made. The parties in this trial met online and
had not met in person before the assault, therefore the sexual history evidence stemmed from
digital communications. Due to the defendant’s deception about who he was, at the time of
the assault the victim-survivor was unaware that the man in her house was the same person
she had been talking to via digital media. The defence used the flirtatious exchanges to portray
the victim-survivor as ‘promiscuous’, including by misrepresenting the content of a redacted
image to such an extent that the judge intervened to ensure the jury was not misled (see
below). This makes it difficult to separate out the flirting from the sexual history in this case
(further trial narratives around flirting are discussed in section 4.3.2). For this reason, and
because the admitted deception in this case meant that the flirting had no bearing on the
defendant’s reasonable belief, all aspects of the victim-survivor’s sexual behaviour related to




            
            
     
   
       
   
            
         
            
          
   
          
 
   
        
    
             
             
   
           
        
      
    
             
           
   
           
   
   
            
   
         
   
In cross-examination of the victim-survivor, the defence used digital evidence (a combination
of phone records and WhatsApp messages) to demonstrate a flirtatious exchange between
the victim-survivor and the defendant:
EXTRACT 4f
Defence It becomes a bit flirty.
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence [You said you were laying naked on your bed].
Victim-survivor I don’t recall saying that, no. (T3)
This questioning positioned the victim-survivor as the instigator of sexual behaviour. The
defence then asked how the exchange of photos came about:
EXTRACT 4g
Defence [Because we can see you send them after the
conversation].
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence [Photos of your own choosing?]
Victim-survivor Yes. (T3)
The defence clearly highlighted the victim-survivor’s agency in the exchange of photos through
the clarification in the above excerpt. The questioning continued in this vein:
EXTRACT 4h
Defence [Moving on to [page number]. You would agree there was
a discussion regarding photos, you initiate a conversation
about the size of your breasts]?
Victim-survivor Yes. (T3)
The above extract shows how the defence again highlighted the victim-survivor’s agency in
the flirtation and positioned her as the instigator. It continued:
EXTRACT 4i
Defence [[page number X of the bundle], another photo shared from
[defendant] to you]
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence [Then you say ‘I’m sure you’ve had enough photos of me’].
Victim-survivor Yes.





           
    
            
                
                
             
               
              
                
       
             
          
 
   
               
           
       
   
            
           
          
    
                
           
   
           
         
              
        
         
Defence That you deliberately chose to send to him?
Victim-survivor Yes. (T3)
This questioning positioned the victim-survivor as the agentive sexual provocateur. First the
defence barrister suggested that during a phone call she told the defendant she was nude and
then that she had initiated a conversation about her breasts, both of which place her as
instigator. In two places the defence highlighted the victim-survivor’s agency in sending the
images: “[Photos of your own choosing?]” and “That you deliberately chose to send to him”.
Furthermore, in pointing out that the victim-survivor said “‘I’m sure you’ve had enough photos
of me’” and shortly thereafter sent another image of herself, the defence barrister drew on the
notion of ‘token resistance’ (see section 4.3.1).
In discussing the photographs, the defence barrister never described the content of the
defendant’s images, but he did describe what the victim-survivor sent:
EXTRACT 4j
Defence […you say ‘I would send you a pic of my butt but I don’t
want anyone seeing it’, then you send a photo, which is
redacted, of your semi-naked backside, a close-up].
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence [A little while later, he says he hopes you’re thinking about
the massage, you say ‘indeed I am’. Now, you would agree
this is in the context of a fairly explicit exchange]?
Victim-survivor Yes. (T3)
After a further two questions about the massage the judge sent the jury out while she
intervened with regards to the defence’s description in the above example:
EXTRACT 4k
Judge Sorry to interrupt. [I’m concerned about the way this photo
has been described, it’s not anatomically graphic. It was
sent in response to a penis photo so you need to put it into
context, no implying a provocative first move on [victim-




          
 
    
              
   
             
 
          
 
    
         
         
 
           
          
          
            
            
     
           
           
           
         
        
           
             
   
               
                
             
                 
                 
              
                
                
statement that you would take this line of questioning, was
it?]
Defence No.
Judge I would expect it to be. [Can you help me see where you’re
going with this?]
Defence Not much further. [It’s just to show she went back to explicit
messaging…]
Judge [Are you saying she thought the massage would be
sexual?]
Defence No.
Judge That’s the impression you’re giving…
Defence [It’s just positioning that there was exaggerated sexual
fantasy]
Judge [… I wonder whether you find, [prosecution], that you want
to show the intimate images? I’m keen the jury understand
the context but don’t necessarily want to show them the
image of the penis, but perhaps you want to make it clear?
It’s the sort of thing you’d see on a beach in Brazil].
Prosecution Yes […].
Judge [I think it’s important the jury understand].
Prosecution They may think it’s worse than it is.
Judge Exactly. That’s what I’m worried about. I don’t want them
speculating. [What’s important is that the jury don’t have
an inaccurate impression of what’s in those images].
Defence I think it’s best dealt with in re-examination.
Judge [Yes. I’m happy on the basis that you said you’re not going
much further]. (T3)
During this intervention the judge expressed her surprise at the line of questioning because it
was not in the defence statement, which suggests that no s.41 application had been made in
relation to this evidence. This is even more surprising and seemingly inappropriate considering
that the primary issue in this case is not one of consent because the argument from the
defence was that the actions never happened at all. It is therefore difficult to see why this
evidence would be relevant. The judge’s intervention was reassuring, but because it was the
line of questioning that was unexpected rather than the photo (which would have been in the




                 
                
           
               
            
         
              
                
                
             
             
              
                 
              
                
               
                 
             
          
                
               
             
             
                  
 
             
              
 
not allowed the photo evidence to be adduced in the first place. This also raises the question
of where the line should be drawn as to what counts as sexual history evidence, because
evidence about victim-survivors sexual character aside from physical sexual encounters is
often used to the detriment of victim-survivors with no clear probative value other than to
encourage the jury to make negative moral judgements about the victim-survivor’s character
(Kelly et al., 2006; Burman, 2009; McGlynn, 2017).
After the judge’s intervention, the defence immediately moved on from that line of questioning,
which suggests he may have been purposely pushing the boundaries. It is a noted tactic that
barristers will pursue a line of questioning they know to be inappropriate or irrelevant until the
judge intervenes (Darbyshire, 2011; Smith, 2018). It also highlights the importance of robust
judicial intervention and management of such evidence. The defence did not directly relate
the messages to consent, and their overall argument was not about consent because they
asserted that no sexual touching took place. The tactic here seemed to be building up a picture
of the victim-survivor based on rape myths irrelevant to the defence argument, knowing the
likely influence on the jury. That is, the defence had been allowed to portray the victim-survivor
as being sexually experienced (the implication being that she would be more likely to have
consented), which cast her as less credible to the jury, using an argument that is irrelevant to
their actual defence. This reflects McGlynn’s (2018) argument that sexual behaviour is likely
judged according to ‘moral credibility’, rather than truthfulness. Furthermore, Redmayne
(2003) has posited that sexual history evidence should in fact be used to argue that consent
is less likely, rather than more likely, because women in relationships and women who have
a higher number of sexual partners are more likely to experience sexual victimisation.
Additionally, research has shown that women with more extensive sexual experience are least
likely to define something as rape and no more likely to make a false allegation (Flowe et al.,
2007).
In establishing the chronology of contact between the parties and the communication platforms




   
             
      
     
              
            
               
                 
               
               
               
            
              
                  
                 
                
              
           
              
               
               
               
             
               
              
                 
                
              
EXTRACT 4l
Defence And on this particular site, if there’s a match, the female is
required to send the first message?
Defendant Yes. (T3)
This is completely irrelevant to consent because consent is specific to each act. More
significantly, the victim-survivor was expressing interest in a persona invented by the
defendant, not in the defendant himself. Indeed, as the defence argument was that no sexual
contact had even occurred, there is no issue of consent for this to be relevant for. Baroness
Kennedy expressed concern about the impact of dating apps on the perception of women at
trial, suggesting that judges and juries often assume women who use such apps “would have
sex with anyone” (Gibb and Ames, 2018). Indeed, since the time of these observations the
CPS has introduced new guidelines for rape prosecutions that specifically address such
concerns. These updated guidelines clarify for prosecutors that the use of dating apps cannot
be taken to imply consent (CPS, 2020). In T3, the allusion to such rape myths appears to be
a tactic of misdirection. By playing into the myth that women imply consent to sex through their
actions (Burgin and Powell, 2019), such as sending the first message on a dating app or
sending a photograph of themselves, defence counsel may hope that this portrayal of the
victim-survivor as provocative may damage the prosecution’s case. Indeed, barristers in
Carline and Gunby’s (2011) study noted how easily consent can be established through a
focus on irrelevant aspects of the victim-survivor’s behaviour prior to the rape or assault.
There has been some debate in other jurisdictions as to whether digital evidence should be
covered by so-called ‘rape shield’ laws (Sweeny and Slack, 2017). In E&W, s.41 does cover
evidence obtained from digital devices (CPS, 2019), and the example from T3 demonstrates
why this is important. What T3 also demonstrates, though, is that a wider discussion and
consideration of s.41 with specific thought to digital evidence is required. This is because
digital evidence is often assumed to be neutral, however as Dodge (2018) argued, it is not: it
is open to interpretation and can be manipulated to fit competing narratives at trial (see also




             
         
                 
                
               
              
              
                  
                
           
         
                
               
               
                 
 
               
             
                
                 
             
            
 
   
            
           
 
         
sexual history contained within digital communications are given as much scrutiny as, for
example, verbal evidence in investigations and s.41 hearings.
It is important to note that regardless of whether or not rulings were made in the cases
discussed in this section, the findings feed into the wider discussion of the relevance of sexual
history evidence and the efficacy of s.41. If rulings were made in the problematic examples
discussed above, then either the evidence adduced was deemed relevant and allowed or the
evidence was not deemed relevant but was adduced without challenge anyway, both of which
show the inefficacy of s.41. If the evidence was not the subject of a s.41 application, that too
signifies inefficacy. It seems clear, then, that s.41 does not work as intended and that reform
is necessary, and this is discussed further in section 8.3.2.
4.2.1.1 The use of sexual history of victim-survivors’ mothers
The sexual history of other witnesses in rape trials is not protected by s.41. However, my
observations in the two trials involving child sex offences (one with a child victim-survivor, one
a historic case with two adult victim-survivors) indicate that the sexual history of the mothers
is used to undermine the credibility of the family as a whole, and as such undermines the
victim-survivors.
In T5, the mother of the child victim-survivor was subjected to intrusive questioning about her
lifestyle and parenting skills, seemingly to undermine her credibility and bolster the narrative
of her as vindictive (see section 6.3.1.1). In addition, there was a question regarding her sexual
history with the defendant, where the question was worded in such a way as to suggest casual
sex, drawing on middle-class ideals of respectability which suggest women who have sex
outside of relationships are ‘promiscuous’ (see section 6.2 for classed narratives of
respectability).
EXTRACT 4m
Defence You broke up, then some time later he came round, you
end up in bed together and that’s when [youngest son] was
created.




                 
             
              
                
                
    
              
             
             
               
              
   
          
    
         
               
 
 
       
     
 
          
   
         
      
            
         
         
    
             
    
Whilst on its own this question may not seem inflammatory, it was set within a context of
questions that suggested the witness had involvement with social services and portrayed her
as a ‘benefit cheat’, drawing on classed narratives of ‘single mothers’ (see section 6.2.3).
Therefore, the use of this mother’s sexual history, which has no relevance as to whether or
not the defendant abused her child, was used to undermine her credibility and, by proxy, the
credibility of her son.
Similarly, classed narratives positioned the family in T6 as not conforming to ideals of
respectability. The mother’s sexual relationship with the defendant was referred to on multiple
occasions. The defence insinuated that the daughters were aware of the mother’s sexual
habits with the defendant and had used that to bolster their ‘invented’ allegations. For example,
the defence drew attention to the sexual relationship between the mother and the defendant:
EXTRACT 4n
Defence [Did you do sexual acts on the bus?]
Mother Yes
Defence Where were your daughters when that happened?
Mother 9 out of 10 times it was a double decker so we would be
upstairs.
…
Defence Would it be sexual intercourse?
Mother Yes. (T6)
The defence later raised this in relation to the victim-survivors:
EXTRACT 4o
Defence They were young teenagers at the time?
Mother I can’t remember.
Defence Would you agree you’d talk to them about the affair?
Mother Now and again, not very often.
Defence Did you tell them about sexual things?
Mother No.





           
           
      
            
              
                
           
           
                
                 
   
     
                 
               
             
             
                
                 
             
             
               
               
                
          
   
               
               
               
               
Defence Were they aware you had sex on the bus?
Mother I don’t know if they were or not.
Defence No more questions. (T6)
These examples show that with regards to child sexual offences, victim-survivors’ credibility
can not only be undermined through adducing evidence relating to their own sexual history,
but also by that of their mothers. This is because women have historically been positioned as
untrustworthy, particularly with regards to their sexual behaviour (Phipps, 2009). The
gendered cultural narratives regarding the untrustworthiness of women are discussed further
in section 6.3.1. The use of mothers’ sexual history in child sexual offences trials does not
appear to be an area previously explored in the literature and is certainly an area that warrants
further investigation.
4.2.2 Vitiated consent through deception
In T3, the defendant pretended to be two different people, one of which was a masseur sent
to the victim-survivor’s home by the other person the defendant had been pretending to be.
On the second count of sexual assault, the defendant had touched the victim-survivor’s
breasts during the massage. The victim-survivor said she thought it strange but acquiesced
because she thought it was part of a professional massage. Whilst it was the defence’s case
that this touching had not happened, they argued that if the jury decided it had happened, the
victim-survivor had consented in her acquiescence. This meant the question of consent on
this count was about whether the jury believed the victim-survivor had been sufficiently
deceived so as to remove her freedom to consent. The defence therefore argued that the
victim-survivor knew it was not a professional massage, thus if the jury believed the defendant
had touched her breasts (it was their case that he did not) the victim-survivor had consented
to the touching. The jury was therefore directed as follows:
EXTRACT 4p
“[the touching of her breasts she accepted assuming it was a proper part of the
massage… it is up to you to decide whether she was deceived. Defence say it
was clearly a friend, prosecution say it was clearly a professional. It will be for




           
  
            
     
   
           
    
              
             
        
            
             
             
             
               
              
           
   
         
   
           
             
        
  
         
          
              
              
            
decide whether such deception removed her freedom of choice to consent]”
(Judge, T3)
During cross-examination of the victim-survivor, the defence had specifically asked about the
victim-survivor’s expectation of the massage:
EXTRACT 4q
Defence [Did he say it would be a professional massage?]
Victim-survivor Yes, definitely.
Defence I suggest he never said it would be a paid professional.
Victim-survivor [He said he knew a qualified person, that he was very nice
and professional]. That’s exactly what he said. (T3).
This questioning came directly after the defence had cross-examined the victim-survivor about
sexualised messages between her and the defendant, and just before the judge intervened
regarding the misleading depiction of those messages by the defence (see section 4.2.1.1).
The questions were therefore within the context of painting the victim-survivor as promiscuous
and, as the judge pointed out, appeared to be creating the impression that the victim-survivor
was expecting a sexual massage (see extract 4k). The victim-survivor was clear in subsequent
testimony that she thought it was to be a professional massage:
EXTRACT 4r
Defence [You say he massaged your breasts firmly].
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence You didn’t think at that stage it was-
Victim-survivor I thought it was odd [I’ve never had a full body massage
before, I didn’t know if that was included].
…
Defence Then you let the massage continue?
Victim-survivor Yes, like I said, I wasn’t sure. (T3)
The victim-survivor pre-empted the defence’s question here which enabled her to give a clear
statement without her answer being framed by the defence barrister’s words. Earlier in the




               
  
   
       
   
         
   
            
       
        
             
          
              
              
               
            
           
               
               
              
              
               
               
               
            
              
               
           
        
 
suspect the defendant was not a professional masseur and in doing so openly called her
behaviour stupid:
EXTRACT 4s
Defence You didn’t ask for ID?
Victim-survivor No.
Defence You didn’t ask for a card?
Victim-survivor No.
Defence Your explanation [for saying to [friend] that you did ask was
that] you thought you had been stupid.
Victim-survivor I thought he would think that.
Defence Do you agree you had been a little bit stupid?
Victim-survivor I was worried [friend] would think so. (T3)
Whilst this line of questioning was arguably relevant to the victim-survivor’s belief that the
defendant was a professional, and therefore to her freedom to consent, it seems unnecessary
and irrelevant to refer to her actions as stupid. By framing the victim-survivor’s actions as
reckless, the defence was arguably relying on victim-blaming narratives. The extract began
with what Thornborrow (2013) calls ‘blame-implicative’ questioning, that is, questioning that
positions the victim-survivor as wholly or partially responsible for the actions of the defendant.
Whilst this excerpt was not directly about consent, it was maintaining a focus on the victim-
survivor’s agency in an attempt to obscure the defendant’s acts of admitted deception. This
excerpt positioned the victim-survivor as in some part responsible for letting the defendant into
her home. This draws on victim-blaming attitudes that are prevalent in our society by focusing
on what the victim-survivor ‘could’ or ‘should’ have done to protect herself, rather than tackling
the predatory, violent behaviour of men. This framing serves as a tool for downplaying the
seriousness of the defendant’s actions. The phrasing of the questions positioned the victim-
survivor’s agency at the forefront and thus obscured the agency of the defendant who
intentionally deceived her by pretending to be not one but two fictitious characters. In his
closing remarks, the defence linked the victim-blaming questioning about the victim-survivor’s




   
             
             
            
 
              
                
             
       
     
              
             
                
            
              
                  
      
   
            
      
               
              
               
             
          
   
              
           
           
EXTRACT 4t
“… just how naïve [victim-survivor] was. [No ID, no massage table, massage not
happening in the living room or the conservatory], so at what point did [victim-
survivor] fail to understand that this was not a professional massage?” (Defence,
T3).
The implication here is that the victim-survivor thought it was a professional massage because
she had been “naïve” and “stupid” and this was why she thought the defendant was a
professional masseur, which deflected from and obscured that the defendant had engaged in
a purposeful drawn-out deception on multiple levels.
4.2.3 Victim-survivors’ capacity to consent
Alcohol intoxication often plays a prominent role in rape cases (HMCPSI, 2007; Lovett and
Horvath, 2009; Hester, 2013; MOPAC, 2019). My sample, however, included only two trials
with mention of alcohol. In T1, alcohol played a prominent role in the narrative about capacity
to consent. Additionally, victim-survivors’ alcohol consumption was used to form classed and
gendered narratives about ‘respectable’ sexualities in both T1 and T4 (see section 6.2.2). The
discussion here will focus on T1 and the capacity to consent, the focus of which for the jury
was clearly stated by the judge:
EXTRACT 4u
“Consent is the issue. Drunken consent is still consent… A regretted drunken
consent is not non-consent.” (Judge, T1)
In T1 both alleged rapes took place after the victim-survivor and defendant had been out
drinking together. There was therefore a lot of questioning focused on alcohol consumption in
order to determine the level of intoxication of both the victim-survivor and the defendant. The
prosecution’s case was that the victim-survivor was passed out asleep after consuming large
amounts of alcohol and therefore had no capacity to consent:
EXTRACT 4v
“This message is significant: ‘How did I end up without clothes on?’. Her
concerns are clear. [[Victim-survivor] says she challenged him the morning after,




                 
                 
             
             
            
              
               
               
  
   
             
            
              
 
              
                 
                  
             
               
  
          
          
          
    
       
    
        
     
                 
                
               
sex, therefore it is significant that he did not tell her about it.] She said ‘I really
hope we didn’t have sex’. [That is clear that she didn’t want to, she didn’t want it
to happen.] The defendant says that it stopped because they both decided. The
Crown is saying no, something happened that meant it stopped, she woke up.
She cannot consent when asleep, she was unconscious from sleep. The Crown
says that is why he was scared to tell her about it.” (Prosecution, T1)
Whereas the defence’s case was that the victim-survivor was not as drunk as she claimed,
suggesting she was not indeed asleep, and so had consented to sexual intercourse with the
defendant:
EXTRACT 4w
“[Victim] says she was sooooo drunk that she doesn’t remember, that she was
asleep, comatose, drifting in and out of consciousness. Yet the back calculation
on alcohol shows she was not so drunk that she would be comatose.” (Defence,
T1)
Here the defence used scientific evidence to support his argument that the victim-survivor was
not as drunk as she claimed and in doing so had distanced her from the prosecution’s portrayal
of her as unconscious at the time of the initiation of the alleged offence. He then used the
victim-survivor’s mother’s testimony to bolster that argument: “You heard from her mother that
she was fine, not drunk” (Defence, T1). She had not in fact testified as such:
EXTRACT 4x
Judge You spoke to her the night before?
Mother Yes, several times. Once before midnight, again after 2am,
she called to say goodnight, cos that’s the kind of
relationship we had.
Judge And she sounded fine?
Mother Yes!
Defence You had no difficulty understanding her?
Mother No! (T1)
The victim-survivor’s mother had said she sounded fine, but she had not said that she was not
drunk. The defence had therefore given a certainty of meaning to the mother’s words that was




               
              
                
              
              
            
                  
               
                  
                 
                  
                
                
                 
             
             
            
     
                
               
              
              
               
              
               
             
             
            
daughter not being drunk. Furthermore, in using this to bolster his argument, he ignored the
testimony of two other witnesses who testified that the victim-survivor was drunk and falling
asleep on the way home, whereas the mother had spoken to the victim-survivor on the phone,
she had not seen her. This practice is what Rosulek (2015) terms ‘silencing’ and ‘de-
emphasising’, whereby a barrister gives very little or no attention to inconvenient evidence that
contests the argument they are putting forth in their closing remarks.
In her summing-up of the evidence, the judge directed the jury to read a specific section of the
digital bundle carefully and then drew their attention to one message in particular sent from
victim-survivor to defendant: “She says ‘I know I have a drink problem, I get fucked all the time
now’” (Judge, T1). It is unclear what the relevance of this piece of evidence could have been
to the issues the jury was to decide about. The statement the judge made would not help the
jury in deciding whether or not there was consent. That this message was included in the
evidence was questionable enough, but for the judge to directly draw the jury’s attention to it
as a point to consider regarding the credibility of her account seems to be drawing directly on
narratives that position women who have consumed alcohol as unreliable and incredible. As
is discussed in Chapter Six, much of the questioning around this victim-survivor’s alcohol
consumption drew on gendered and classed cultural narratives of respectability, and thus
helped to undermine her credibility.
The assertion of the defence in T1, that the victim-survivor was not raped and instead had
consensual sex whilst drunk which she later regretted, is not unusual. It reflects a common
rape myth, that women often lie about rape after regretful sex. Indeed, previous court
observation studies have shown this defence argument is not uncommon (Temkin et al. 2016;
Lees 1996). Research has found that in cases involving intoxication jurors are likely to raise
this myth during their deliberations (Gunby et al., 2012). Defence barristers are of course
entitled to make this argument, and jurors entitled to consider it, however the notion itself
draws on problematic gendered narratives firmly shaped by a long history of scrutinising
women’s sexuality. This narrative is valuable to defence barristers because of the widespread




               
            
               
                 
              
             
           
           
  
               
               
              
            
               
            
              
                  
              
                
  
   
               
            
     
                
                
          
               
draws on victim-blaming attitudes. This is because there is a tendency for people to attribute
more blame and responsibility to victim-survivors who were voluntarily intoxicated when they
were raped (Schuller and Wall, 1998; ICM, 2005; Finch and Munro, 2005; Finch and Munro,
2007; Gunby et al. 2012). All witnesses in the trial were questioned by both the defence and
prosecution about the victim-survivor’s level of intoxication. There was far less focus on the
defendant’s level of intoxication, which reflects the double standard previously noted by Finch
and Munro (2005) whereby whilst intoxicated victim-survivors are viewed as more
blameworthy, intoxicated perpetrators are viewed as less blameworthy (Grubb and Turner,
2012).
The above extracts also provide an avenue to offer a critique of the evidential presumptions.
Had the prosecution been able to convince the jury that the victim-survivor was asleep, an
evidential presumption would mean the burden of proof was shifted and the defence would
have some responsibility to show that the victim-survivor had indeed consented.
The defence deflected from this with the argument that the back calculation of blood alcohol
levels proved the victim-survivor would not have been unconscious from alcohol. The
prosecution had not suggested that she was. The prosecution’s position was that she had
drunk a lot of alcohol and they had been out very late, therefore her tiredness had made it
more difficult to rouse from sleep when the defendant began sexual activity. The defence
therefore used the alcohol to distract from the issue of sleep meaning there was no capacity
for consent:
EXTRACT 4y
“Moving on to the victim’s claims that she was asleep. What she describes is not
being asleep, she says comatose, drifting, frozen. These are not words indicative
of being asleep.” (Defence, T1)
The defence ignored that colloquial uses of words do not always match their literal or original
meanings and stated that ‘drifting’ is not congruent with sleeping, despite that fact that it is
commonly associated with states of sleep/sleepiness. He presented the victim-survivor’s




               
            
             
              
              
              
              
              
               
             
   
         
                 
               
            
           
            
            
               
                   
 
   
            
           
              
               
                
  
that it was quite possible for the victim-survivor to have been in various states of
consciousness throughout the incident. He further ignored that ‘freezing’ is a common
response to rape (see section 4.3.1.1 for more on ‘freezing’). The prosecution missed
opportunities to push back against this tactic, for example that the text exchanges appeared
to support a lack of consciousness when sexual activity took place. Previous interviews with
barristers have demonstrated that there is a confusion about and reluctance to engage with
the presumptions outlined in s.75 of the SOA (Carline and Gunby, 2011). My observations
support this, as the presumptions were not mentioned in court despite their apparent relevance
and the prosecution barrister missed an opportunity to use them by allowing the defence to
detract from the evidence that the victim-survivor was asleep, not simply unconscious from
alcohol consumption.
4.3 Myths about the defendant’s reasonable belief in consent
The law on consent in E&W says that there must be a reasonable belief in consent. This
standard allows defence barristers to argue that even where a woman says she did not
consent, the defendant ‘reasonably’ believed that she did. To demonstrate a defendant’s
reasonable belief, defence barristers in my observations used resistance narratives and
narratives that focused on the victim-survivor’s pre-assault behaviour. Agency was a clear
theme throughout these narratives. Aspects of pre-assault behaviour that came under scrutiny
were flirting and variations of the ‘coffee myth’, which wrongly suggests that consent is implied
when a woman offers or accepts an invitation to go inside (for coffee) with a man after a night
out.
4.3.1 Victim-survivors’ resistance
Resistance narratives formed part of the overarching narrative defence barristers used to
demonstrate defendants’ reasonable belief in consent through drawing on the misconception
that women should and always do actively resist rape. The narratives employed by defence
counsel differed according to the level of resistance a victim-survivor had made, and so the





      
              
               
             
              
               
               
           
             
              
              
             
   
          
            
        
    
     
             
       
      
       
  
           
         
         
        
        
 
                  
                
             
              
4.3.1.1 Making little or no resistance
Victim-survivors making little or no resistance was used by defence barristers to argue that
the defendants had reasonable belief in consent. This narrative was employed in T1, T3 and
T4. Scholars have previously noted the linguistic constructions of agency and non-agency in
rape trial narratives. For example, Susan Ehrlich’s (2001) concept of a grammar of non-agency
identifies ways in which defendants use a “variety of linguistic resources that all work to
represent him as innocent of unlawful sexual acts of aggression” (p.38). The use of particular
grammatical constructions helps defendants mitigate, diffuse, and obscure their agency, as
well as relocate agentive acts to the victim-survivors (Coates, Bavelas and Gibson, 1994;
Ehrlich, 2001). Put another way, the linguistic choices of defendants and their barristers wholly
or partially remove agency from the defendant and place it with the victim-survivor, thus
implying a reasonable belief in consent. The following example from T1 exemplifies this:
EXTRACT 4z
Defence You put a film on, then what happens?
Defendant We lay on the bed, flirting, full on kissing.
Defence Were you both fully clothed?
Defendant Yeah.
Defence Then what?
Defendant She was touching me and I was touching her back
Defence Over or under clothes?
Defendant Over at first.
Defence How did it progress?
…
Defendant More kissing, then we took our clothes off.
Judge Who took whose clothes off?
Defendant We took our own clothes off.
Defence Did you talk at all?
Defendant We were talking, yes. (T1)
In this exchange the defendant framed all actions as mutual and the only time he said “I” was
as a response to the victim-survivor’s actions: “She was touching me and I was touching her
back”. Through this exchange he placed more agency with the victim-survivor’s actions, thus




               
               
 
   
          
    
     
              
               
               
             
  
  
           
    
        
      
       
           
      
     
           
              
                
              
 
   
              
   
    
survivor’s behaviour. The next example from the same part of the trial illustrates how agentless
passives were used by the defence barrister to form a grammar of non-agency for the
defendant:
EXTRACT 4aa
Defence Clothing came off, her underwear was removed but she
kept her bra on?
Defendant Yeah. (T1)
The only agency attribution in this example was placed with the victim-survivor. Agency was
placed with the defendant only where it benefited his overall narrative of reasonable belief in
consent, the rest of the time a grammar of non-agency was employed. Thus, as the
questioning continued the defendant did accept agency where it strengthened his claim to
innocence:
EXTRACT 4ab
Defence Did you put your penis in her vagina?
Defendant Yes.
Defence How long did it last?
Defendant Not that long.
Defence Why did it stop?
Defendant She said she didn’t want to do it.
Defence So you stopped?
Defendant Yes. (T1)
Here the defendant acknowledged verbal resistance from the victim-survivor (although the
prosecution’s case was that the victim-survivor was asleep so could not have consented) and
accepted agency (at least in part) in stopping. By accepting his agency at this point, the
defendant distanced himself from ‘rape’ and ‘rapist’. This was in contrast to the prosecution’s
representation:
EXTRACT 4ac






            
     
     
            
     
     
             
             
                  
               
         
  
         
              
    
  
          
     
              
               
                 
                
                 
               
               
                
               
                 
  
 
Prosecution I suggest you entered her while she was asleep, so you
did not get her consent.
Defendant No, never.
Prosecution She woke up after you had penetrated her and that’s when
she said, ‘No not now’.
Defendant No. (T1)
Here the prosecution presented the victim-survivor as passive through sleep and making the
verbal resistance when she woke. The victim-survivor was not questioned about this verbal
resistance as she had not remembered saying it and so it was not in her evidence. This extract
related to the first alleged rape, whereas the victim-survivor did recall making resistance in the
second alleged rape, which she detailed in her ABE:
EXTRACT 4ad
Police Did you make any verbal resistance?
Victim-survivor I said ‘Get off’ when he kept pulling my hand to him…I don’t
remember him saying anything.
…
Police So you said stop 3 times?
Victim-survivor Yeah. (ABE interview, T1)
There was no cross-examination on this because the victim-survivor said she could no longer
remember. The prosecution could have raised this part of her ABE in re-examination in order
to clarify, however, whilst he did ask about the defendant pulling her hand towards him, he fell
short of asking about her pulling it away. Although it was arguably implied in the victim-survivor
saying it happened “several times” and saying “I didn’t want it to happen”, it was not made
clear at this point that she had actively resisted by repeatedly pulling her hand away.
In contrast, the cross-examination of the victim-survivors in T3 and T4 drew directly on the
misconception that women should and do always actively resist. As in T1, the defence in T3
used a grammar of agency to bring scrutiny to the victim-survivor’s actions through saying that





   
         
           
             
            
              
                 
             
  
   
                 
            
            
 
   
           
                
       
             
                  
           
              
                   
              
               
                
              
                 
EXTRACT 4ae
Defence […] then you let the massage continue.
Victim-survivor Yes, like I said, I wasn’t sure […] (T3)
This framing reflected the ‘inferred consent’ narrative Ehrlich (2015) found in a Canadian
context, where the victim-survivor’s passivity was taken to imply consent. This stance
completely ignores that it is common for victim-survivors to freeze during a sexual assault
(Galliano et al., 1993; Rothschild, 2000; Nurius et al., 2004; Heidi et al., 2005). Indeed, this is
precisely how the victim-survivor had described it in her ABE and reiterated during cross-
examination:
EXTRACT 4af
“It was almost like I sort of froze, thinking, ‘Is this normal? No. What should I do?’
so I just stayed there and let him finish.” (ABE interview, T3)
The defence explicitly framed the victim-survivor’s response as abnormal in his closing
speech:
EXTRACT 4ag
“[Her Honour has directed you about not making assumptions about reactions,
but in this case you may…] you may find it somewhat surprising as to why she
took no action at all” (Defence, T3)
Whilst the defence acknowledged the judge’s ‘myth-busting’ direction, he went on to explain
to the jury that this case was an exception; a tactic also noted by Smith (2018). He bolstered
this claim through continuing to frame the victim-survivor’s post-assault behaviour as
suspicious, which is discussed further in section 5.2. The defence’s assertions drew on rational
ideals that suggest there is a ‘normal’ way to respond to rape, when in fact it is well established
that there is no such thing (Rothschild, 2000; Lodrick 2007). Furthermore, by placing agency
with the victim-survivors defence barristers are able to frame a lack of resistance as an
indicator of consent. The implicit argument being that if a victim-survivor did not resist, it would
be reasonable for a defendant to believe she was consenting. Indeed, that argument was




             
              
  
          
   
       
   
            
   
             
   
         
          
   
              
  
      
             
                
               
              
           
             
 
   
      
   
          
     
          
   
      
   
defence counsel in T4 pointed out opportunities where the victim-survivor could have made
resistance and additionally drew on the absence of force to bolster his narrative:
EXTRACT 4ah
Defence You didn’t say that you didn’t want to?
Victim-survivor No.
Defence He didn’t force you?
Victim-survivor No.
Defence To be clear, he undid his trousers, not you?
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Defence [You pulled into the layby… Why didn’t you just get out of
the car then?]
Victim-survivor Where would I go? In a field?
Defence [There was a lorry in the layby…]
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Defence [Did you get out of the car, scream, bang on the door of
the lorry?]
Victim-survivor No, I didn’t. (T4)
The defendant in T4 had multiple convictions related to domestic abuse against the victim-
survivor, including some that he pleaded guilty to at the outset of the trial. The prosecution’s
case was that the victim-survivor did not freely consent, and the defendant did not reasonably
believe that she was consenting, therefore the consent narratives in this trial centered on
coercion, compliance, and resistance. Later in the cross-examination the defence barrister
used the victim-survivor’s agentive acts and the absence of verbal resistance to suggest
consent:
EXTRACT 4ai
Defence You were on top.
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Defence How did you get in that position?
Victim-survivor Just rolling about.
Judge You got on top of him?
Victim-survivor Yeah.





         
   
           
   
            
  
      
               
               
 
  
                
                 
               
                 
              
               
           
          
  
            
                  
                
              
                 
           
              
               
             
                   
             
Defence Was it something that just happened?
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Defence [A follow on from touching each other sexually?]
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Defence [You didn’t tell [defendant] at any time you didn’t want to
do that?]
Victim-survivor No, I didn’t. (T4)
The implicit suggestion here is that rape can only happen in certain sexual positions, that
‘woman on top’ cannot be rape, and was summed up clearly in defence counsel’s closing
speech:
EXTRACT 4aj
“[there was no indication from her of a lack of willingness on her part. He didn’t
have to repeat what he said, he didn’t have to lean over … ‘It just happened’, she
says, ‘We touched each other sexually, I took my own clothes off, had sex without
any discussion, I just went on top, rolling around and I ended up on top’. She did
that unprompted, without being asked, no force or threat.] Dare I say, that woman
on top during sex may not be what you imagine when the word rape is
mentioned…you may think that suggests an element of control for the
woman…wouldn’t it be entirely reasonable for [defendant] to presume consent?”
(Defence, T4)
This assertion completely obscured the power dynamics involved in intimate partner violence.
Men who are violent towards their partners often do not need to resort to violence or threat in
order to obtain sex because the underlying pattern of abuse works as an effective tool of
coercion (Kelly, 1987; Hamby and Koss, 2003). Becoming an active participant in this context
offers women a way to manage risk (Dowds, 2020). That women can be raped even as an
active participant demonstrates the problematic nature of defence assertions that a victim-
survivor’s limited resistance can be taken to prove a defendant’s reasonable belief in consent.
In this case, the jury appeared to recognise this because they found the defendant guilty,
thereby rejecting the defence’s apparent assertion that rape can only happen in ‘submissive’
sex positions. That is, however, not to say that the law in this area is easily applied by jurors




    
             
               
              
           
           
   
               
         
         
             
     
   
       
         
                
           
 
   
            
        
       
        
      
         
           
             
           
              
          
          
   
             
    
4.3.1.2 Making active resistance
In T2, the victim-survivor made physical and verbal resistance when the defendant (her long-
term boyfriend) instigated sex. Her physical and verbal resistance was laid out in minute detail
through the prosecution’s questioning and in the statement she gave to police. The defence
barrister cross-examined extensively about the exact timing of when the victim-survivor
verbally resisted in relation to when the defendant penetrated her:
EXTRACT 4ak
Defence [You say you told him ‘no get off me’, it appears to me that
you said it before he had actually penetrated you]
Victim-survivor I told him to get off me.
Defence Look at your statement, all the words that you say you said
happen before he penetrated you.
Victim-survivor No.
Judge <Re-worded defence’s question>
Victim-survivor It says I kept telling him. (T2)
In an attempt to demonstrate her point, the defence barrister then read out part of the victim-
survivor’s police statement where she described what happened, then continued her
argument:
EXTRACT 4al
Defence So in your statement, all the words are before.
Victim-survivor It says I kept telling him.
Defence But that was before.
Victim-survivor [It says I kept telling him].
Defence Then he replied.
Victim-survivor Yeah and I kept telling him throughout.
Defence Well that is a matter for the jury.
Judge [You have to put it in the whole context].
Defence <Reads the whole section of the statement>. [You felt him
get on top, then he tried to put his penis in your vagina.] All
of your words in your statement come before that part
where you say he put his penis in your vagina.
Victim-survivor Yes.





                
            
             
               
                 
                 
         
                 
             
              
                
               
                 
              
               
                
                
              
              
              
                
             
             
             
               
                   
              
             
Here the defence was arguing that saying ‘no’ before the penetration took place was not an
indication of non-consent. Through this questioning, the defence implied that the defendant
could have reasonably believed the victim-survivor was consenting because she did not say
‘no’ after he penetrated her, which is plainly wrong and a worrying assertion. Accordingly, the
judge made clear in his summing-up that the timing of the verbal resistance does not need to
be after penetration. That said, it is unclear why such a line of questioning was allowed to
continue when it was irrelevant and arguably misleading.
Resistance is not required or common in rape, but is seen as an element that bolsters a victim-
survivor’s story. This is clearly demonstrated in the way prosecution use resistance narratives
to strengthen their cases (see section 4.3.1.3). It therefore becomes beneficial for the defence
to undermine any claims of resistance, as in the extract above. This narrative drew on the
persistent myth that women often offer token resistance to sex (Edwards, et al., 2011), i.e.
‘when women say no they really mean yes’, which leads to this notion of not having resisted
enough for it to be non-consensual. Burgin (2018) linked the token resistance myth to socio-
sexual scripts that form a narrative of ‘seduction’ whereby upon hearing a woman’s ‘no’ it
becomes the man’s role to persuade her to have sex and that this constitutes a romantic
interaction. This is indeed reflected in the above example, in that the defence had framed the
victim-survivor’s ‘no’ as being before penetration and therefore it was not rape, the implication
being that the defendant had ‘successfully convinced’ her to consent. Ehrlich (1998) also noted
the influence of token resistance, where she identified ways in which defendants attempt to
redefine consent to fit their own narrative. Again, this is precisely what the defence in this
example attempted to do in her interrogation of the timing of penetration.
The victim-survivor in T2 had confronted the defendant via digital messaging about him
ignoring her resistance. The message extracts are provided and discussed in section 7.4.1,
so the following is a brief summary to give context for the current discussion. The victim-
survivor used the phrase “you climbed on top of me when I said no” in her challenge to the
defendant, which he did not respond to. The prosecution posited that because the defendant




             
                  
             
               
             
              
               
                 
            
               
                
                
                
               
                    
             
              
               
                
               
            
             
             
                 
               
                
               
            
was accurate. The defendant therefore claimed that he thought the victim-survivor was talking
about “the way [he’d] argue with her and stand over her” (T2). In doing this he undermined the
resistance narrative through what Hlavka and Mulla (2018) term the ‘animation’ of digital
evidence. That is, digital evidence being made corroborative through the manner in which it is
deployed at trial. Digital messaging captures the exact wording used, therefore through the
‘animation’ of digital evidence the prosecution and the defence were able to attribute entirely
different meanings to a commonly used colloquial term. In this case, the jury acquitted the
defendant and whilst it is not possible to know the reasoning behind the jury’s decision, it is
notable that the resistance narrative and the defendant’s reinterpretation of the digital
messaging evidence were central to the arguments throughout. Even if the jury did accept the
prosecution’s argument with regards to the meaning of “you climbed on top me when I said
no”, the not guilty verdict would mean that the verbal resistance of saying ‘no’ was not
considered enough to count as non-consent, which goes back to the myth of token resistance.
Myths about resistance stem from the ‘real rape’ stereotype that says women who are raped
call out for help, try to fight off their attacker and sustain injury as a result. Rape laws in E&W
were historically constructed based on this assumption and the assumption that women often
make false allegations of rape (Munro, 2010). Whilst there has been a growing awareness
among the public that ‘real rape’ does not accurately reflect the most common experiences of
rape, these narratives remain persistent. In E&W there is no longer a requirement for a woman
to be subjected to force and to verbally or physically resist in order to demonstrate non-
consent. Yet research from multiple jurisdictions frequently points to the existence of
resistance narratives at rape trials (Ehrlich, 2001; Burgin, 2019; Smith, 2018). Smith and
Skinner (2017) found that trial narratives often focused on the resistance of victim-survivors
and what they did to remove consent, rather than the steps taken by the defendant to obtain
it. Although the English and Welsh model of consent does not require that defendants take
steps to ascertain consent, they are required to explain to investigators what steps, if any, they
did take (CPS, undated). This leads to juries considering resistance as a factor relevant to




          
     
      
               
            
                
            
     
                
           
  
         
   
        
   
        
               
            
      
         
   
          
               
  
           
    
            
          
   
              
                
             
narratives (Burgin, 2019; Dowds, 2020). Accordingly, the next sub-section explores
prosecution reliance on resistance narratives.
4.3.1.3 Prosecution use of resistance narratives
Although the English and Welsh model of consent means there is no requirement that a victim-
survivor make verbal or physical resistance, resistance narratives are commonly employed by
prosecution barristers as a way of strengthening their case. In T1, T2 and T3, the prosecution
used resistance narratives to bolster their cases because, as outlined above, the victim-
survivors did make resistance.
In T4, where in contrast to the other adult cases the victim-survivor did not make resistance,
the prosecution questioning sought to justify the absence of active resistance:
EXTRACT 4am
Prosecution Did you want to give oral sex?
Victim-survivor No.
Judge Did you say that?
Victim-survivor No.
Prosecution Did you have a choice?
Victim-survivor [No, I didn’t think I did, I just wanted to keep the peace and
get away, I would have done anything to get away, I dunno
maybe I’m gone in the head].
Prosecution You say you never said no.
Victim-survivor No.
Prosecution Did you think you had a choice?
Victim-survivor No, I just had to keep the peace so I could get away.
…
Prosecution Generally about the sex at [defendant’s] flat, did you think
you had a choice?
Victim-survivor No, <crying> I just wanted to keep him happy, it never
worked, I just weren’t good enough, I’d have done anything
for him. (T4)
In this example the judge intervened to ask whether the victim-survivor had voiced her non-
consent, which is especially troubling given that she later gives a direction to the jury regarding




                   
              
              
                
                
                
                 
               
            
               
                
             
              
             
              
             
               
              
            
                
             
              
              
                  
              
 
                
          
may give the false impression that it is a point salient to the issue of consent. This is because
in adversarial legal systems, judges are considered by those involved, including juries, to be
impartial referees and are therefore trusted to be balanced (Smith, 2018). Indeed, Carline et
al. (2020) found that barristers shared the view that juries give weight to the judge’s words.
Whilst there is no obligation on a defendant to have taken steps to ascertain consent (Judicial
College, 2019), they are required to explain to police and prosecutors what steps, if any, they
did take (CPS <what is consent? doc>, n.d.). Dowds (2020) suggests that this may lead a jury
to wrongly conclude there was consent or reasonable belief in consent based on an absence
of clear resistance. Relatedly, Smith and Skinner (2017) argued that prosecuting barristers’
reliance on resistance narratives draws on the ‘real rape’ stereotype and as a result legitimates
the defence’s use of it. Burgin (2019) made a similar argument in an Australian context.
Hovdestad and Renner (2021), however, argue that the prosecution bringing evidence of a
victim-survivor’s resistance does not constitute a rape myth and should therefore not be seen
as problematic. This is because consensual sexual encounters do not usually involve one
party resisting it.12 The absence of resistance, however, cannot be said to indicate consent
because it is known that victim-survivors often do not resist. Therefore, when defence
barristers point to lack of resistance as justifying a reasonable belief in consent, they are
drawing on a rape myth (Hovdestad and Renner, 2021). Hovdestad and Renner further argue
that the prosecution bringing evidence of resistance does not legitimate defence arguments
that are based on the ‘real rape’ myth. Prosecutors can therefore correctly argue that acts of
resistance are consistent with rape and support the allegations, but defence counsel cannot
correctly argue that a lack of resistance is consistent with consensual sex and therefore
undermines the allegations (Hovdestad and Renner, 2021). It would be right for the defence
to rebut the evidence brought by the prosecution, but if they simply point to a lack of resistance
as an indicator of consent or reasonable belief then it has no relevance.
12 Where elements of ‘real rape’ may appear in consensual sex, such as in BDSM, explicit




               
              
             
             
  
  
             
         
       
 
            
           
            
     
   
              
           
             
   
              
               
                    
               
                  
                
           
                
  
            
            
             
The ease with which the ‘real rape’ stereotype can pervade trial narratives was also evident
in the persistence of the stereotype in victim-survivors’ own narratives at trial. My observations
show that the ‘real rape’ stereotype remained relevant for women in identifying their
experiences. For example, in T2 the victim-survivor twice referenced it when giving her
evidence-in-chief:
EXTRACT 4an
Victim-survivor Well, it was hard to come to terms with [because when you
think about rape you normally think about strangers and
shouting and screaming]. I only told [friend].
…
Prosecution So you were at your mum’s and the relationship is over.
You messaged [friend] saying ‘I think I was raped but I’m
not sure if it counts, I wasn’t kicking and screaming but I
said no the whole time’.
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Prosecution [Tell us the thought process about ‘not sure if it counts’]
Victim-survivor Well because we were in a relationship, and when you
think of rape you think of a back alley with some guy you
don’t know. (T2)
Similarly, in the above previous extract from T4, when the victim-survivor was questioned to
justify her lack of resistance, she gave her explanation but then seemed to second guess
herself when she said, “I dunno, maybe I’m gone in the head” (T4). Also of note in T4 is that
the victim-survivor had never used the word rape to describe her experiences. As the officer
in the case (OIC) stated in her live testimony: “she never said she has been raped. She said
she’d had sex under certain conditions because she was in fear of him” (T4). This again
demonstrates the difficulty victim-survivors have in reconciling their experiences against the
‘real rape’ stereotype and that this difficulty can in part be attributed to the expectation of
resistance.
The resistance narratives discussed in this section overlap with narratives about the victim-
survivor’s pre-assault behaviour (such as perceived flirtations; see section 4.3.2) to form




              
               
              
           
               
             
            
        
       
             
            
              
  
            
             
  
   
 
             
           
 
            
              
           
    
   
              
  
   
              
    
(Burgin and Flynn, 2019). Cossins (2020) posits that these narratives emerge at trial, even
though implied consent forms no part of substantive law in E&W, because the court allows
defence counsel to raise the ‘moral propriety’ of victim-survivors and thus jurors are permitted
to scrutinise a victim-survivor’s character and behaviour through consideration of extra-legal
factors. Jurors are then invited to use their ‘common sense’ and ‘life experience’ in deciding
their verdict, which amounts to permissive reliance on rape myths and broader cultural
narratives to form judgements on victim-survivors’ character, behaviour, and morality as a
proxy for deciding on consent (Cossins, 2020).
4.3.2 Victim-survivors perceived flirting as sexual provocation
Reasonable belief in consent was also established using references to flirtation between the
victim-survivor and defendant. For example, in T1, the victim-survivor was frequently accused
of leading the defendant on, both implicitly and explicitly because of apparent flirting:
EXTRACT 4ao
Defence …You would spend a lot of time together. You would argue




Defence You would cuddle. You would ask him for a cuddle.
Victim-survivor Yeah like you cuddle your friends, like you cuddle girl
friends.
Defence [Okay. You would cuddle, you would ask him for a cuddle.
He had told you that he was in love with you, you were well
aware of his feelings and you were desperate not to lose
him as a friend].
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence There came a time when he said he didn’t want to carry on
the friendship.
Victim-survivor Yes.





             
                  
                
              
             
                
                
     
              
    
  
            
          
   
   
           
             
       
      
            
 
      
        
           
           
     
            
                 
                   
              
              
               
In the extract above, the defence highlighted the closeness between the victim-survivor and
the defendant. The defence put it to her that “you would ask him for a cuddle” positioning her
as the instigator of close contact. When her reply clarified it as platonic contact the defence
counsel repeated the statement “you would ask him for a cuddle” before directly referencing
her awareness of the defendant’s feelings towards her. This also draws on victim-blaming
narratives that position women who ‘tease’ men as more culpable for their own rape, i.e. they
were ‘asking for it’, and defendants as less culpable (Abrams et al., 2003; Krahé, Temkin and
Bieneck, 2007; Fraser, 2015).
As the following extract shows, the defence immediately went on to frame the victim-survivor’s
actions as selfish:
EXTRACT 4ap
Defence [But you didn’t want to lose him, so you initiated contact,
knowing that it would hurt him. You contacted him to
rekindle the relationship].
Victim-survivor Friendship.
Defence [I’m not suggesting it was a sexual relationship. You were
at the club, happy to see each other. Is it true that you
asked him to go on a date?]
Victim-survivor No, he asked me.
Defence But you used the term date when you were speaking about
it.
Victim-survivor Best friends day out.
Defence Did you use that term?
Victim-survivor I said it’s a day out just for us.
Defence He was pleased, he used the term date.
Victim-survivor He did. (T1)
These examples illustrate part of the defence’s overarching narrative that the victim-survivor
knew the defendant had feelings for her, selfishly lead him on, had sex with him then regretted
it and so lied about rape. The idea that women lie about rape has been embedded in the legal
system for hundreds of years (Smith, forthcoming) and is reflected in the persistently common
misconception that false allegations of rape are common (see section 6.3.1). The narrative in




              
           
              
                 
            
             
               
              
  
              
            
                 
                 
                
           
             
               
                  
          
            
               
             
           
            
             
                 
             
 
to sex. It suggests that had the victim-survivor not encouraged the defendant then the
incidents would not have occurred, thereby simultaneously blaming the victim-survivor and
excusing the defendant’s alleged actions. The idea that women lie about rape after regretful
sex is discussed further in section 6.3.1. For now, the discussion will focus on the notion of
perceived sexual provocation as establishing a reasonable belief in consent. Scholars have
previously noted the linguistic constructions of agency and non-agency in rape trial narratives.
In the above excerpt, the defence uses a grammar of agency (Ehrlich 2001) when speaking
about the victim-survivor’s actions, thereby placing her behaviour at the centre rather than the
defendant’s.
The defence also drew on the defendant’s unrequited feelings for the victim-survivor to garner
sympathy (discussed further in section 7.3). The defence positioned the victim-survivor as
having power over the defendant, which is in stark contrast to the power dynamics of rape. It
draws on the sexist idea that women often lead men on for attention or validation, with some
even going so far as to argue that women ‘leading men on’ constitutes sexual abuse (e.g.
Mantyla, 2018). Studies have found increased blame attribution when perceived sexual
provocation was involved (see Gravelin, Biernat and Bucher, 2019, for an overview). In
particular, studies have shown that women who initiate contact or dates are viewed as more
culpable if they are raped and that some men view being ‘led on’ as a justification for rape
(Muehlenhard and Linton, 1987; Muehlenhard, 1988; Muehlenhard and MacNaughton, 1988).
These public attitudes remain prevalent (e.g., ICM 2005, End Violence Against Women
Coalition [EVAW] 2018), and therefore it can be assumed that some jurors may subscribe to
these views. This gives sway to defence narratives that frame victim-survivors as sexual
provocateurs. Indeed, McGlynn (2017) points out how these vague references to victim-
survivors’ sexual character serve to undermine their ‘moral credibility’, thus positioning them
as undeserving of sympathy and minimising the defendant’s actions. This narrative was used
by the defendant in T1, who gave a conflicting account of who had suggested a date and




   
            
              
            
          
    
            
          
          
 
                     
              
                  
              
               
     
   
               
                
                
                
               
        
              
                
           
                
               
              
             
   
EXTRACT 4aq
Defence And there was talk of going on a date?
Defendant Yeah, she said to me ‘If you wouldn’t mind, I’d love for you
to take me on a date’ and I said I’d love to.
Defence [So you bought her drinks all evening?]
Defendant Yes.
Defence [How was she acting towards you in the club?]
Defendant [Different, she was flirty, always wanting to cuddle me,
always wanting to kiss me. Full on kissing like snogging.]
(T1)
This drew on the myth that if a woman flirts with a man she must want to have sex with him,
and that flirting implies consent for later sexual activity (McGlynn, 2017; Burgin and Flynn
2019). The purpose appears to be to draw on that rape myth to suggest consent, or that the
defendant could have reasonably believed there was consent, which is a tactic noted by
defence barristers in Carline and Gunby’s research (2011). In T1, this tactic was made clear
in the defence’s closing remarks:
EXTRACT 4ar
“[You know that they frequently shared a bed together. She knew that he was in
love with her, that he was infatuated. You know she knew he broke it off because
she couldn’t feel the same. You know she got desperate to be back with him, you
know she said that she wanted to see if she had sexual feelings for him. You
know she was snogging him. You know they were like a couple that night, no
flirting with others. You know that.]” (Defence, T1)
This narrative worked together with resistance narratives in this trial (see section 4.3.1) and
both narratives relied on the grammar of agency and non-agency to shift focus and blame onto
the victim-survivor’s actions. The framing of women’s everyday behaviour as indicating
consent is referred to by Ehrlich (2015) as ‘inferred consent’ and by Burgin and Flynn (2019)
as ‘implied consent’ (see also Cossins, 2020). In the context of Australian rape trials, Burgin
and Flynn (2019) argued that narratives of implied consent function at trial to provide





               
               
              
           
   
            
        
  
            
   
   
             
            
                 
             
            
             
            
           
               
               
             
             
  
   
            
  
    
      
         
In T6, the defendant admitted to a sexual relationship with one of the victim-survivors but
claimed that it began only after the victim-survivor had turned 16, whereas she claimed it
began when she was 15. In the following example the defence highlighted the victim-survivor’s
consent whilst ignoring the broader context of age of consent violations:
EXTRACT 4as
Defence … I’m going to suggest that your evidence is that you
wanted to kiss and have sex with [defendant].
Victim-survivor1 Yes.
Defence [So what you told the police is you consented to everything
sexual with [defendant].
Victim-survivor1 Yes. (T6)
This narrative serves to excuse or minimise the defendant’s behaviour by highlighting the
victim-survivor’s agency. The historical context of age of consent laws and surrounding
discourses shows how this may be a valuable narrative for a defence barrister to draw on. For
example, historically men were often excused for statutory rape if they claimed the victim-
survivor was promiscuous (Bourke, 2008). By highlighting the sexual agency of this victim-
survivor, the defence distanced her from the ‘innocence’ often attributed to children and
ignored that contemporary discourses around age of consent focus on protecting against
exploitation (Waites, 2005; Benedet, 2010) rather than protecting ‘virginity’ (Bourke, 2008).
Some research has however indicated that this type of narrative, that which aims to highlight
victim-survivor promiscuity in age of consent cases, does not necessarily work in favour of the
defendant and may in fact work against them (Horvath and Giner-Sorolla, 2007).
Throughout this trial the defence sought to downplay the defendant’s relationship with the
victim-survivors’ mother:
EXTRACT 4at
Defence Before he was kicked out, you were not partners, it was
just sexual?
Mother Yeah.
Defence He wasn’t a stepfather?




              
               
             
            
               
             
           
              
     
        
           
               
            
                
                 
                 
                 
                
               
                
            
          
   
           
    
        
    
 
           
This arguably attempted to distance the defendant from cultural narratives of incest and child
sexual abuse, ignoring that the defendant had been in a relationship with the mother through
the victim-survivors’ early teenage years. Narratives of child sexual abuse position the younger
party as lacking in agency (Waites, 2005), therefore highlighting the victim-survivor’s agency
can distance the defendant from that narrative. The narrative in this trial obscured the power
dynamics whilst positioning the victim-survivor as a willing participant, and thus minimised the
defendant’s actions. The above extract also provides another example of victim-survivors’
mothers’ sexual history being used in trial to undermine the claims and credibility of victim-
survivors (see section 4.2.1.1).
4.3.3 Accepting and offering invitations to private spaces
Victim-survivors’ pre-assault behaviour was portrayed as an indicator of consent through
framing it as sexual provocation, and therefore relied heavily on narratives of agency. As well
as narratives about the victim-survivor’s sexual behaviour (see section 4.2.1), there were
variations on what has become known as the ‘coffee myth’. The ‘coffee myth’ refers to the
belief that the acceptance or offering of an invitation to go inside a residence with a man
implies a willingness to engage in sexual activity with that man. Whilst this line of thinking did
not present exactly as that in the trials observed in this study, there were narratives that were
clearly formed on the same premise. These narratives were mainly evident in T1 and T4.
In T1 the defence focused on the victim-survivor’s agency in meeting the defendant, and when
the defendant answered that it was his suggestion that they go to his house the defence
subsequently asked whether the victim-survivor agreed, thus placing the agency with her
acceptance of the invitation rather than the defendant’s offer:
EXTRACT 4au
Defence Whose idea was it to meet up that evening?
Defendant Hers.
Defence She came to meet you?
Defendant Yeah.
…




    
      
    
              
      
               
                  
              
               
                
                
              
              
                  
             
               
               
                  
                 
              
               
                
      
   
              
             
          
               
                 
            
Defendant Mine.
Defence Did [victim-survivor] agree?
Defendant Yes.
Defence When you got back where in the house did you go?
Defendant My bedroom. (T1)
This plays into the so-called ‘coffee myth’, which is the assumption that because a woman
invites someone in or agrees to go to someone else’s, she is agreeing to sex. Drawing on this
myth presented an avenue for the defendant’s actions to be minimised and the victim-survivor
held to bear some responsibility by focusing on her acceptance of the invitation. Arguably, it
was not necessary for the defence to ask whether the victim-survivor had agreed as that was
implied by the context of the questioning, therefore it appears that the purpose of that question
was to draw attention to the victim-survivor’s agency. The defence’s argument was that the
sex was consensual, therefore drawing on that rape myth and placing agency with the victim-
survivor in this way could be used as a tool in constructing a narrative of reasonable belief in
consent. The implication was that the defendant could reasonably believe she was consenting
because of her actions. This again reflects the notion of inferred (Ehrlich, 2015) or implied
consent (Burgin and Flynn, 2019; Cossins, 2020). It was not unusual for the victim-survivor to
stay at the defendant’s house, so the defence took a normal behaviour and recast it as a signal
of consent, or a signal the defendant could read as consent. This was bolstered by the frequent
references to flirtatious behaviour made throughout this trial, as outlined in section 4.3.2.
Similarly, the defence in T4 drew attention to the victim-survivor’s agency in entering, and not
subsequently leaving, the defendant’s car and home, and used it to bolster his narrative of the
defendant’s reasonable belief in consent:
EXTRACT 4av
“[Defendant] had no wish to keep her against her will, he was hardly concerned
about locking doors, she’s not interacting with people saying ‘fuck, I’ve just been
kidnapped and raped’ … [defendant] had no concerns about [victim-survivor]
being in the company of [friend] or others. Why wouldn’t he think that she was
there willingly when he comes out and she’s still sat in his car?! … She went in




               
                
                 
               
               
              
               
         
   
              
            
             
   
              
                 
            
         
             
            
             
            
             
             
              
            
                
          
The narrative was bolstered through ignoring the wider context of domestic abuse in this case.
As previously discussed in relation to the resistance narratives in this trial, men who are violent
and controlling towards their partners often do not need to use explicit force or threat to obtain
sex because the underlying context of abuse serves as an effective tool of coercion (Kelly,
1987; Hamby and Koss, 2003). This can be extended to the defence’s argument that the
victim-survivor went willingly into the defendant’s home and could have left at any point.
Women with abusive partners often acquiesce to their partner’s requests because of a fear of
what may happen if they do not (Stark, 2007).
4.4 Chapter summary
This chapter has provided fresh evidence of the continued reliance on rape myths about
consent and defendants’ reasonable belief in consent in courtroom narratives. These myths
and the surrounding narratives served to undermine the victim-survivors’ stories of rape and
sexual assault.
Women’s sexual behaviour was scrutinised in all trials and this included trials where s.41
rulings had been made. Whilst in two trials there was evidence of good practice in relation to
s.41, these were outnumbered by examples of questionable evidence being allowed or
unchallenged. Furthermore, the evidence presented demonstrates the difficulties in
establishing what is covered by the ‘sexual behaviour’ terminology within the legislation. My
observations suggest that in practice the phrase is being interpreted narrowly, the
consequence of which is that jurors are encouraged to make moral judgements about victim-
survivors’ behaviour in terms of perceived flirtations and their ‘sexting’ digital communications.
Additionally, it was not only victim-survivors’ sexual behaviour that was scrutinised, as was
demonstrated in the two trials involving child sexual offences. In these trials, the victim-
survivors’ mothers were questioned about their own sexual behaviour and such was used as
a mechanism to undermine the victim-survivors’ allegations. The evidence presented in this
chapter in relation to s.41 adds to the existing evidence base that questions its efficacy and




            
              
             
             
              
              
             
              
      
               
             
              
               
              
            
           
In addition to narratives about sexual behaviour, victim-blaming narratives and narratives that
focused on the agency of victim-survivors were used by defendants and defence barristers to
reinforce rape myths about consent and ‘reasonable’ belief in consent. Narratives that focused
on the victim-survivors’ agency were most commonly utilised with regards to the defendants’
‘reasonable’ belief on consent and manifested through reference to aspects of the ‘real rape’
stereotype that suggests women always can and do actively resist rape and sexual assault.
Agency narratives were also deployed against victim-survivors in order to reference the ‘coffee
myth’, which invited the jury to draw on victim-blaming attitudes to make further moral
judgements about victim-survivors’ pre-assault behaviour.
Overall, the findings discussed in this chapter support my thesis that rape myths remain a
prevalent feature of trial narratives. The following chapter bolsters this point through providing
evidence of the use of rape myths relating to victim-survivors’ post-assault behaviour and the
expected consistency of their stories. In further support of my thesis, this chapter has also
begun to highlight ways in which rape myths interact with broader cultural narratives to
undermine the credibility of victim-survivors. Further such interactions will be noted throughout




         
      
  
                
             
             
            
          
           
               
              
     
       
            
             
          
            
                
              
             
          
            
      
           
              
               
           
Chapter 5 Undermining the teller of rape: post-
assault behaviour and (in)consistency
5.1 Introduction
The observations set out in Chapter 4 delineated the ways in which rape myths about consent
and reasonable belief in consent permeated trial narratives. This chapter builds on this
evidence to show that rape myths relating to victim-survivors’ post-assault behaviour and the
expected consistency of their stories were also prevalent. These myths often manifested
through characterisations of victim-survivors’ stories as irrational or unbelievable, and
interacted with broader cultural narratives that position the victim-survivors as untrustworthy
or unreliable. The findings in this chapter therefore support my thesis that rape myths remain
prevalent in serious sexual offences trials and that they interact with broader cultural narratives
to further disadvantage victim-survivors.
5.2 Myths about the victim-survivor’s post-assault behaviour
The victim-survivors’ post-assault behaviour was framed as irrational and thereby used to
undermine their story and their credibility. Rape myths about post-assault behaviour are based
upon ignorance or misunderstandings about trauma responses and compare victim-survivors’
behaviour to what is considered ‘rational’ (Smith, 2018). For example, victim-survivors who
remain in a relationship with a perpetrator or continue to have contact with them after an
assault are often treated with suspicion. Similarly, victim-survivors who do not report to the
police immediately are often treated with suspicion. The section unpacks the narratives that
formed around the victim-survivors’ immediate responses, their continued contact with
defendants, and their decisions about when to report to the police.
5.2.1 Victim-survivors staying in the situation
Victim-survivors’ immediate responses were regularly scrutinised and held up against ideas
about what a ‘rational’ person might do. For example, in T4 the victim-survivor’s post-assault
behaviour was scrutinised and framed as ‘choice’ in much the same way as her pre-assault




   
             
              
              
                
             
               
                 
             
               
         
   
       
     
       
    
     
     
      
        
         
           
  
              
             
          
                
     
   
              
            
EXTRACT 5a
“the fact that [victim-survivor] chose to stay with [defendant], [you know from your
own common sense that she could have left at any point …]” (Defence, T4)
By framing the victim-survivor’s response as a choice, the defence placed agency with the
victim-survivor and presented it as “fact”. By urging the jury to draw on their “common sense”
when considering the victim-survivor’s actions, the defence implied that her behaviour did not
match with what a rational person would do in that situation. The victim-survivor was also
criticised for remaining in the defendant’s car when he had left her alone whilst he went inside
a friend’s house. This narrative was bolstered by evidence elicited from defence witnesses
who encountered her and the defendant together in the aftermath of the rapes, whereby the
victim-survivor was described as appearing “fine” and “normal”:
EXTRACT 5b
Defence What were you talking about?
Defendant’s sister Her new cat.
Defence Who started the conversation?
Defendant’s sister [Victim-survivor] did.
Defence Anything else?
Defendant’s sister No, just laughing.
Defence All of you?
Defendant’s sister Yeah, all 3 of us.
Defence How did [victim-survivor] appear to you?
Defendant’s sister She seemed okay, [defendant] did too, both their normal
self. (T4)
This was a case where the defendant had multiple convictions relating to domestic violence
against the victim-survivor. The ‘why didn’t she leave’ narrative so commonly associated with
domestic abuse (see Duggan, 2018) permeated questioning about this victim-survivor’s
behaviour and her reaction to the various acts of aggression and sexual violence. It was drawn
together in the closing remarks:
EXTRACT 5c
“…more opportunities for her to have got away than I could possibly even begin




                
                   
             
             
              
              
  
              
              
            
              
             
               
                
                
                  
            
        
   
       
       
        
              
         
            
            
        
  
         
   
       
              
 
she was so fearful], when she gave her evidence to police in her video, she said
that she lay in his bed with him, [waiting for him to go to sleep, but she dozed off
first]. I make no apologies for perhaps sounding harsh, [prosecution say she was
kidnapped, raped 4 times, petrified, desperate to escape], but she just dozed off?
I don’t know what sort of things keep you awake at night, […work, an
argument…there are some things you just can’t switch off from and go to sleep].”
(Defence, T4)
The defence minimised the victim-survivor’s trauma by comparing it to work stresses or an
argument. Counsel’s argument also positioned the only ‘rational’ response as to leave as soon
as possible. Whilst this victim-survivor’s post-assault behaviour might not seem rational to
some, it is well established that victim-survivors of intimate partner violence often form strong
attachments to the perpetrator through trauma bonding (Reid, et al., 2013). Similarly, another
common response to trauma is to befriend the perpetrator. This is what Lodrick (2007) refers
to as the ‘friend’ response to trauma. The ‘friend’ response is the use of social engagement
as a way of minimising further harm (Lodrick, 2007). This response was also seen in the victim-
survivors in T1, T2, T3 and T6 to varying degrees and was presented by the defence in each
trial as something that undermined the victim-survivors’ stories. The victim-survivor in T3
described what could be considered a ‘friend’ response:
EXTRACT 5d
Victim-survivor …Can I just say something else?
Defence <looks taken aback, looks to Judge>
Judge If it’s in answer to the question.
Victim-survivor It’s related. [I didn’t know what to do, I got dressed and we
went downstairs] <says the rest whilst crying> [I just
wanted to feel normal and so I played this piano piece to
him cos I’d said that I would.] Cos that’s what you’re gonna
ask me next, ‘Why did you do that?’
…
Defence He asked you to play piano.
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence [You played three songs].





              
                 
                   
             
                
           
               
             
             
              
       
               
              
                
      
      
               
              
              
             
            
  
            
      
   
           
             
           
In pre-empting the defence’s question, the victim-survivor was able to explain her response to
the jury, positioning it as a way of regaining some sense of normalcy. Her acquiescence to the
defendant’s request of her to play piano for him can be seen as a reaction to fear of further
harm. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the ‘friend’ response is not only a subconscious
reaction, but that it can be an actively chosen form of passivity. Similarly, in T4 the
prosecution’s closing speech focuses heavily on the difference between consent and
compliance and the role of fear in compliance. In doing this, the prosecution had rationalised
the victim-survivor’s post-assault responses for the jury. The defendants in these two trials,
T3 and T4, were both found guilty, so arguably the counter-narratives employed by victim-
survivors and prosecution barristers did enough to broaden the narrow confines of what is
presented as reasonable by the defence.
In T1, T2 and T6, the ‘friend’ responses and associated scrutiny from the defence barristers
usually manifested in relation to the ‘continued contact’ myth, which says that the ‘rational’
response to rape is to cut-off all contact with the perpetrator. This forms the basis for
discussion in the following sub-section.
5.2.2 Victim-survivors maintaining relationships with defendants
That the victim-survivors in T1, T2 and T6 had maintained contact with the defendants after
alleged incidents of rape was treated with suspicion by the defence barristers, which reflects
previous findings from rape trial observations (Smith and Skinner 2017). In T1, the defence
directly referred to continued contact between the victim-survivor and defendant after the first
alleged rape and used it to suggest that the victim-survivor had consented:
EXTRACT 5e
Defence I submit that you do remember it all and you had
consensual sex [with the defendant].
Victim-survivor No.
Defence [He is suggesting that you weren’t that drunk, he checks
with you whether you still want to go on a date. You say,




               
     
   
            
     
    
            
                
             
   
           
 
   
        
    
              
             
              
             
             
                 
                 
                
              
                
                
              
              
               
               
want to go on a date with him to see how you feel, and this
is after you’ve had sex.]
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence The events of that night don’t stop you from seeing each
other and spending time together.
Victim-survivor No. (T1)
Here the defence presented the victim-survivor’s continued contact with the defendant and
agreement to a ‘date’ as incompatible with an absence of consent. Similarly, in T2 the defence
used continued contact as a tool to undermine the victim-survivor’s narrative of non-consent:
EXTRACT 5f
Defence [That summer you went to festivals, spent time with his
family…]
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence So not all bad then?
Victim-survivor Yeah. (T2)
In this case the victim-survivor and defendant were in a long-term relationship when the
alleged rape occurred, and they remained in a relationship for approximately six months
afterwards. The victim-survivor reported to the police two months after the end of the
relationship. In both examples above the defence implied consent or untruthfulness by pointing
to continued contact, which ignores the complexities women face in labelling their experiences
as rape. The ‘real rape’ myth positions the rapist as a deviant ‘other’, which makes it difficult
for victim-survivors who are raped by someone close to them, be it a friend, family member or
intimate partner, to reconcile this image with the person who was harmed them (Kahn, et al.,
2003; Peterson and Muehlenhard, 2011). This means it often takes time for women to
recognise or accept what has happened to them as rape. This is also true of acquaintance
rape (Angiolini, 2015). Indeed, the victim-survivor in T1 stated “I didn’t want to believe it” when
cross-examined about why she had not immediately identified the experience as rape. In the
above extract from T2 the defence’s characterisation of the relationship not being “all bad”
after the alleged rape seemed to present a false dichotomy of relationships as either wholly




            
    
   
            
            
  
           
             
          
             
               
            
                 
            
                
                 
             
           
                
                
            
           
              
      
              
              
    
   
the victim-survivor’s story. The prosecution attempted to resist this narrative through reference
to youth and immaturity:
EXTRACT 5g
“[Victim-survivor] was very young girl and what happened in [month] was clearly
very distressing for her and continued to be beyond then.” (Prosecution, T2)
EXTRACT 5h
“[Victim-survivor] was young, she stayed. You heard that she stopped giving
blowjobs to [defendant], and you may think that is an indication that someone
might stop doing that because of being raped.” (Prosecution, T2)
In these examples the prosecutor implied that the victim-survivor stayed in the relationship
after the alleged rape because she was “young” and “immature”, and these were words she
used throughout her closing speech. This narrative served to infantilise the victim-survivor,
which presumably aimed to position her as ‘victim’ in the eyes of the jury. The narrative was
patronising, which is particularly important in this case because the victim-survivor was
observing the trial from the public gallery and was therefore listening to what was being said.
What this narrative also implied was that older women would have left, which is by no means
necessarily the case—women stay with violent and abusive men for many complex reasons
(Duggan, 2018). The prosecution therefore reinforced the problematic and pervasive cultural
narrative that asks, ‘why didn’t she leave?’. Whether or not this may have been a damaging
narrative in this trial, it served to reinforce the narrative for those hearing it, including the victim-
survivor, which could have wider social implications. The prosecutor could have instead
addressed the defence’s assertions by challenging the broader structural mechanisms that
impact these decisions for women, rather than by pointing to individual characteristics of the
victim-survivor, which reinforced victim-blaming narratives.
In T2, not only was the victim-survivor’s behaviour questioned because she had continued the
relationship but also because she had continued sexual contact with the defendant after the





              
 
   
            
   
    
             
          
             
   
              
            
          
      
         
        
                
            
   
          
     
       
       
          
         
         
   
          
  
           
  
Defence In some of that time he had tried to get back together with
you.
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Defence I’m going to say that there were times between when you
were intimate together.
Victim-survivor Yeah. (T2)
Defence counsel also attempted to get a prosecution witness, the victim-survivor’s friend, to
confirm post-relationship sexual encounters between the victim-survivor and the defendant,
through asking him to interpret social media messages he had received from her:
EXTRACT 5j
Defence Look at page 4 please, the message that starts ‘I try and I
try…’, please read that in your head then I will ask you
about it. <pause> If I was to suggest that [victim-survivor]
and [defendant] were still having sex-
Judge How can he answer that?
Prosecution Yes, he can’t answer that.
It is reassuring that both the judge and prosecution immediately took issue with this line of
questioning and intervened, however the judge then accepted the defence’s reasoning:
EXTRACT 5k
Defence I just want his understanding of the relationship.
Judge Okay.
Defence Was that your impression?
Friend I wouldn’t know.
Defence Was your understanding that it had ended?
Friend Yeah that was my impression.
Defence counsel also questioned the OIC about it:
EXTRACT 5l
Defence It remains her stance that she had ended communication
with [defendant].





             
        
            
         
  
     
         
        
       
             
        
              
             
              
                 
                
             
              
               
           
   
                  
                 
              
  
                  
                  
                  
     
   
            
            
Defence Did she tell you or anyone else that she had continued to
have sex with [defendant] through [month after break-up]?
OIC I never asked that question and I wouldn’t want to assume.
Defence Was it your impression that [defendant’s] sexual advances
were unwanted?
OIC Yes.
Defence [When did you become aware that [victim-survivor] had
had sexual relations with [defendant] in that time?]
OIC I can’t recall.
Defence [That is not something she puts in any police statement].
OIC I can’t recall. (T2)
Here the defence seemed to be implying that the victim-survivor had deliberately omitted the
information, which feeds into portrayals of women as calculating liars (discussed in section
6.3.1). Again, this line of questioning ignored what is known about trauma responses. The
implied reasoning is that a woman would not continue to have sex with her rapist, however, it
is known that women often stay in relationships with men who have assaulted them, be that
physically or sexually, for myriad complex reasons (e.g. Duggan, 2018). The defence therefore
oversimplified an extremely complex issue in order to imply that the victim-survivor either must
have consented or must be lying. The prosecution in T2 anticipated the defence’s reliance on
misunderstandings about continued contact and addressed it in her closing remarks:
EXTRACT 5m
“As I said to you at the start of this case, there are many ways victims react to
rape. It is easy to say ‘why didn’t she leave?’ and think ‘I wouldn’t have put up
with that’. [Value judgements are easy to make but they have no place here].”
(Prosecution, T2)
Whilst it is not possible to say whether or to what degree the jury might have considered this
aspect of the trial narrative in their decision to acquit the defendant, it may be fair to assume
it had some bearing given that the defence relied heavily on it as a tool for undermining the
victim-survivor in her closing remarks:
EXTRACT 5n
“What you do know about [victim-survivor’s] credibility is that she also reported




                
                
              
              
               
               
     
             
              
            
           
             
          
                
             
            
             
   
          
      
   
              
             
             
              
            
             
                
               
            
her asking for sex, [and she tells the police that is not something she is interested
in because they split for good in [month] and she wants nothing to do with him,
she signs that statement, she produces messages, and then what we can see is
that there is a wealth of communication both ways, she gives a number of
statements,] does she say in any of them that she carried on sleeping with him?
Now that doesn’t help you with the rape, but it does help you with credibility,
doesn’t it?” (Defence, closing T2)
Here the defence explicitly suggested that the victim-survivor was not credible because she
had not included the continued sexual relationship in her statements. The defence also refers
to the “wealth of communication both ways”, drawing on the misconception that victim-
survivors never communicate with their rapists. This narrative also demonstrates how
evidence about a victim-survivor’s sexual behaviour can be adduced and used to undermine
her (see also section 4.2.1 on victim-survivor’s sexual history evidence).
The previous extracts in this section from T1 and T2 showed that defence barristers were able
to use digital communications between victim-survivors and defendants to cast doubt on the
prosecution cases by evidencing continued contact between the parties. In contrast, the
defence in T6 used a single piece of digital communication to do this:
EXTRACT 5o
Defence …Did you send [defendant] a happy birthday message on
Facebook [10 years after alleged rapes]?
Victim-survivor2 Yeah. (T6)
That was the final question in the cross-examination of that victim-survivor and was completely
unrelated to the previous questions about whether she had discussed allegations with her
sister. Again, the suggestion that a ‘happy birthday’ message from victim-survivor to defendant
a decade after the alleged incidents could be relevant to credibility completely ignored the
potential for trauma bonding and the friend response discussed earlier, particularly because
this victim-survivor had viewed the defendant as a stepfather figure. Furthermore, there was
no digital evidence bundle in this case, which suggests that a ‘fishing exercise’ may have been
carried out in an attempt to find evidence of communication to undermine credibility, which is




                 
                
            
              
               
     
      
             
                
                 
              
                  
                 
              
                 
                
               
                 
               
                
               
              
              
   
                
              
                 
2011; Diss, 2013; Carmico et al. 2016; Smith and Daly, 2020). That this tactic is so widely
used is indicative of its value and demonstrates how pervasive rape myths, in this case myths
about continued contact, can be used as tools to undermine victim-survivors’ credibility.
Indeed, analysis by Howell and Heberlig (2007) demonstrates that even before the ubiquity of
smart phones, digital evidence had long been recognised as a useful tool for undermining the
claims of victim-survivors in court.
5.2.3 Victim-survivors delaying disclosures and reporting
Another common rape myth reflected in my observations related to the timeframes within
which victim-survivors chose to make their reports to police or to third parties. A common rape
myth suggests that it is suspicious if a victim-survivor does not report a rape to the police
immediately. In T2, T5 and T6 the victim-survivors did not make police reports straightaway.
However this was not treated with suspicion in all cases. Both T5 and T6 related to child sex
offences, and in T5 the victim-survivor was still a child at the time of the trial. This victim-
survivor’s delayed reporting was not treated as suspicious, which may have been because he
was a young child and because his mother gave evidence that he had tried to disclose the
alleged abuse to her earlier but she had not taken it seriously. In contrast, the victim-survivors
in T6 were adults when they made historic allegations against the defendant. The delay in
their reporting to police was met with suspicion, though not due to the delay in reporting as
such, but rather the delay in the full allegations being made to police. Victim-survivor2 had
begun to make a complaint five years after the alleged rape and sexual assaults but then
declined to give a statement. Then five years later the allegations were made again, and
victim-survivor1 added her complaint a few months later. The defence used these delays and
staggered disclosures to help build a gendered narrative of collusion, which is explored further
in 6.3.1
The victim-survivor in T2 disclosed to a friend around six months after the alleged rape, via
social media messaging, before reporting to the police two months later. The defence used




                 
  
   
              
        
 
               
          
 
         
       
             
              
               
             
                 
                
                
              
               
              
              
            
        
                 
                  
                 
              
    
because the digital means by which she disclosed were available to her from the time of the
alleged rape:
EXTRACT 5p
Defence So, [if she wanted to, she could have spoken to you at that
time, you weren’t working abroad, your phone wasn’t
broken?]
Friend No, [there was nothing to stop her, but I do feel that it was
easier for her to speak more freely about these issues
post-relationship]
Defence Obviously you just have [victim-survivor’s] side of events,
because you’ve never spoken to [defendant]. (T2)
The victim-survivor’s friend gave reasoning for why she may have delayed reporting, however
the defence dismissed it as biased, using minimising language to do so. The reasoning
articulated by the victim-survivor’s friend was in line with what is known about disclosures of
sexual violence, thus the defence’s dismissal aimed to downplay the fact that delayed
reporting is common and rational. The defence in this trial used the delay in reporting to bolster
her gendered narrative of women as vengeful liars, which is discussed more in section 6.3.1.
Despite it being recognised that delayed reporting of rape is not uncommon, it has often been
used as a tool for undermining victim-survivors in court (Adler 1987; Bronitt 1998; Brereton
1997; Raitt 2004; Smith, 2018). Mock jury research has shown that jurors do often reference
this myth in deliberation (Taylor and Joudo, 2005; Temkin, 2009; Ellison and Munro 2009).
Arguably, this is because delayed reporting remains a commonly held rape myth in wider
society (Ellison and Munro, 2009a; Raitt, 2004; Rose et al., 2006).
5.2.3.1 Victim-survivors reporting to police within 24 hours
In both T1 and T3 the victim-survivors disclosed to friends within 24 hours of the incidents (in
T1 it was the second incident). Both women confided in their friends (in T1 this was after the
report to police, in T3 it was before), and these disclosures were treated as suspicious by the
defence barristers. For example, the defence in T1 employed a gendered narrative of women




   
              
               
                
        
              
             
                
              
               
               
                 
                
            
                  
                
              
               
         
                
             
                
        
   
          
             
         
        
       
EXTRACT 5q
“In the time between her report and ABE she messaged people to tell them
something really bad had happened that was so difficult for her to talk about, yet
she keeps telling people. This, we submit, is a way for her to garner support and
sympathy to keep up her charade.” (Defence, T1)
The defence were not able to undermine the prosecution’s case by arguing that the victim-
survivor had delayed reporting to the police and therefore behaved suspiciously, but by
reframing it as an act of manipulation he was able to undermine what might otherwise be
framed as the victim-survivor’s ‘rational’ behaviour as problematic. This was also a tactic used
in T3 where the defence implied the victim-survivor had colluded with her friend (see section
6.3.1 for further discussion of gendered narratives of women as liars). These findings from T1
and T3, as well as the preceding finding from T2, suggest that it could be who the victim-
survivors tell, rather than when, that have more of a bearing for the narratives of suspicion
deployed by defence barristers. Whilst judges usually give judicial directions explaining that
there is no typical response to rape and that a delayed report does not mean a false report,
the direction does not go so far as to explain that victim-survivors of sexual violence often
speak to third-parties, including friends and family, before deciding whether to make a report
to police (Smith and Daly, 2020). It should therefore be considered a normal and rational
response to trauma, rather than treated with suspicion.
As well as being treated with suspicion for telling her friends about the sexual assaults, the
victim-survivor in T3 was criticized for not calling someone immediately (and whilst the
defendant was still there), even though she did call someone within hours of the assaults and
went to the police in under 24 hours:
EXTRACT 5r
Defence You didn’t think at that stage it was-
Victim-survivor I thought it was odd [I’ve never had a full body massage
before, I didn’t know if that was included] […]
Defence You could have called [friend].




           
          
        
 
          
        
    
                
               
                
              
                 
   
   
                
            
                
            
            
               
                  
             
             
  
          
            
           
              
Defence [QandA about [friend] having been at her house earlier that
afternoon and saying she could call him if she felt
uncomfortable with the massage]. Why didn’t you call
[friend]?
Victim-survivor [I called him as soon as [defendant] left].
Defence You didn’t call the police?
Victim-survivor No. (T3)
This example from T3 also calls into question what is regarded as soon enough. The defence
argued that the victim-survivor could have called her friend as soon as she felt uncomfortable
with the way the massage was going. This is significant because the defence was then by
implication suggesting that what the victim-survivor should have done was to call her friend
not even in the immediate aftermath of the assaults, but whilst the defendant still had his hands
on her.
EXTRACT 5s
“We know that her good friend [friend] has been with her that day, he told her
how the massage might happen, she asked about how a professional massage
happens. So we have there a clear indication that he said she could ring him, and
he told her he would come round if she called” (Defence, T3)
Whilst delayed reporting has long been held against victim-survivors and prompt reporting
therefore lauded as a way to help toward being believed and viewed as credible, these
examples show ways in which the power of the ‘women lie about rape’ myth can be used by
defence barristers to undermine them ‘doing the right thing’ by reporting promptly. This
produces an alarming ‘damned if they do, damned if they don’t’ predicament for victim-
survivors.
5.3 Myths about (in)consistent stories of rape and sexual assault
Prosecution and defence counsel in all trials pointed to consistencies and inconsistencies,
respectively, in the victim-survivors’ accounts. Barristers usually recognised that accounts will




            
  
   
              
            
            
          
              
 
   
            
         
         
              
    
            
               
            
             
            
                
               
                 
              
             
              
               
               
                
example, in T3 the prosecution characterised the victim-survivor’s accounts as having “no
meaningful inconsistencies”:
EXTRACT 5t
“She immediately told 3 friends and all accounts are consistent with what she told
the police, there are no meaningful inconsistencies, and I stress the word
meaningful, there of course are some, but you are sensible people, you
understand why some of these exist.” (Prosecution, T3, emphasis added)
Whereas the defence asked the jury to consider whether those same accounts were “internally
consistent”:
EXTRACT 5u
“Consistency, is her account consistent? [You can’t say you’re sure], is it
internally consistent?...[I’m sure you will give very careful consideration.
Consider the evidence very, very carefully]. Single unsupported, inconsistent
word [is not enough to make you sure enough to return a guilty verdict].”
(Defence, T3, emphasis added)
Despite asking whether it was “internally consistent” and thereby implicitly conceding that
some inconsistencies with other witnesses are inevitable, the defence went on to say that the
victim-survivor’s “unsupported, inconsistent word” was not enough to make them sure beyond
a reasonable doubt that she was being truthful. This ignores modern understandings of
memory (see Hohl and Conway, 2017) and the extensive neuropsychological evidence about
the impact of trauma on memory coding (see Lodrick, 2007), as the implication is that the
victim-survivor’s story will be consistent if truthful, when this is not the case. Such arguments
hark back to the corroboration warning that judges used to be required to give to juries in
sexual offences trials, warning them of the dangers of convicting based on the unsupported
word of a victim-survivor. The mandatory warning was based on historic gendered narratives
that positioned women as untrustworthy and the belief that false allegations of rape were
common (Leahy, 2014). Indeed, it is perfectly possible in English law to make a conviction
based on the testimony of a single witness. The defence barrister’s words, then, were rooted




                
   
              
   
               
              
            
              
            
                 
            
   
           
                   
            
               
               
                  
         
               
               
             
               
              
           
              
             
           
   
                
              
discretion give a corroboration warning, however the judge in T3 did not deem it necessary to
do so.
Similarly to T3, consistency in T5 was qualified as ‘fundamentally’ true by the prosecution:
EXTRACT 5v
“Detail is important, but not the be all and end all, [each individual experience of
it will be remembered differently, the Learned Judge has given you a number of
warnings, be careful, then stand back and consider where we are. Although
details differ, the fundamental story is not untrue. I’m sure you have heard people
tell stories of something you’ve witnessed, and you’ve thought ‘hang on, that’s
not how he told it last time’, but you know the story to be true]” (Prosecution, T5)
Whereas again the defence seemed to call for nothing but 100% accuracy:
EXTRACT 5w
“Accuracy, reliability, truthfulness. That’s what this case is about… because it
stands and falls on the word of one little boy…It is a fact that children lie, it is a
fact that adults lie. Children make things up…[his] evidence is peppered with
inconsistencies [and worryingly this is a child who has also been found to say a
host of different things… He may not have set out deliberately doing this, it takes
courage to say you were lying, imagine how hard it is for a child to admit to mum,
school, grandmother, aunts, that it wasn’t true.]” (Defence, T5)
These suggestions from the defence barristers in T3 and T5 that only complete accuracy was
sufficient to make the jury sure enough to convict reflects the false dichotomy observed by
Smith and Skinner (2017) that presented victim-survivors’ accounts as either wholly truthful or
wholly untruthful. It is also interesting considering that Munro and Kelly (2009) found that being
too consistent may work against victim-survivors. This suggests there is a narrow margin in
which victim-survivors will be deemed honest and credible (Smith 2018).
The focus on consistency in T2 presented slightly differently to the examples above. Whilst
both the defence and prosecution pointed the jury to consider consistency of the victim-
survivor’s accounts, the focus was on different parts of her accounts:
EXTRACT 5x
“She decides to tell her friend about it and she later tells the police the same




               
           
             
                 
              
                
      
   
                
                 
             
             
               
             
            
               
             
               
           
           
              
               
              
             
             
               
       
             
               
account. The defence’s case is that she made it up […]. But she never wavers,
never embellishes, she simply says it how it is.” (Prosecution, T2)
Here the prosecution pointed to the consistency between the victim-survivor’s account of the
alleged rape given to her friend, the police and in her live testimony. The level of consistency
in these accounts left the defence without opportunity to point the jury towards inconsistencies
in how she described what had happened. The tactic taken by the defence was instead to
point to inconsistencies in peripheral areas:
EXTRACT 5y
“You can see whether things have a ring of truth to them…, [she says she only
mentioned it via text, but then she has said in interview that she had said it in
arguments]. These are not conversations about who forgot to buy the milk, you
would think she would remember talking about it, [… she would] have flashbacks,
she would have it clear in her mind. [She says she can’t remember what was
said], does that ring true to you? Can you be satisfied?” (Defence, T2).
The defence highlighted inconsistencies in the victim-survivor’s recollection of how and when
she had confronted the defendant about the alleged rape. Defence counsel drew on ideas of
what a rational person might remember and treated the victim-survivor’s poor recollection of
conversations from two and a half years prior with suspicion. By making the comparison with
conversations about mundane everyday conversation, the defence implied that a normal
person would remember every conversation about a traumatic event. This completely
misrepresents and obscures what is known about the effects of trauma on memory (Lodrick,
2007; Hohl and Conway, 2017) and that men’s aggression can become a mundane feature of
life for many women (Stanko, 2013). It also ignored the complexities women face in
recognising rape, especially in romantic relationships (see discussion in section 5.2). To argue
that the victim-survivor should remember all conversations she had with the defendant relating
to the alleged rape merely because rape is traumatic assumes that the victim-survivor had at
the time fully recognised that trauma.
Furthermore, the defence argued that the victim-survivor would have had flashbacks to the




                 
               
               
               
               
                 
               
                 
                  
           
                 
                
    
                
           
            
               
              
           
   
             
               
 
           
                 
               
            
             
response (Duke et al., 2008), it is not a universal response and the defence was not talking
about the traumatic event itself but conversations about that event. It therefore seems that the
defence was implying that the victim-survivor was lying because she had not said she had
flashbacks to conversations (not the alleged rape itself). With the final remark in the above
extract the defence clearly suggested to the jury that the victim-survivor was not being truthful
because she cannot, two and a half years on, remember in detail all of the times she
confronted the defendant about the alleged rape. The implication, then, seemed to be that she
was lying about the confrontations so she was not trustworthy and thus the jury could not be
sure she was not lying about the alleged rape. The defendant in this case was acquitted so it
seems that the defence’s attempts to undermine the victim-survivor’s consistent accounts
were successful. Although it is not possible to know the basis on which the jury made their
decision, it is clear that they did not find the victim-survivor credible enough to convict based
on her testimony.
Digital evidence has also provided a new way for barristers to undermine the credibility of both
victim-survivors’ and defendants’ stories (see section 7.4.1 for discussion related to
defendants), by focusing on inconsistencies in their recollections of conversations which often
largely took place via digital platforms. For example, if a victim-survivor stated that she could
not remember saying something, and it was subsequently shown in digital evidence, it was
used to accuse her of lying. The following excerpt demonstrates this:
EXTRACT 5z
“She said she ‘wasn’t prepared’, she said she couldn’t remember saying it, but
when she was shown the messages it was clear that she had said that.” (Defence,
T1)
The focus on inconsistencies in victim-survivors’ evidence ignores a large established
evidence base which shows that in fact truthful accounts are not told in the same way each
time, that small details do change, that human memory and recall is imperfect (Temkin, 2000;
McMillan 2007). To expect a consistent account each time is unreasonable. Nevertheless,




          
           
            
               
               
              
                
             
         
  
              
             
           
               
               
                
          
                 
  
             
              
               
            
               
         
       
   
            
                
            
highlight every inconsistency in victim-survivors’ accounts and testimonies, whilst prosecution
barristers draw on consistencies in victim-survivors’ accounts to bolster the victim-survivor’s
credibility. This ignores that human recall is imperfect and positions victim-survivors’ evidence
as either wholly accurate or wholly inaccurate (Smith, 2018). This does ignore the reality that
there will inevitably be both accurate and inaccurate elements of each account because of the
limitations to human memory and the added issue of passing time degrading memories.
The effect of the passage of time on memory was particularly pertinent in T6 because the
allegations related to historic sexual abuse. The defence relied heavily on inconsistencies in
the accounts from both victim-survivors. The prosecution preempted this:
EXTRACT 5aa
“There are a number of inconsistencies between what you heard, I am not going
to go through them, they are there. … insofar as these inconsistencies are
concerned, you may think for example that in [victim-survivor2’s] first account
[there was a discrepancy of 1 year], well we all have difficulty with years don’t
we? … It is important for you to consider [the inconsistencies] … [Given the effect
of people dealing with the passage of time, is it surprising? You may come to the
conclusion that actually [victim-survivors] have been quite consistent about what
they say, and when we apply it to known dates it all starts to fit into place]”
(Prosecution, T6)
The prosecution attempted to rationalise the inconsistencies for the jury through first pointing
out that it is common for people, including rape victim-survivors, to have difficulty accurately
placing time in memories (London et al., 2008). Second, the barrister pointed to the consistent
elements of the testimony, much like the “meaningful” (T3) and “fundamental” (T5)
consistencies in T3 and T5. The defence barrister spent a significant portion of her closing
speech delineating inconsistencies in the victim-survivors’ stories, especially victim-survivor2,
and had prefaced this with the following:
EXTRACT 5ab
“[regarding [victim-survivor2] it means being sure that not only is she trustworthy
but is she accurate and reliable, and we say you can’t be sure about that. Her




             
        
              
          
              
               
               
             
            
               
   
             
               
               
                  
             
               
            
             
  
              
                
                
               
                  
                 
                
  
 
that’s time, that’s not a case of getting small things wrong, it’s enormous
inconsistencies, each account is entirely different].” (Defence, T6)
The defence’s assertion that each account was entirely different was at odds with the
prosecution’s characterisation of consistency. The inconsistencies largely came from the
difficulty the victim-survivors had with time and location in their accounts, which has been
established as a common issue with memory (London et al., 2008). The emphasis on such
peripheral details has long been a noted tactic used by defence barristers in rape trials
(Temkin, 2000; Ellison, 2001; Wheatcroft and Wagstaff, 2009). The defence barrister in T6
also sought to undermine victim-survivor2’s explanation for some of her consistencies, which
was that she did not recount her experiences in her ABE in a linear way:
EXTRACT 5ac
“[her account in court was] completely different to her account to [police officer]
… when challenged she said she was just saying things, not in order, but you
have it there in the ABE transcript, you have the connecting words … you would
know if it was oral, you would know if it was intercourse … she’s in a safe space
in the police station, no-one is giving her a hard time.” (Defence, T6)
The defence therefore suggested that stories must be linear in order to be considered true
and consistent, however evidence has shown that victim-survivors are often unable to
articulate their stories with linearity in their ABEs (Gilmore, 2001; McMillan and Thomas,
2009).
Not only do victim-survivors’ accounts have to be suitably consistent, their accounts must also
be whole and complete with every detail from the first disclosure. The omission of details was
used against the victim-survivors in T2 and T6 as a way of portraying them as untrustworthy,
thus undermining their credibility. As outlined in section 5.1.2, the victim-survivor in T2 did not
tell the police that she had had sexual contact with the defendant after they broke up and this
was used by the defence as a tool in the cross-examination of not just the victim-survivor but





   
            
            
                
                
              
              
               
               
    
              
   
   
             
    
  
             
             
               
           
 
             
            
               
              
               
               
                 
               
EXTRACT 5ad
“What you do know about [victim-survivor’s] credibility is that she also reported
to the police that [defendant] was pestering her, sending unwanted messages to
her asking for sex, [and she tells the police that is not something she is interested
in because they split for good in [month] and she wants nothing to do with him,
she signs that statement, she produces messages, and then what we can see is
that there is a wealth of communication both ways, she gives a number of
statements], does she say in any of them that she carried on sleeping with him?
Now that doesn’t help you with the rape, but it does help you with credibility,
doesn’t it?” (Defence, T2)
Similarly, in T6 omissions in both victim-survivors stories were highlighted by the defence in
her closing remarks:
EXTRACT 5ae
“[other inconsistencies include at [specific event], there was no mention of oral in
the ABE].” (Defence, T6)
EXTRACT 5af
“[having made up allegations about [defendant] kissing her when she was a child,
which none of us had heard before, then when she was challenged she
backtracks and says it was when she was 15. She says it happened [in specific
place], but you know [defendant] wasn’t working [in specific place].” (Defence,
T6)
There are many reasons a victim-survivor may (consciously or unconsciously) hold back some
details or information when disclosing sexual violence. For instance, MacMillan and Thomas
(2009) found that victim-survivors were not always able to recall or provide specific details in
their police interviews. Furthermore, the majority of victim-survivors have a fear of not being
believed (Victims’ Commissioner, 2020), and so it stands to reason that they may choose not
to give certain details to the police when they make a report. Moreover, victim-survivors are
well aware of rape myths and these factor into their decisions about whether to tell, when to




   
               
             
           
              
           
           
               
           
           
             
              
       
           
           
             
              
               
             
             
      
             
           
              
             
             
          
5.4 Chapter summary
This chapter has built on the findings presented in Chapter 4 which demonstrated that rape
myths related to consent and reasonable belief in consent remain prevalent features in
courtroom narratives. The evidence presented within the present chapter demonstrated that
the same is true of rape myths related to victim-survivors’ post-assault behaviour and the
expected consistency of their stories of rape and sexual assault.
Rational ideals permeated the narratives outlined in this chapter, which reflected victim-
blaming attitudes that are common in society. Indeed, it was not only defence barristers who
drew these problematic ideas, a prosecution barrister also reinforced damaging narrative
about victim-survivors of intimate partner violence. Victim-survivors who did not immediately
cease contact with the defendants were presented as suspicious by defence barristers. This
was contrary to established evidence bases that show there are many varied, equally valid
responses to trauma and sexual victimisation.
Digital communications evidence played a significant role in defence characterisations of
victim-survivors’ post-assault behaviour as irrational, especially in relation to continued contact
with the defendant and delayed reporting. With regards to delayed reporting, the findings
presented suggest that who victim-survivors tell and how they tell them, rather than when,
may have more of an impact on the narratives of suspicious reporting deployed by defence
barristers. In addition to this, the findings demonstrated that no matter how soon victim-
survivors disclose their experiences, defence counsel can still manage to cast suspicion by
implying it was not soon enough.
Digital evidence also played a significant role in defence counsel pointing to inconsistencies
to undermine victim-survivors’ stories. Defence barristers looked to digital messages to
compare to flawed recollections in live testimony to ‘prove’ that victim-survivors’ were at best
unreliable or at worst liars. These narratives ignored contemporary evidence on how trauma
and time affect memory. Whilst prosecution barristers focused on the common thread of




             
             
           
              
    
               
             
            
            
                
              
               
absolute accuracy, with complete consistency being presented as the marker for this. Defence
counsel routinely looked beyond the core aspects of victim-survivors’ accounts to point to
inconsistencies in recall of conversations, inaccurate recollection of dates and locations, non-
linear recollections of events, and the omission of details in previous accounts. Again, ignoring
contemporary research on memory.
Overall, the findings discussed in this chapter support my thesis that rape myths remain a
prevalent feature of trial narratives. This chapter has demonstrated that trial narratives were
constructed through the deployment of rape myths about victim-survivors’ responses to sexual
violence and the expectation that victim-survivors’ make consistent and accurate accounts of
their experiences. In further support of my thesis, this chapter has continued to signal to ways
in which rape myths interact with broader cultural narratives to undermine the credibility of




        
  
              
               
                
              
           
               
  
             
            
              
              
    
            
           
             
             
              
               
           
            
             
 
Chapter 6 Victim-survivors as (in)credible tellers of rape
6.1 Introduction
The preceding two chapters showed that rape myths remain a prominent feature in courtroom
narratives in serious sexual offences trials and serve to undermine stories of rape and sexual
assault. Chapters Six and Seven build on this by establishing ways in which those myths are
scaffolded by and interact with broader cultural narratives and systems of oppression to further
disadvantage victim-survivors and benefit defendants. Chapter Six will focus on the victim-
survivors as the ‘tellers’ of rape, then Chapter Seven will focus on the defendants as
storytellers.
Sexism, classism, ageism and ableism intersected at varying points in the construction of
narratives about respectability and honesty, and this chapter is arranged accordingly. In
support of my thesis, this chapter therefore shows that broader cultural narratives interact with
rape myths to undermine victim-survivors and their stories of rape and sexual assault.
6.2 Narratives of respectability
Narratives of respectability permeated all six trials. These narratives drew on middle-class
ideals of respectability whilst also drawing on working-class stereotypes, thereby positioning
victim-survivors, and some other prosecution witnesses, as not credible because they did not
adhere to middle-class ideals. This section shows how these narratives were formulated at
the intersection of gender, class and age. According to Skeggs (1997), respectability is a
significant marker by which class is measured and ascribed. As such, I first establish how
barristers highlighted parts of witnesses’ personal circumstances that were congruent with
wider cultural narratives about working-class people in Britain. Then, the intersections of





       
             
           
           
              
            
              
              
           
           
              
            
             
           
          
             
            
      
          
           
                
 
                  
                  
                    
              
              
                 
              
              
                 
              
              
       
6.2.1 Establishing social class in trial narratives
Social class was often indicated within the trial narratives through ‘micro-examinations’. I use
the term ‘micro-examination’ to distinguish smaller chunks of questioning within the sub-
genres of trial (that is, evidence-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination). In the
context of how social class was signified, the micro-examinations consisted of short sets of
introductory or scene-setting questions used to characterise the background of the witnesses.
The questions were brief and subtly pointed to stigmatising cultural narratives, thus they could
be seen as akin to microaggressions (see Sue et al., 2007). These micro-examinations worked
to underpin working-class13 narratives within the observed trials. The working-class narratives,
therefore, were rarely formed through direct reference to working-class stereotypes, rather
they were built through small details throughout the trial narratives that culminated in a
working-class backdrop. All victim-survivors, defendants and other witnesses in the trials were
racialised as white and were therefore racially privileged. This racialisation did however help
form the working-class narratives because whiteness is salient in dominant working-class
stereotypes in Britain, with a delineation between respectable and non-respectable working-
class whites (Skeggs, 2004; Watts, 2006; Lawler, 2012). The discussions of class throughout
this and the following chapter therefore specifically relate to narratives about white working-
class14 , specifically white British working-class.15 
Through micro-examinations of victim-survivors and defendants, small details were presented
which when taken together pointed toward being working-class. These details included
reference to the towns and villages they resided in, which in all but T3 included areas
13 There are varying definitions of working-class and the usefulness of the term in the 21st century is
contested (Harvey, 2005; Payne, 2013), however for my purposes I am using the term not to define the
people in the trials but to reflect a set of stereotypes that exist in our society about people perceived to
be from working-class communities or low socioeconomic backgrounds. This is not a comment on
whether the participants were or were not working-class or would identify themselves as such.
14 I note that race in general and whiteness in particular, are not objective truths, rather social
constructions shaped by social, political and historical contexts that have tangible effects on lived
experience (e.g. Frankenberg, 1993; Rasmussen et al., 2001; Byrne, 2006; and Feagin, 2020).
15 Nationality is key to both racialisation and class narratives. For example, EU migrants and white Irish
are differently stereotyped to white British working-classes. I therefore acknowledge that the use of
white British is not unproblematic as it homogenises a diverse group that includes generational




           
               
                
            
       
             
               
              
           
              
              
            
               
                  
                  
                 
               
               
          
             
              
               
   
        
 
                 
                  
                
   
            
considered deprived16 (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2015), and the
types of accommodation they lived in, for example social housing (T4) or ‘council estates’ (T5,
T6) or caravans (T6). All of the trials involved some allegations that took place in domestic
settings therefore descriptions of those dwellings were relevant, but these ‘crumbs’ elicited
through micro-examinations underpinned the wider narrative.
The types of (un)employment of victim-survivors and defendants were also detailed in each
trial. In all trials, victim-survivors and defendants who were employed, or had been around the
time of the alleged incidents, were in types of employment17 and/or working patterns typically
considered working-class in contemporary society according analysis by Roberts (2011), and
in some cases this was characterised by the precarity of their employment (Skeggs 2011).
The victim-survivor and defendant in T2 were in receipt of housing benefit, which was
introduced into the narrative through the defendant’s police interview transcript which was
read into evidence in court. The defendant was explaining to the police officers what he
thought had led to the deterioration of their relationship since the time of the alleged rape. It is
unclear why the reference to state welfare was not edited out of the transcript, as it is difficult
to see what relevance this level of detail could have to the case. Simply commenting that there
were arguments about finances would have sufficed to make the same point, and there was
no suggestion from the defence that these difficulties were a motive for the victim-survivor to
stay in the relationship or to lie about rape.
The victim-survivor in T4 and the victim-survivor’s mother in T5 were long-term unemployed
because of disability (T4) and full-time parenting responsibilities (T5), and were in receipt of
social welfare. This was directly raised by the defence in both trials. For example:
EXTRACT 6a
Defence There were texts between you and [friend]?
16 Living in an area considered deprived does not mean all the people living there are deprived,
however for the purpose of this analysis it is the ‘reputation’ of these areas as deprived that informs
the narratives. It is not a comment on whether the individuals in these trials were themselves
necessarily deprived.




   
       
   
             
     
    
              
               
                   
             
            
              
              
            
              
            
              
            
              
            
            
           
              
            
              
              
    
              
          
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Defence Talking about your benefits?
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Defence Then you text her a few days later to update her after
you’ve been to the police?
Victim-survivor Yeah. (T4)
In this extract the defence counsel mentioned state welfare to reference a text message
exchange between the victim-survivor and a friend, however it was irrelevant to the case and
because it formed no part of any arguments put forth by either barrister, it did not need to be
asked. The defence could have established that the victim-survivor had texted her friend
without referencing state welfare. Removing the question “Talking about your benefits?” would
not have altered the information elicited. By drawing the jury’s attention to the victim-survivor
being in receipt of state welfare, the defence arguably relied on stereotypes of ‘scroungers’
and the ‘underserving poor’ (Hancock and Mooney, 2011; Romano, 2018; Morrison, 2019).
Such narratives have long been pervasive in Britain, with ‘the poor’ being scapegoated for
perceived economic and social ills (Welshman, 2013; Morrison, 2019). In particular, Murray’s
(1990; 1994; 1996) widely criticised work on ‘the underclass’, which depicted ‘the poor’ as
‘feckless’ and reliant on state welfare, strongly influenced policy and media portrayals
throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, with a resurgence under Coalition and Conservative
Governments in the 2010s (MacDonald et al., 2020). This framing ignores structural
inequalities, viewing poverty as resultant of individual failure or laziness, and understands
‘respectability’ as something achieved through participating in the workforce (Patrick, 2016).
These political and media discourses are also reflected in popular culture through ‘reality’ TV
shows such as Benefits Street, and thus powerful ‘scrounger’ narratives have become
culturally embedded in Britain (Patrick, 2016; Day et al., 2020). Reflecting these narratives in
the courtroom can therefore be beneficial to barristers wishing to portray a witness as
objectionable or untrustworthy.
In T5, the defence counsel mentioned state welfare in a more overtly disparaging way,




   
            
       
            
          
  
      
   
           
 
     
           
      
      
              
            
           
                
              
               
               
             
               
           
                
            
             
             
              
        
EXTRACT 6b
Defence I’m going to suggest that he moved in with you.
Mother No, my neighbour.
Defence I know you talked about ‘officially’, but we don’t care about
officially, we don’t care about what you did to keep
benefits. (T5)
Defence counsel later repeated this reference:
EXTRACT 6c
Defence And you struggled at this time with chores around the
house?
Mother Yeah.
Defence And that is when [defendant] moved in next door, because
you didn’t want to lose benefits?
Mother Yeah. (T5)
In both these extracts there was direct reference to the ‘benefits cheat’ stereotype commonly
associated with working-class women (Gelsthorpe 2010). The pertinent issue was that the
victim-survivor and defendant began co-habiting, which could have been established without
needing to explain the reason for any decisions. An analysis of results from the British Social
Attitudes survey found that although public beliefs about the prevalence and morality of benefit
fraud has decreased in recent years, it remains more harshly judged than the similar offence
of tax avoidance (Geiger et al. 2017). This double standard arguably reflects the tendency for
poorer people, particularly social welfare claimants, to be judged more negatively than those
who are more affluent (Geiger et al. 2017). Media portrayals are often critical of benefits
claimants, reinforce stereotypes about working-class people (Biressi and Nunn 2010; Jensen
2014; Button and Tunley 2015), and draw on the idea of the ‘underclass’ (see Murray, 1990;
2001) and ‘underserving poor’ willing to obtain state benefits through fraudulent means
(Lundstrom 2013; Geiger et al. 2017). Drawing on these cultural narratives therefore arguably
sought to present the mother in T5 as unlikeable to the jury.
In particular, in T4, the defence barrister effectively othered both the victim-survivor and the




   
            
                
 
            
             
               
                  
              
              
               
             
                
                
    
              
              
               
          
     
             
              
              
             
                    
               
           
EXTRACT 6d
“[Prosecution’s opening statement sounded like the plot from a feature film], but
this is real life, real people. They may live very different lives to you …” (Defence,
T4)
This positioned the victim-survivor and defendant as distinctly separate from the jurors,
creating an avenue for class-based morality judgements to be made. Whilst the defence
claimed to be treating the victim-survivor and defendant as “real people” and asked the jury
not to ‘other’ them, he actually did just that and reinforced the othering in stating that they “live
very different lives”, thereby giving a contradictory message to the jury. Interestingly, this case
was one of only two trials ending in conviction and the working-class connotations were
strongest here given the context outlined above as well as a context of domestic violence.
Arguably a reflection of Phipps’ (2009) assertion that working-class men are perceived as
more likely to commit violence (see also Bourke, 2008). Smith (2018) noted a similar tactic for
othering in her observations, relating to race and class, through use of the phrase “some types
of people” (p.148).
Other aspects of trial narratives further fed into the broad working-class narratives, such as
framings of alcohol consumption and domestic abuse, which will be discussed in more detail
throughout this and the following chapter as they are points with marked salience to other
gendered, aged and ableist narratives relating to sexual violence.
6.2.2 Working-class femininities as ‘unrespectable’
Women’s femininity has long been judged and policed in terms of excessiveness, particularly
with regards to sex and alcohol (Mackiewicz, 2015) and particularly for women perceived as
working-class (Skeggs, 1997). This was reflected in T1 and T4, where alcohol formed an
integral part of constructing classed and gendered narratives. Alcohol was a prominent feature
in T1 and a peripheral feature in T4, whereas it was not talked about in any of the other trials.
In both T1 and T4 the narratives involving alcohol drew on notions of respectability by




               
     
  
                
                
              
 
               
                
    
  
           
            
                 
    
              
              
  
         
    
        
          
     
              
           
              
             
              
           
evidence adduced to the court. For example, in T4 the victim-survivor referred to her heavy
drinking during her ABE:
EXTRACT 6e
“I went to my friend’s house and had three cans of beer…5% beers, [didn’t affect
me much cos I used to drink more than that, I’ve stopped drinking now, it would
just have given me a little tingle in me ear nothing more].” (Victim-survivor, ABE,
T4)
In this extract she suggested that she had previously had difficulty with alcohol, but had
stopped drinking heavily by the time of the rapes, which was also confirmed by the defendant
in his police interview:
EXTRACT 6f
“[<Q&A>: Asked if victim-survivor has mental health issues, defendant says yes
and references the accident she had. Defendant says that she self-harms and
that she used to drink a lot of alcohol, he says she struggles to cope with things].”
(Defendant, police interview, T4)
The defendant clearly linked the victim-survivor’s drinking to her mental health. This was later
built upon through the testimony of a mutual friend of the victim-survivor and defendant:
EXTRACT 6g
Defence Regarding volatility, what does [victim-survivor] do to make
you think she’s volatile?
Friend Drinking, the ways she acts.
Defence And how often do you see that behaviour?
Friend Occasionally. (T4)
The linking of volatility to alcohol consumption drew on classed and gendered notions of
respectability. Gendered stereotypes about women as ‘hysterical’ and ‘crazy’ interlinked here
with ableist narratives (see section 6.3.2) and classed notions of excess, where heavy drinking
and violence, including intimate partner violence, have been conceived of as a working-class
phenomenon (Phipps, 2009; Bourke, 2008). It had particular salience in the context of this




            
      
  
            
              
   
                
             
            
              
             
                 
                 
             
              
                
              
            
 
             
  
           
         
     
      
   
            
     
         
perpetrated against the victim-survivor. This notion was arguably given congruence by the
judge including it in her summing-up:
EXTRACT 6h
“He said that [victim-survivor] has previously told him she’s scared of [defendant],
but that [victim-survivor] gave as good as she got and can be worse when
drinking.” (Judge, T4)
The wording the judge used, “gave as good as she got”, is problematic because it minimised
the defendant’s known violent behaviour towards the victim-survivor whilst at the same time
equating the victim-survivor’s ‘volatility’ with the defendant’s domestic abuse. This is reflective
of cultural narratives that quickly villainise women but excuse men for violence, as was
illustrated in discourses surrounding a court case involving Johnny Depp and Amanda Heard
in the latter half of 2020 (see, for example, Peat, 2020). A similar narrative was found by
Hlavka and Mulla (2018), where defence counsel used the term “gave as good as she got” to
support their characterisation of a Black woman victim-survivor as aggressive, again in the
context of intimate partner violence. Whilst the victim-survivor in T4 was privileged in this
regard due to being racialised as white, the ‘aggressive woman’ narrative for both her and the
victim-survivor in Hlavka and Mulla (2018), sought to distance them from the ‘ideal victim’
(Christie, 1986), thus minimising the male violence whilst shifting blame onto the victim-
survivors.
In T1, the victim-survivor’s drinking habits were put under far more scrutiny.
EXTRACT 6i
Defence You get drunk quite often, you often can’t remember how
you got home. What were you drinking that night?
Victim-survivor I can’t remember.
Defence You can’t remember?
Victim-survivor Alcohol.
Defence Yes, well I got that. <chuckles> What type?
Victim-survivor I don’t remember.




               
                  
              
                   
               
                
               
            
                
               
                 
                    
              
                 
                 
               
            
             
  
           
        
      
    
       
          
     
          
                 
              
                 
Even though the defence barrister goes on to suggest that the victim-survivor was not drunk,
he began by pointing out that she gets drunk often, to the point where she is unable to
remember getting home. The supposition that the victim-survivor was not as drunk as she
claimed was a key element in the defence, so it is unclear what the purpose of pointing to the
victim-survivor’s drinking habits prior to the alleged rapes could be other than to impeach her
credibility. Whilst it could be argued they were establishing that she had a high tolerance for
alcohol, doing so by stating that she often cannot remember how she got home seems
incongruent with that purpose. Furthermore, by laughing at the victim-survivor’s answer and
stating “Yes, well I got that”, the defence barrister arguably breached rule C7.1 of the BSB’s
(2020) code of conduct for barristers, which states: “you must not make statements or ask
questions merely to insult, humiliate or annoy a witness or any other person”. Rule C7 is one
of the few rules without further guidance attached to it, so it is not clear where the line is, which
is problematic both in terms of practice and accountability. This is important because questions
with a purpose of insulting and humiliating may not be asked in isolation, rather there may be
a range of ‘subtle’ questions that culminate as such. Whilst it may be argued that it goes
towards credibility, it is difficult to see the probative value of laughing at a victim-survivor.
Indeed, defence counsel later took advantage of an opportunity presented by the victim-
survivor in a moment of jest to further comment on her drinking habits:
EXTRACT 6j
Judge and Defence [Talking about what [strong liqueur] is, also mentioning
vodka. Jokes between them about [strong liqueur]]
<Laughs from public gallery [defendant’s supporters]>
Victim-survivor <jokingly> What, now?
<Laughs from the public gallery [defendant’s supporters]>
Defence You developed a taste for it [vodka]?
Victim-survivor It’s alright, yeah.
Defence Moving on to the second night… (T1)
To say someone has ‘got a taste for something’ is a term often used to indicate frequent
consumption of or a strong inclination/desire for something. Within the digital evidence in this




                 
                
              
                 
             
           
              
            
  
          
   
   
            
        
      
       
              
              
                  
                  
             
              
              
             
              
           
   
          
           
a drink problem, I get fucked all the time now” (T1). Given that barristers carefully choose their
words, it seems reasonable to conclude that the barrister in this case likely saw an opportunity
to strengthen the narrative of this victim-survivor as a ‘problem drinker’, especially given that
he then immediately moved on to a new line of questioning. The value in this insinuation comes
from drawing on wider cultural narratives that position ‘excessive’ substance use as an
indicator of a person being unreliable and untrustworthy (Selseng, 2017).
The extract below follows on almost immediately from extract 6j and demonstrates that the
defence were in fact arguing that the victim-survivor was not drunk.
EXTRACT 6k
Defence [You walked over to McDonalds, walked fine]. How high
were your heels?
Victim-survivor High.
Defence But you were walking fine. [You were aware enough to go
to McDonalds. You weren’t that drunk were you?]
Victim-survivor I was quite drunk.
Defence Quite drunk. Okay. (T1)
Here the defence counsel used repetition and emphasis of the victim-survivor’s own words to
underscore his point, taking advantage of the differing strength of meaning attributed to the
adjective ‘quite’ (it can mean fairly or very). Also of relevance in this excerpt is the question he
used to make this point, that is, the question about the height of her heels. Whilst this was
asked within the context of establishing her level of drunkenness, arguably giving relevance,
the wider context of this trial’s gendered and classed narratives creates further meaning. In
addition to the remarks regarding the victim-survivor’s drinking habits and the height of her
heels, evidence was adduced through police questions in the ABE and through witness
testimony regarding the length of her dress. For example, the prosecution asked directly about
the victim-survivor’s clothing, and the reasoning for this is unclear:
EXTRACT 6l
Friend [[Victim-survivor] was sick before we went out, just once




             
 
       
              
        
            
  
            
               
               
              
             
              
          
              
             
           
           
             
        
               
      
           
            
              
           
                 
           
             
hour and she said she felt okay, so we decided to still go
out].
Prosecution What was [victim-survivor] wearing?
Friend A dress, mini dress. Black or gold I think.
Prosecution How much had [victim-survivor] drunk?
Friend A substantial amount, but we were all the same level of
drunk. (T1)
The prosecution asking about what the victim-survivor was wearing seems entirely irrelevant
to this line of questioning and arguably to their case at all. Referring to victim-survivors’
clothing without cause to could lead to the jury unnecessarily deeming it relevant. The defence
later discussed the length of the victim-survivor’s dress in the context of establishing the
‘mechanics’ of how the defendant touched her. Whilst the defence’s reasoning for asking
about clothing can be argued relevant, the prosecution question cannot. This built on the
narratives discussed in section 4.3.2 regarding this victim-survivor’s perceived flirtatious
behaviour by drawing on embedded stereotypes at the intersection of gender and class which
position female heavy-drinkers as sexually available (Blume 1991; Cozzarelli et al. 2002). A
study by Spencer (2016) found that rape victim-survivors from low socioeconomic
backgrounds were more often rated as ‘promiscuous’ than victim-survivors from higher
socioeconomic backgrounds and that this correlated with higher levels of blame and negative
attitudes towards victim-survivors from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Furthermore,
Riemer et al. (2018) found that by merely holding an alcoholic beverage, women were routinely
dehumanised and assessed as sexually available.
As Skeggs (1997; 2005) notes, ‘promiscuity’ and excessiveness, including drunkenness, are
commonly associated with working-class femininities. This relates to the middle-class ideal of
respectability, which “is one of the most ubiquitous signifiers of class” (Skeggs, 1997, p.1).
Traditional femininity was constructed based on middle-class ideals and respectability was
used as a measure by which to hold certain groups of people as valued and legitimated whilst
‘othering’ those not deemed respectable (Skeggs, 1997; Lawler, 2005). Robinson (1983)




            
              
            
                 
             
                
              
                  
                
           
            
             
             
              
               
               
               
            
            
             
              
              
                
        
                
             
             
               
desire, particularly along classed and racialised lines. Similarly, Clark (1987) delineated the
significance of classed narratives in the construction of working women as unchaste and thus
unrapable. Phipps (2009) and Anthias (2014) have articulated similar thoughts on the
intersections of gender and class with regards to sexual violence and it has been a noted form
of narrative in previous rape trial observation research (Lees, 2002; Smith, 2018).
The age of the victim-survivor was also of relevance in T1 with regards to these gendered
narratives of respectability. The victim-survivor and defendant in T1 were both in their early
twenties at the time of the trial and late-teens at the time of the alleged rapes, which added
youth as a factor. The media and popular culture play a significant role in circulating images
and representations that govern what is considered desirable and undesirable behaviour
(Blackman and Walkerdine 2001). So-called ‘reality’ TV forms a significant part of
contemporary popular media and within it there is an overrepresentation of young, white,
working-class men and women (Wood and Skeggs 2008). Portrayals of them are often
disparaging and aim to incite moral judgements of their behaviour (Skeggs and Wood 2012;
Allen and Mendick, 2012). The portrayals on these TV shows are heavily gendered, with the
young women depicted in forms of excess in relation to alcohol and sexuality (Nunn and
Biressi, 2013; Wood 2017). That these portrayals are of young white men and women is
significant because within these classed narratives whiteness becomes a marker of excess,
positioning the white working-class as lacking in morals and thereby positioned as non-
respectable subjects of disgust (Skeggs 2004; Lawler, 2005). Indeed, as Skeggs (1997, p.99)
argued, both Black and white working-class women have been “coded as the sexual and
deviant other against which femininity was defined”, but it cannot, however, be assumed that
this happens in the same way. Whiteness, therefore, is salient in this narrative in that it
distinguishes a particular type of working-class femininity.
Shows such as Geordie Shore and The Only Way Is Essex contain images of young white
working-class women drinking alcohol to excess and engaging in, or talking about, sexual
acts, thus portraying them as hyper-sexualised and sexually available (Griffin et al., 2013;




               
          
            
              
                  
             
             
   
              
               
           
               
               
               
            
                 
               
               
               
                
   
               
           
                
            
                 
al. 2018; Baker et al. 2019), as is highly gendered language which constructs women as
irrationally emotional and objectified, sexualised beings (Payne, 2016). When barristers
deploy these classed and gendered narratives about young working-class women, the impact
of any sexual history evidence that is introduced is arguably compounded (Smith, 2018), such
as in T1 (see section 4.2.1). That alcohol can play such an easy role in the formation of
narratives about the sexual behaviour of victim-survivors is significant because alcohol is a
prominent feature in many rape cases (HMCPSI, 2007; Lovett and Horvath, 2009; Hester,
2013; MOPAC, 2019).
The narratives in T1 therefore culminate in an image of a young, ‘promiscuous’, working-class
woman, who binge drinks often and who does not therefore conform to middle-class ideals of
respectability, thereby positioning her as untrustworthy and unreliable and drawing on victim-
blaming myths about rape. As Brooks (2002) posits, rape trial narratives are often a reflection
of cultural narratives about how women are “supposed to behave” (p.4). It appears that being
perceived as a young working-class male can be used in favour of defendants in excusing
their behaviour (see Chapter Seven), whereas being perceived as a young working-class
female is used as a tool for undermining credibility by casting them against the image of the
‘ideal victim’ (Christie, 1986). Whilst this may seem at odds with Phipps’ (2009) assertion that
working-class men are perceived as more likely to commit rape, it speaks, rather, to the
shamefully low conviction rate by providing an insight as to the mechanisms that may serve
in the acquittal of even men who may be perceived as more likely to rape.
6.2.3 Working-class motherhood
Narratives about motherhood were present in T3, T5 and T6. Broadly, there were two types
of motherhood narratives: respectable (good) mothers (T3) and unrespectable (bad) mothers
(T5 and T6). The good mother narrative in T3 was, however, not substantial and was very
peripheral to the case. The ‘unrespectable mothers’ narratives drew on classed stereotypes




              
  
 
   
           
    
     
        
     
           
 
        
         
     
        
               
             
               
                   
                  
      
   
         
     
         
       
     
       
      
           
      
In T5, the parenting skills of the child victim-survivor’s mother were frequently called into
question.
EXTRACT 6m
Defence [Did you catch them both playing video games that were
too old for them?]
Mother Yeah.
Defence For example? Call of Duty?
Mother Yeah.
Defence [Did you catch them watching DVDs that were not age
appropriate?]
Mother Not really, Twilight.
Defence [When you say to police that [victim-survivor] watches
things he shouldn’t, what things?]
Mother Call of Duty. (T5)
In the above excerpt the defence barrister was questioning the mother about an assertion that
her sons had been watching pornography. Whilst asking about DVDs could therefore be
relevant, it is unclear why asking about video games, and specifically a violent video game
with no sex or nudity, would be. It therefore seems that asking about Call of Duty was a way
of building the portrayal of her as a ‘bad mother’. The defence later returned to this point after
pursuing several other lines of questioning.
EXTRACT 6n
Defence Okay, was there a time you caught [victim-survivor]
watching naked men and women?
Mother No, I caught [eldest son].
Defence How old was he?
Mother Nine.
Defence Was it age appropriate?
Mother Very inappropriate.





               
                
               
                 
             
                
  
   
          
      
     
        
           
       
         
                   
               
              
             
               
                
                
            
     
   
           
      
             
             
   
The questioning about viewing pornography was relevant to the case as it was suggested that
this could have informed a false allegation, however the above extract was all that was needed
for the defence to establish this, which further demonstrates that asking about Call of Duty
was merely a mechanism by which to portray her as a ‘bad mother’. The ‘bad mother’ narrative
was bolstered further in other lines of questioning. For example, during cross-examination the
defence asked about the end of the mother’s relationship with the father of her eldest two
children:
EXTRACT 6o
Defence You told [defendant] that things were tough when you
broke up with [the boys’] dad.
Mother Yeah.
Defence What did you mean?
Mother He used to be violent towards me.
Defence Did the boys see?
Mother I don’t know, maybe. (T5)
It is difficult to see how this line of questioning could be relevant to the case. Eliciting from the
mother that her children may have seen their father being violent towards her arguably drew
on cultural narratives that position victims of domestic violence as failing to protect their
children. The ‘failure to protect’ narrative pejoratively shifts blame and responsibility from the
perpetrator to the mother (Humphreys et al., 2006) and is pervasive in society (Moulding et
al., 2015). The line of questioning in the excerpt above therefore appears to be another way
to portray the mother as a ‘bad’ parent. The defence then used this narrative to contrastingly
portray the defendant as showing protective parenting behaviour, thereby distancing him from
the allegations of sexual abuse:
EXTRACT 6p
Defence When you confided in [defendant], did he say maybe they
shouldn’t see [their father] as much?
Mother No, he moaned that he didn’t have them enough.





      
               
      
 
   
             
            
       
      
                
                 
            
          
             
                 
         
   
          
    
        
           
 
      
                 
             
           
             
          
              
Mother No. (T5)
As well as the more subtle references to ‘poor parenting’ outlined above, the defence also
made much more explicit insinuations.
EXTRACT 6q
Defence During that time did you ever get angry at your kids?
Mother All parents lose their temper with their children.
Defence I’m only asking you.
Mother Yeah. (T5)
The defence asked a question that almost any parent would be required to answer ‘yes’ to,
and when the mother pointed that out in her response the defence drilled down further so that
only an affirmative answer could be given. Middle-class ideals characterise calmness and
congeniality as appropriate emotional behaviour (Wingfield, 2010), therefore portraying the
mother as angry bolstered the classed narrative that already othered her as working-class.
That the anger was directed at her children put this in the context of ‘bad parenting’. The
defence barrister immediately continued to build on this narrative:
EXTRACT 6r
Defence And the school had significant input with you regarding
boundaries and managing behaviour?
Mother Only for [eldest son].
Defence And you struggled at this time with chores around the
house?
Mother Yeah. (T5)
Here the defence drew on the school’s involvement and phrased it in such a way that it
responsibilised the mother. Furthermore, raising the point that the mother had struggled with
household chores is further reflective of middle-class motherhood ideals, where the middle-
class ‘home-maker’ is portrayed as a virtuous, capable housekeeper in contrast to the working-
class slovenly, welfare-dependant mother (McRobbie, 2013). Indeed, Walkerdine and Lucey




              
  
              
             
            
              
            
              
               
            
            
            
                
             
             
              
             
            
               
            
            
              
         
              
              
           
             
and working-class mothers and is inextricably linked to notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mothering,
respectively.
The above excerpt was immediately followed with questioning that framed the mother as a
‘benefits cheat’ (see section 6.2.1). Lone parents, in particular lone mothers, are commonly
positioned as ‘deficient parents’ and ‘scroungers’ (Dermott and Pomati, 2016). Whilst the
mother in T5 was in a relationship, questioning about the victim-survivor’s attitude towards his
mother’s previous partners positioned her as having introduced multiple men into her
children’s lives. Whilst the questioning was arguably relevant, it further fed into the narrative
of her as a ‘bad mother’ by contrasting her against middle-class values of sexual respectability
and the nuclear family. Lone mothers are often conceptualised as representing sexual
immorality (Smart, 1992; Carabine, 2001) and Lehtonen (2018) has noted that policy
documentation linked ‘multiple relationship transitions’ to poor outcomes for children and thus
to ‘poor parenting’, reflecting the middle-class ideal of the nuclear family as the expected norm.
Lone parenthood, especially lone motherhood, has long been stigmatised in the UK (Smart,
1992; Skeggs, 2005). Political and media discourses frequently position lone mothers as being
economically deprived and reliant on state benefits (Atkinson et al., 1998; Salter, 2018; Jun,
2019; Morris and Munt, 2019). These gendered and classed portrayals draw on Murray’s
(1991) concept of an ‘underclass’ and remain embedded in contemporary society (Tihelková,
2015; Salter, 2018; Morris and Munt, 2019). These narratives draw on the notion of ‘benefits
scroungers’ to frame lone mothers as undeserving (Tihelková, 2015) and thus as
unrespectable and ‘other’ (Jun, 2019). Positioning victim-survivors and their mothers as the
unrespectable ‘others’ in this way invites the jury to make moral judgements based on
stigmatising cultural narratives formed on middle-class notions of respectability.
Working-class motherhood in general has long been scrutinised and viewed as inferior in the
UK (Skeggs, 1997, 2004; Gillies, 2007). Indeed, Smart (1995) traced classed notions of ‘good
mother’ through legislation dating back to the seventeenth century. Respectable parenting,




             
               
               
          
              
                
              
              
            
            
            
             
             
    
               
             
 
   
        
   
     
        
       
              
             
             
              
                
     
not meet those standards are blamed and vilified (Gillies, 2007). Working-class mothers have
long been responsibilised for ‘failings’ or problems within their families by being made to feel
inadequate in their caring skills and abilities. As a result, they constantly have to prove
themselves against middle-class ideals of motherhood, for example through ‘parenting
courses’ imposed or encouraged by social workers (Skeggs, 1997; Moran et al., 2004; Gillies,
2007). Though these courses are purported to be aimed at all families and at mothers and
fathers, in practice they are “targeted at poor and disadvantaged mothers” (Gillies, 2007, p.7).
Poor parenting (mothering) is conceptualised as an individual issue rather than the result of
structural inequalities (Gillies, 2007; Stewart, 2016). Further, there is a persistent cultural
narrative that “poor parents spawn damaged, antisocial children” (Gillies, 2007, p.8). Thus,
framing the child victim-survivor’s mother (T5) as an inferior parent through highlighting
interventions from social services, the NSPCC, and the school, served to reinforce the
portrayal of the victim-survivor as an untrustworthy, ‘problem child’ who tells antisocial lies
(see section 6.3.1.2).
At the same time as positioning the mother as inferior, the defence portrayed the defendant
as a respectable father-figure who took on responsibility for another man’s children. For
example:
EXTRACT 6s
Defence Moving forward, [defendant] had contact with [defendant
and mother’s son]
Mother Yeah.
Defence He took them all out?
Mother Sometimes yeah. (T5)
Here the defence drew attention to the defendant’s continued contact with all three children
as opposed to just his own child. This was reinforced through the defendant’s evidence-in-
chief. These narratives of ‘good dad’ versus ‘bad mum’ played out broader gendered
narratives of ‘good man’ versus ‘bad woman’ which permeate rape trials through the portrayal
of women as untrustworthy liars (see section 6.3.1) and cast men against the ‘good men don’t




              
              
                
              
            
             
               
               
               
                
               
               
             
           
             
              
            
             
      
    
              
             
              
  
              
           
T6 also involved allegations of child sexual abuse, although they were historic accusations so
the victim-survivors in the trial were both adults. The motherhood narrative that ran through
this trial was to a lesser extent than T5 but was nevertheless a negatively framed narrative
about the mother. The narrative drew on classed and gendered cultural narratives that position
working-class women as ‘promiscuous’ (see 6.2.2) through drawing attention to the mother’s
sexual history with the defendant (see section 4.2.1.1). When asking about the relationship
(see extract 4o) the defence stated the age of the victim-survivors as ‘young teenagers’ before
asking questions about what the mother had told them about the relationship. In doing this,
the defence arguably sought to portray it as an example of ‘bad parenting’. Although not
explicitly saying that, it seemed to invite the jury to make moral judgements about the family
and the type of people they are. Particularly because this was subsequently used to suggest
that victim-survivor2 had made up her allegations and had used her knowledge of the sexual
relationship as a basis for those allegations. This narrative reflected stigmatising portrayals of
working-class, lone mothers as sexually immoral (Smart, 1992; Carrabine, 2001; Skeggs,
2005) which was further supported through the defendant’s distancing of himself as a
stepfather figure in his characterisation of the relationship with the mother as a sexual
arrangement rather than a committed relationship. This characterisation was contested by the
victim-survivors, their mother, and evidence provided by a neighbour who described it as
eventually becoming a co-habiting relationship.
6.3 Narratives of honesty
Credibility is considered central to rape and sexual assault trials. There is a pervasive
misconception that false allegations of rape are common despite evidence that the opposite
is true (Kelly, 2010; CPS, 2013; Weiser, 2017). Indeed, as former Canadian Supreme Court
Justice asserted:
“The most injurious myth is that women and children are not credible in this




             
            
               
        
    
             
              
               
               
              
                
              
             
                  
               
              
             
       
             
            
               
        
       
             
              
             
        
This section therefore explores the way narratives of belief and disbelief were constructed
through gendered narratives that intersect with pejorative narratives about age and mental ill-
health. These narratives of honesty further intersect with social class with a clear overlap with
the respectability narratives discussed in the preceding section.
6.3.1 Women as liars
The misconception that false allegations of rape are common is often articulated through
narratives that position women as liars for varying reasons, including that they are scorned
and looking for vengeance or that they had drunken sex which they later regretted.
Narratives that positioned women as lying about being raped or assaulted were present in all
trials with adult victim-survivors. In the remaining trial the victim-survivor, a boy child, was
positioned as a lying ‘problem child’, and this is discussed further in section 6.3.1.2. The idea
that women are inherently untrustworthy and deceitful and therefore lie about rape has been
around for centuries (Jordan, 2004; Bourke, 2008). Sir Matthew Hale infamously stated that
rape “is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended
by the party accused, tho never so innocent” (Hale, 1726, cited in Rumney, 2006). Assertions
such as this persisted through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bourke, 2008), and the
following example from an American judge highlights how this notion was clearly articulated
in ways that framed women as irrational:
“There are few crimes in which false charges are more easily or confidently
made than in rape. Experience has shown that unfounded charges of rape
are brought for a variety of motives. The adage, ‘Hell hath no fury like a
woman scorned’, is frequently encountered in rape prosecutions”
(Ploscowe, 1951, cited in Jordan, 2004, p.32).
More contemporarily, an analysis of Twitter posts from 2016 showed that tweets accusing
women of lying about rape were almost three times more common than posts validating victim-
survivors (Stabile et al., 2019), which helps demonstrate the continued pervasiveness of the




              
              
              
              
               
           
   
           
            
          
      
         
           
   
           
 
          
               
         
   
           
  
           
                
                  
                  
              
 
   
             
    
In my observations all victim-survivors were portrayed as liars. The accusations of lying were
put directly to the victim-survivors in cross-examination in some trials, whereas in others there
were micro-examinations that lay the groundwork for the point to be made during closing
speeches. For example, in T2 there were suggestions that the victim-survivor felt scorned or
jealous of the defendant’s new girlfriend, with the implication being she was lying for revenge.
The defence began without making direct comment on motive for lying:
EXTRACT 6t
Defence [You had a work colleague at [place of employment] and
at the end of that year you had concerns about how close
they were getting, then in the [month] she moved into
[house victim-survivor had shared with defendant].
Originally it was a platonic, financial arrangement, but then
later it became a relationship and remains so to this day].
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Defence You found out [the month before reporting], how did you
feel?
Victim-survivor I didn’t really care at that point. (T2)
The defence barrister was setting the background for when she later asked about the timing
of the victim-survivor’s first disclosure of the alleged rape:
EXTRACT 6u
Defence By this time you knew that [defendant’s new girlfriend] had
moved in.
Victim-survivor I suspected but I didn’t know for sure. (T2)
This built on the questioning in the preceding excerpt to imply the victim-survivor was lying out
of jealousy. Later in the trial the defendant’s police interview was read into court. In it he said:
“[It] sounds like she is trying to get back at me for all of this” (T2). The prosecution cross-
examined the defendant to address the suggestion the victim-survivor was jealous of his new
relationship:
EXTRACT 6v
Prosecution So she had no reason to think that she couldn’t have you




    
               
         
    
            
     
             
 
             
           
                  
         
   
           
          
              
 
            
            
   
              
   
           
          
           
              
 
             
         
        
             
           
    
             
     
Defendant No.
Prosecution She had no reason to be jealous of [girlfriend] […] It is your
argument that she made the accusation up because she
was jealous of [girlfriend].
Defence [Not relevant, that is not our argument, our argument is that
there was no non-consensual sex].
Prosecution There is a huge passage in his interview that talks about
jealousy.
Judge What’s been put to him in interview is not put as motive.
Prosecution Can we have the jury out please? (T2)
With the jury out there was a back and forth about the defence case and what wording the
prosecutor was permitted to use in her questioning:
EXTRACT 6w
Prosecution [He’s put forward that she was jealous, it is repeatedly
referred to as about [the girlfriend], the only inference that
can be made from that is that he is saying she is making it
up].
Judge Where is jealousy referred to in this interview?
Prosecution The word ‘jealous’ is not necessary in interview for me to
raise it here.
[Long discussion about whether he had accused her of lying or being jealous of
the new girlfriend]
Defence [My concern is that [defendant] has not put forward a
motive to get back at him, [defendant] is replying to
questions, he is not asserting anything. It’s not right to say
that is his argument, all his case is, is that he did not rape
her].
Prosecution [Because he says she is making it up, I can’t be confined
to only asking questions using words from his interview.]
Otherwise no-one would be able to ask anything!
Judge [I agree, but that was not my point. You said jealous, I
asked where in the interview that was said, you did not
point it out] […]
Prosecution [It has been edited out, my mistake. But am I entitled to




       
              
               
             
              
                
                   
                 
              
                 
             
    
   
          
          
 
    
            
    
         
    
           
    
          
    
          
    
             
 
    
           
   
     
Judge Yes. […] (T2).
Although the defence had been allowed to imply this reasoning in her cross-examination of
the victim-survivor, the prosecution was limited in the way she was permitted to address that
implication. The defence barrister chose to interpret what counts as a ‘legal argument’
narrowly in an attempt to limit the prosecution’s ability to challenge previous assertions made
by the defendant. It seemed, however, that the judge had not noticed or remembered that the
defendant had said “she is trying to get back at me” in the police transcript that was read into
court. It was a clear suggestion of motive for lying. It seemed unnecessarily harsh to limit the
prosecution’s line of questioning in this way, and further interrogation of the defence’s position
by the judge may have made that clearer by, for example, taking time to properly review the
transcript. Nevertheless, the prosecution barrister did go on to effectively counter the assertion
within her limited scope:
EXTRACT 6x
Prosecution So you said in interview that [victim-survivor] would know
from your contact that she was welcome back as your
girlfriend.
Defendant Yes.
Prosecution She was welcome to move back to the flat.
Defendant Yes.
Prosecution And to engage in sexual relations.
Defendant Yes.
Prosecution You loved her and wanted to marry her.
Defendant Yes.
Prosecution So you couldn’t have made it clearer.
Defendant No.
Prosecution So she had nothing to worry about.
Defendant No.
Prosecution She had no reason to do anything nasty to you because of
[girlfriend].
Defendant No.






            
             
                
            
    
 
   
                  
                
             
                
              
                  
     
                
                  
               
               
                 
               
             
            
                 
            
            
   
                 
        
The prosecution skillfully challenged the defence’s insinuation here by clearly and simply
getting confirmation from the defendant that the suggested motive was immaterial. Whilst the
defence had argued that their case was not that the victim-survivor was lying out of jealousy,
and had limited the prosecution’s cross-examination accordingly, in her closing argument the
defence directly stated it:
EXTRACT 6y
“[As for motive, it is not for him to prove, but you may be interested in the timing
of the reports to the friend and the police. At that time we know that [girlfriend]
had moved in and [victim-survivor] has said that she thought that had happened
and said that she wasn’t bothered by that time.] But what do you make of the
timing? … [Every jury brings common sense. Yes you might agree that there is
no such thing as a standard response to rape, but I ask you to look at the timing
of that report.]” (Defence, T2)
It is significant that the defence had explicitly said that she was not arguing that the victim-
survivor was lying out of jealousy but then went on to make exactly that point in her closing
statement. This highlights precisely why it was important for the prosecution to be able to
cross-examine the defendant on the issue, rather than being limited by the defence and the
judge. At the time of this trial there was a considerable amount of media attention given to
cases with disclosure failings that lead to the CPS dropping cases (e.g., BBC News, 2018;
Bowcott, 2018; Evans, 2018). This had resulted in a heightened rhetoric around false
allegations throughout 2018 and 2019 (e.g., Osborne, 2018; Davies, 2019; Fouzder, 2019;
McKinney, 2019). It seems fair to assert, then, that jurors may likely have been aware of this
high-profile media attention, which could have made the defence argument more compelling
to them. Particularly because the defence barrister stated in her closing speech:
EXTRACT 6z
“[Rape is a word that stirs up strong feelings. There is a lot in the news,] there’s




                 
               
               
     
                
              
            
       
   
              
 
           
           
        
            
               
           
                
       
   
             
                 
              
              
                
             
  
               
               
                
Saying “there is a lot in the news” arguably directed the jurors to think about the false
allegations rhetoric, as that is what was dominating the British press regarding rape at the
time. Pointing to this rhetoric, therefore, arguably made the value of drawing on the ‘jealous
women lie’ narrative much stronger.
Another ‘motive for lying’ was put forward in T1. In this case the victim-survivor and defendant
were friends who had been out drinking together and the defendant had unrequited romantic
feelings for the victim-survivor. The victim-survivor was accused of regretting consensual sex
seven times during cross-examination. One such example:
EXTRACT 6aa
Victim-survivor I cried for half an hour first, because I knew something had
happened.
Defence I suggest you do remember and you know what happened.
You felt disgusted and guilty out of regret for it happening
again, and that’s why you got hysterical. (T1)
The use of the descriptor “hysterical” was significant because historically ‘hysterical’ women
were viewed as prone to making false allegations (Jordan, 2004; Bourke, 2008). It also has
connotations with mental ill-health and served to further undermine the victim-survivor’s
credibility by portraying her as unstable (see section 6.3.2). ‘Regret’ as a motive for lying was
a strong theme in the defence’s closing:
EXTRACT 6ab
“She did remember. She did consent, she knows she did. She was embarrassed.
She knew, that she said ‘I really hope we didn’t have sex’ is a clear indication that
she remembered but regretted it… She said she felt disgusted, but was she not
disgusted at herself for what she was doing to the defendant’s feelings? ... My
learned friend says she has no motive for lying, I suggest that her motive is regret
and disgust and embarrassment. The defendant is telling the truth. She is lying.”
(Defence, T1)
These were the final words of the defence. Previous court observation studies have also found
the notion of ‘regretted drunken consent’ to be used by defence counsel (Lees, 2002; Temkin




               
                  
                   
               
               
                
                
         
            
            
              
             
             
             
               
             
             
              
            
            
          
              
              
                
              
                  
                 
           
society, which makes this a valuable argument for defence barristers to put forth and probably
a powerful note to end on. For example, Gunby et al. (2012) asked four focus groups to discuss
a rape vignette and found that the idea of ‘regretting it after’ was discussed in three out of their
four groups. Their findings also indicated that it was held against the victim-survivor that she
did not immediately recognise the experience as rape, which was also the case for the victim-
survivor in T1 (see section 5.2.2). The participants in Gunby et al. (2012) also framed alcohol
as a factor in ‘causing’ women to make false allegations after regretful sex. Again, alcohol was
a significant factor in T1 (see section 6.2.2).
These assumptions and narratives are rooted in patriarchal values where women were
historically denied sexual desire and agency. For example, Degler (1974) documented some
narratives in which women in nineteenth century Britain and America were viewed as having
no sexual desire except in exceptional circumstances and those exceptions were viewed as
abnormal and associated with the working-classes (see 6.2.2 for a discussion of working-class
sexualities). Though Degler (1974) went on to argue that the ideologies prescribed through
those narratives were not necessarily bought into by the majority of the public, the continued
pervasiveness of such narratives cannot easily be denied. Indeed, Webb (2015) traced the
existence of ‘slut-shaming’ as a means of suppressing women’s sexuality back to ancient
Rome, where, for example, type of clothing was used to distinguish between married women
and prostitutes and female adultery was punishable by exile or death.
Robinson (1984) noted how women’s sexuality had historically been denied and obscured,
which therefore shrouded acknowledgement or performance of female sexuality in
contemporary times with shame. The chastity of women was historically a primary marker of
respectability and honour (Gowing,1996) and this was clearly reflected in early rape law which
conceived of women as property of their fathers or husbands (Edwards et al., 2011). The value
given to ‘chastity’ led to ‘unchaste’ women being viewed as dishonourable (Gowing, 1996). It
was therefore thought of as a reason for women to lie to avoid scorn and shame when they
were caught having sex and as a reason that men needed to be protected from these ‘false’




             
             
             
           
              
               
              
               
               
               
           
   
       
   
           
 
   
            
   
         
      
         
     
              
               
                 
             
                 
              
              
ideals that framed the expectations for women’s sexuality (see section 6.2.2). For example,
women in the nineteenth century were characterised in a false dichotomy that positioned
women as either chaste and virtuous and therefore respectable or unchaste and unvirtuous
and often labelled as prostitutes, thereby being unrespectable (Sanday, 1997).
Women were also historically thought of as conniving and cunning in their ‘false allegations’
(Bourke, 2008) and this, too, was reflected in my observations of T3 and T6. Similar
accusations of women conniving were made in T1 and T5, where the victim-survivors’ mothers
were also implicated in the accusations of lying, and this is discussed separately in section
6.3.1.1. Defence counsel in T3 appeared to suggest that a gap in digital messaging between
the victim-survivor and the defendant, which was taking place in the hours after the assault,
provided an opportunity for her to be influenced by a friend:
EXTRACT 6ac
Defence [There is an 11-minute gap].
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence Then that’s where you claim he had massaged inside your
vagina?
Victim-survivor Yes.
Defence Did you speak to anyone in those 10 minutes?
Victim-survivor Maybe.
Defence Did you speak to [friend A]?
Victim-survivor No, that was later.
Defence <long pause> but maybe [friend B]?
Victim-survivor Yes. (T3)
This is where the cross-examination ended. By first identifying a gap in the communications
and determining that it was after that gap that the victim-survivor ‘claimed’ the defendant had
sexually assaulted her, the defence was able to cast suspicion on the gap. Although it was not
explicitly mentioned, it seemed that defence was listing friends until the victim-survivor said
‘yes’. The long pause before “but maybe [friend H]?” could be indicative of this. There is no
confirmation of communication nor any evidence of it, merely a suggestion from defence that




                 
              
           
               
   
             
         
                
               
   
              
             
             
               
              
           
   
            
               
              
          
             
             
               
       
             
               
                 
                 
                   
been. Yet to an observer, such as jurors, this could easily have added weight to the accusation
that the victim-survivor was lying, by leaning on cultural narratives that position women as
untrustworthy and conniving. This was also bolstered through portraying the victim-survivor
as sexually provocative (see section 4.2.1). Indeed, in the closing speech, the defence said:
EXTRACT 6ad
“[there has been a lot of sexual banter, sexually charged, sexual discussion. We
have messages directly after, where [victim-survivor] says [reads messages],
then there’s a gap of 11 minutes then she says] ‘but why did he massage inside
my vagina?’. Her evidence is that she may have spoken to one of her friends
between.” (Defence, T3)
As noted earlier in this section and in section 6.2.2, gendered narratives of women’s
sexualities intersect with classed notions of what counts as ‘respectable’. In the above
example the defence barrister pointed the jury to his earlier characterisation of the victim-
survivor as ‘promiscuous’ (see section 4.2.1) and linked that to his implicit suggestion that she
was influenced in making her allegation after speaking to a friend. The prosecution addressed
the accusation that the victim-survivor was lying in his closing speech:
EXTRACT 6ae
“Unless mentally unhinged, [you don’t go around making these things up. What
reason could there be? You may be really struggling to come up with a logical
reason for why [victim-survivor] might]. I can, and this is really stretching for an
example, maybe [victim-survivor] is scorned, she could logically make something
up. But that is not what has happened here. [According to [defendant] nothing
happened, just a massage, then she immediately decides to make this up?] Why?
There is no reason, what logical process might explain why she made it up? …
You must find him guilty.” (Prosecution, T3)
The prosecutor attempted to resist the false allegations myth by acknowledging the gendered
narratives of ‘scorned women’ and arguing that that reasoning was illogical in this case. Whilst
it is good that it was addressed, the way in which the argument was framed continued to
reference the myth that in certain circumstances women do lie about rape and that it is women




               
                  
              
              
             
             
             
               
             
             
               
           
               
                
 
   
           
              
              
                
           
               
              
         
             
       
           
            
               
            
notion that ‘hysterical’ women lie about rape (see section 6.3.2). The victim-survivor in this trial
did in many ways match up to the ‘ideal victim’ image (Christie, 1986), and even in the ways
she deviated from that image they were what could be considered exceptional. For example,
although ‘sexting’ deviates from the idea of ‘chastity’ associated with an ideal victim, this
victim-survivor was demonstrably hesitant and reserved in the images she sent, therefore she
only minimally, and ‘reasonably’, deviated from the ideals of respectability that formulate the
‘ideal victim’ stereotype (respectability is addressed in section 6.2). Another factor that could
lend favour to the victim-survivor in this regard was that she thrice interrupted the defence
barrister in order to rebut or preempt victim-blaming assertions. This is significant because
Larcombe (2005) argued that “the ‘successful rape complainant’ is not necessarily one with
an unblemished sexual history. Rather, she has a strong sense of herself and takes overt
offence at...alternative or derogatory constructions of her character and credibility” (p.73).
The following excerpt from the defence’s closing remarks demonstrate how easy it is to form
a ‘women lie’ narrative with regard to even those who bear close resemblance to the ‘ideal
victim’:
EXTRACT 6af
“[It is simply one word against another. Does [victim-survivor’s] word have
enough weight… or was it a young woman] a bit prone to exaggeration, perhaps
very embarrassed as to the position she found herself in… ‘I’ve been duped, [he’s
not who he says he is]’. Imagine how she’d feel having to tell people about it.
[Remember her messages, she suspected. Did she, as a result of
embarrassment, knowing she’d be told off by her friend, think] the way out of this
is to…play the victim. [‘I’m going to say I was sexually assaulted…create a wave
of sympathy rather than intense embarrassment…and people thinking I’m
stupid’]… ‘you’ve been playing with my feelings, I’m gonna make your life really
difficult now’…and be really vindictive.” (Defence, T3)
The defence barrister chose words and phrases with clear negative connotations:
“exaggeration”, “embarrassed”, “play the victim”, “vindictive”. This relied on the gendered and
classed narratives already discussed that posit that women lie about rape in order to avoid




              
            
            
                 
               
                
             
               
   
   
        
          
              
    
   
              
  
   
           
  
       
 
   
             
   
                
                 
              
   
noted a belief that “even ‘respectable women’ [could] ‘imagine themselves the victims of a
man’s sexual passion’” (2008, p.33). The connotation of ‘exaggeration’ in the defence
counsel’s closing speech reflected the idea that women ‘imagine themselves the victims’.
Again, as with T2, the defence arguably took advantage of the strength of the ‘women lie about
rape’ narratives in news and social media at the time of the trial observations.
As with T3, there were insinuations of conniving in T6. The case involved two sisters as victim-
survivors who had made allegations against a previous partner of their mother. Defence
counsel in this trial used the sisters’ relationship to undermine their claims by alluding to
collusion. For example:
EXTRACT 6ag
Defence Is it because it didn’t happen?
Victim-survivor1 No. It did. I won’t be called a liar.
Defence … isn’t it the case that you made up the bus allegations to
support your sister’s allegations?
Victim-survivor1 No. (T6)
This assertion was then repeated in the context of inconsistencies with dates in the victim-
survivor’s accounts:
EXTRACT 6ah
Defence I’m going to suggest you brought it forward three months.
Victim-survivor1 No.
Defence Brought it forward to support [victim-survivor2’s]
allegations.
Victim-survivor1 No! (T6)
The defence framed both sisters as vindictive liars in her closing remarks:
EXTRACT 6ai
“… is she trying to make it worse for this defendant? It’s not enough to accuse
him of sex when she was 15, let’s make it worse for him … [having made up





             
            
  
  
                  
            
            
             
  
             
              
              
                
          
             
       
                 
                 
             
                
               
   
              
             
             
               
            
               
            
Here the defence clearly articulated a motive of vindictiveness and malice and used victim-
survivor1’s inconsistencies to bolster that assertion. Victim-survivor2 was also framed as a
vindictive liar:
EXTRACT 6aj
“Members of the jury you may think it quite telling that she says at the end of the
ABE about being angry with [victim-survivor1] ‘stealing her boyfriend’, but no one
says anything about that…[recaps burden of proof] … [Defendant] says she’s odd
… does this rivalry give an insight as to how [victim-survivor2’s] mind works?”
(Defence, T6)
The defence barrister portrayed victim-survivor2 as jealous, a narrative put forward by the
defendant on multiple occasions, and vindictive and implied that a rivalry between the sisters
could be seen as an indication of that vindictiveness. This characterisation of rivalry contrasts
the earlier assertion that one sister had made up allegations in support of the other. Both
characterisations, however, portray the victim-survivors as untrustworthy and provide motive
for lying. These narratives drew on the gendered and classed narratives previously discussed
that position working-class women as untrustworthy.
In contrast to the other trials discussed in this section, the victim-survivor in T4 had not used
the word rape in her allegation, which closed off the opportunity for the defence to put a
‘motive’ for false allegations in the ways outlined above. Therefore, the defence barrister
instead constructed the victim-survivor as a liar through focusing on her actions at the time of
the rapes, rather than focusing on providing the jury with a motive for lying.
EXTRACT 6ak
“Even the most socially adept people can be deceived by the actions of someone
so intent on misleading. [That’s what this case is about. [Victim-survivor] told you
she was scared, in her mind felt scared of [defendant]. So whilst [victim-survivor]
told you that she had fear in her mind, she sought to deceive [defendant] because
she wanted him to believe they were back together…]” (Defence closing, T4)
This remark ignored the context of the history of domestic abuse perpetrated by the defendant




              
       
 
   
              
        
               
               
               
                  
               
             
                 
           
    
               
              
               
             
              
                
            
    
                
            
                  
         
communicating her fear to the defendant and framed it as intentional manipulation. A later
remark in his closing argument reasserted this:
EXTRACT 6al
“if this was a woman who was genuinely fearful and desperate to escape, she
was masterful at hiding it.” (Defence closing, T4)
The assertions in both these extracts ignored and obscured what is known about the power
dynamics in intimate partner violence and draws on the myth that women should and always
do actively resist rape (see section 4.3.1). Men who are violent towards their partners often
do not need to resort to violence or threat in order to have their wishes met because the
underlying pattern of abuse works as an effective tool of coercion (Kelly, 1987; Hamby and
Koss, 2003). Cultural narratives, however, tend to obscure this by trivialising intimate partner
rape, and this has been shown to influence charging decisions in a US context (O’Neal et al.,
2015) and in mock jury research (Lynch et al., 2019).
6.3.1.1 Mothers as liars
So far, this section has demonstrated that all the adult victim-survivors were accused of lying
by the defence barristers through the use of gendered and classed narratives that reflect
hundreds of years of disbelief of women and shaming of their sexualities. The gendered nature
of these narratives was further demonstrated in the ways in which victim-survivors’ mothers
were also framed as untrustworthy liars by defence counsel. Whilst there was one male victim-
survivor, he was a child and so narratives about his age were used to illustrate his
untrustworthiness (see section 6.3.1.2), however this was bolstered by gendered and classed
narratives about his mother.
Section 6.2.3 discussed the ways in which the child victim-survivor’s mother in T5 was cast as
a bad mother through gendered and classed narratives. During cross-examination she was
asked about the timing of the report to the police in relation to her being annoyed with the




   
         
         
 
          
            
         
       
            
           
        
               
            
            
              
            
                 
              
               
              
             
         
   
                
          
           
             
              
                   
           
EXTRACT 6am
Defence Were there some messages after the breakup where
[defendant] had to rearrange seeing the boys because of
work?
Mother No, it was because of his back.
Defence I suggest there was a time he had to rearrange because
he had a few days of work come up.
Mother Maybe, I don’t remember.
Defence And shortly after it is when you call the police?
Mother I don’t remember, I mean I remember what you’re saying
but I don’t remember when it was. (T5)
Casting suspicion on the timing of the allegations in this way drew on pervasive cultural
narratives that wrongly suggest mothers often make false child sexual abuse allegations
against their former partners (Penfold, 1995; Trocmé and Bala, 2005). These assumptions
draw on gendered and classed narratives that position women as vindictive liars. For example,
Bourke (2008) noted that during the nineteenth century working-class children were thought
to often make malicious allegations and were spurred on to do so by their mothers. Given the
classed narratives constructed around the mother in T5 by the defence (see section 6.2.3),
the casting of suspicion over the timing of the allegations seems to reflect this historic
narrative. This narrative was also reflected in T6, where the victim-survivors had been accused
of fabricating their allegations and conniving together (see section 6.3.1). Their mother was
brought into this narrative in the defence’s closing speech:
EXTRACT 6an
“[Did you think all three of them were challenged and backtracked to say ‘I can’t
remember’. Are they helping you? Especially [mother]? That] throwaway remark
‘I got dementia’, really?! Really, members of the jury?” (Defence, T6)
The defence barrister suggested that all three had given untruthful accounts and “backtracked”
when they were challenged over details. She pointed particularly to the mother. This mother,
like the mother in T5, had been painted as a ‘bad mother’ by the defence through the use of




             
  
              
              
             
               
   
          
        
            
    
        
              
    
     
           
       
                
              
               
                 
             
             
              
               
          
              
               
              
    
expectations that wholly accurate and consistent accounts of sexual violence are given (see
section 5.3).
As earlier examples show (extracts 6aa-6ab), the victim-survivor in T1 was accused of lying
about being raped because she regretted having sex with the defendant. This narrative was
bolstered through implying that the victim-survivor had conceded to a suggestion from her
mother that it was rape, which was put forward as the source of the lie:
EXTRACT 6ao
Defence You accused him of ‘taking advantage’. Not rape.
Victim-survivor I don’t know what went on.
Defence Exactly. You didn’t accuse him of rape. You didn’t tell your
mum it was rape.
Victim-survivor I didn’t want to believe it.
Defence It was your mum who first said it was rape. She put the
idea in your head.
Victim-survivor I don’t agree.
Defence You were not truthful to your mum about what happened.
Then she suggested it was rape. (T1)
Here the defence used the term “put the idea in your head”, which has clear negative
connotations, to suggest that the victim-survivor had not believed it was rape. By then
suggesting that the victim-survivor had not been truthful with her mother, he implied that she
had misled her and did not correct her suggestion that it was rape. The implication was that
she should have corrected her mother. This suggested that because the victim-survivor had
not herself immediately labelled her experience as rape, her mother’s assertion was invalid.
This assumes that all ‘true’ victim-survivors are able to immediately accept or understand what
has happened to them as rape, which ignores the difficulty women have in naming their
experiences (McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance, 2011; see also section 5.2.2). Indeed, Brooks-
Hays (2019) found that it is common for victim-survivors to discuss their experiences with third-
parties before reporting to the police and that these discussions are helpful in enabling them
to ‘name’ their experiences. Nevertheless, the defence in T1 furthered his narrative in his





   
            
        
             
          
              
          
     
          
     
             
            
 
  
           
     
              
               
 
   
         
     
         
     
         
     
            
        
      
               
             
EXTRACT 6ap
Defence [Am I right that…all she said was ‘[defendant] did things to
me’. You thought she was embarrassed because you’re
her mum, and she said ‘I was aware that he was doing stuff
but I couldn’t move’], she never said what ‘stuff’ is.
Mother But I knew what she was saying, I know her, I’m her mum.
I know what she meant when she said ‘stuff’.
Defence You assumed.
Mother I don’t think that’s an assumption.
Defence You assumed.
Mother I know what she meant by how she said ‘you know mum,
‘stuff’’. [She was so upset, but she was fine a few hours
earlier.]
…
Defence So, you made an assumption about what ‘stuff’ means.
Mother No! (T1)
The defence barrister repeatedly used the word ‘assumption’ to cast doubt on the mother’s
account. He then continued by asking closed questions about the use (or not) of specific
words:
EXTRACT 6aq
Defence Did she use the word rape?
Mother No.
Defence Did she use the word penis?
Mother No.
Defence Did she use the word vagina?
Mother No.
Judge Do you use different words for body parts? You know some
people have different words for things within families.
Mother No. (T1)
The implication of the above exchange was that a victim-survivor’s account must be clear and




           
       
   
            
  
     
          
          
        
        
            
 
     
      
                 
                  
              
                
                
              
           
            
                 
              
            
             
            
            
examination continued with the defence barrister returning to calling the mother’s
interpretation of her daughter’s words an assumption:
EXTRACT 6ar
Judge So you just thought that’s what she meant from what she
was saying?
Mother Yes.
Defence That’s an assumption. She said the defendant had done
‘stuff’ to her, you made an assumption about what that
meant. So the word rape came from you?
Mother Yeah, and so what?!
Judge You were first to use the word rape, that’s what he’s
asking.
Mother Yes.
Defence Nothing further. (T1)
This whole line of questioning focuses in of the meaning of words. A pattern that has been
clear in this and two other trials (T2 and T3, see section 7.4.1) is that commonly used words
and phrases that are well established colloquially as referring to sexual activity were drilled
down on and given alternative meanings. In this case that word is ‘stuff’. It seems, therefore,
that the language used to describe rape has to be precise, otherwise it is questioned and
positioned as incredible or insignificant. This is a worrying finding, given the frequency of
colloquialisms in the English language. Guidance for ABE interviewers recognises that
descriptions contain imprecise language (MoJ, 2011), and indeed the use of imprecise
language to give an account of rape is not a new phenomenon (see Bourke, 2008, p.21, for
an example account from 1880). Women’s accounts of sexual violence are shaped by cultural
narratives that blame and shame them (Brown, 2013) and medicalise their experiences
(McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance, 2011). Their narratives of trauma are thus often filled with
uncertainty and minimisation (Brown, 2013). It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect precise




                  
               
            
 
  
         
               
        
                
                
                  
                 
               
             
             
   
              
                
               
             
               
                 
   
              
                
           
                 
               
               
In the above extract, the act of a mother comforting her child and helping her identify what had
happened to her was used to undermine the victim-survivor’s credibility and position her as a
liar. The defendant also made use of this narrative during his cross-examination:
EXTRACT 6as
Prosecution Why would she say she didn’t consent?
Defendant Well, to be honest I think it was down to her mum.
Judge That is speculation. (T1)
Whilst the judge rightly asserted that the defendant was speculating, she did not go further to
explain to the jury that they should not give any consideration to speculation. As is standard,
the judge did direct the jury in her summing-up that there is no place for speculation in a
criminal trial, however she did not refer back to this intervention. It seems unlikely that the jury
would independently remember this intervention by the end of trial when the judge gave her
directions. Instead, they were left with the defence’s narrative of calculating women, involving
the mother as well as the victim-survivor, implied through the defence’s closing remarks:
EXTRACT 6at
“She never told her mum using words rape, penis or touching. Rape was her
mother’s idea. The timing of it all is interesting. Her mother said it was rape and
off they went to the police station that very morning. In the time between her
report and ABE she messaged people to tell them something really bad had
happened that was so difficult for her to talk about, yet she keeps telling people.
This, we submit, is a way for her to garner support and sympathy to keep up her
charade.” (Defence, T1)
The word “idea” carries connotations of scheming and brings the mother clearly into the
narrative. Stating that “the timing of it all is interesting” again casts suspicion over the mother
and daughter’s intentions, seemingly implying an element of scheming. The victim-survivor
confiding in her friends is treated as suspicious and a function of her “charade”. As noted in
section 5.2.3, this produces a ‘damned if they do, damned if they don’t’ predicament for victim-




    
             
            
               
                 
               
              
               
              
               
                 
            
             
   
        
 
       
       
     
           
      
             
          
              
               
               
           
           
            
6.3.1.2 Children as liars
Best practice for the cross-examination of child witnesses is guided through the Equal
Treatment Bench Book (ETBB; 2020), which outlines considerations and adjustments that can
be made at the judge’s discretion. For example, it specifies the manner in which questions
should be phrased, that the defence case should not be directly put to the child, and that
inconsistencies should be pointed out to the jury after rather than during the child’s evidence.
T5, the only observed trial with a child victim-survivor, provided an example of excellent
practice in this regard. The questions were agreed in advance with the judge and intermediary,
were phrased according to the guidelines in the ETBB, and were stuck to during cross-
examination. The defence barrister used a manner appropriate for a child witness, that is, it
was not aggressive or cold, rather it was friendly in tone. The mother of the child, however,
was cross-examined in a manner akin to the cross-examination of adult victim-survivors,
during which questions pertaining to child’s motive for lying were put to her.
EXTRACT 6au
Defence What was [victim-survivor’s] reaction to [sibling] being
born?
Mother He loved him.
Defence Wasn’t he insanely jealous?
Mother No.
Defence Didn’t he say he wanted him to die?
Mother No. (T5)
The above extract shows how the victim-survivor was portrayed as harboring extreme jealousy
towards his then-newborn half-brother. This reflects the gendered jealousy narrative
discussed in section 6.3.1, and whilst that narrative was formed around women, as recently
as the 1970s the belief that boys lie has been clearly articulated by the judiciary:
“‘It is well known that women in particular, and small boys, are liable to be
untruthful and invent stories’” (Judge Sutcliffe, 1976, cited in Jordan, 2004).
Bourke (2008) traced historical narratives about children being disbelieved when making




              
                
          
 
   
           
       
     
       
      
                 
              
                   
             
             
              
              
               
                
            
          
   
           
     
           
              
           
     
       
of this misconception is significant because in T5 the mother’s parenting skills were routinely
called into question by the defence (see section 6.2.3), arguably in an attempt to bolster the
image of her child as a lying ‘problem child’:
EXTRACT 6av
Defence Do you recall [victim-survivor] saying he was going to go
to school and say you stabbed him?
Mother Yep.
Defence Did you stab him?
Mother No. (T5)
Four other instances of historical lying were laid out in the same manner one after the other,
building a concentrated image of this child’s past behviour. This painted the victim-survivor as
a child who tells lies in order to get people into trouble. ‘Fanciful lying’ is a trait associated with
narratives of the ‘problem child’ (Horn, 1993). Horn (1993) demonstrated how the ‘problem
child’ was constructed based on middle-class ideals in the twentieth century, where the
‘proper’ raising of children was seen to ameliorate social problems (see also section 6.2.3).
Given that behavioural problems are associated with not guilty verdicts in child sex offences
trials (Lewis, Klettke and Day 2014), drawing on the ‘problem child’ narrative could have been
compelling for the jury. Indeed, a similar narrative has been observed in a US context, where
Powell et al. (2017) identified narratives about ‘rebellious adolescents’ and ‘dysfunctional
families’ being used to undermine the credibility of child victim-survivors.
EXTRACT 6aw
Defence Has he ever told you anything bad about [current partner]?
Mother No.
Defence As far as you’re concerned he loves him?
Mother He sees him as a friend, likes him not love.
Defence Has he ever told you he hates him?
Mother Sometimes.




                 
                 
                
                 
                  
              
                
   
   
          
    
             
    
           
    
          
 
  
           
         
 
    
           
      
            
    
 
            
 
     
               
 
                     
  
These lines of questioning ignored the fact that it is not unusual for young children18 to lie
(Talwar and Crossman, 2012) or say they hate someone as a reaction to a perceived slight or
to being told off (Einon and Potegal, 1994). Furthermore, lying about one thing does not mean
they are lying about the alleged offences. This issue with credibility and past lies is a narrative
that is applied to children in court as well as adults, and school records are commonly used to
evidence histories of lying (e.g. Busby, 1997; Temkin and Krahe, 2008; Baird and Newlove,
2018). The prosecution in T5 addressed the narratives of both mother and child as liars directly
with the defendant:
EXTRACT 6ax
Prosecution [The mother] never showed any antagonism to you?
Defendant No.
Prosecution So if you’re right, and he has made this up.
Defendant Yeah.
Prosecution There’s nothing in your experience of him that gives any
indication that he would?
Defendant Well, when [sibling] was born I felt [victim-survivor] was
jealous.
…
Prosecution So you’re saying there were enough things she would be
aware of to show that [victim-survivor] was hostile towards
[sibling]?
Defendant Yes.
Prosecution So that’s a pretty big lie from [mother]?
Defendant Yes, it is.
Prosecution … Are you sure you’re not making this up?
Defendant Yes.
…
Prosecution Or is it just a motive you have made up for [victim-
survivor]?
Defendant No. (T5)
The prosecution also addressed this, along with other rape myths, well in her closing speech:





   
           
             
               
            
             
      
              
             
                    
   
                
               
        
            
   
              
              
                
               
     
                
               
              
              
              
                 
                
                
              
EXTRACT 6ay
“[You have to assess whether [victim-survivor] is fundamentally telling the truth].
You may think that all boys and girls lie, sometimes about important things,
sometimes about trivial things [… what we do know] is that as soon as he’s
challenged he has retracted them… that is not something that happened here,
[lying is not something that runs through the time of [defendant] and [mother’s]
relationship, it comes after].” (Prosecution, T5)
The defence’s closing focused on positioning the victim-survivor as a liar and countering the
prosecution’s reasoning for viewing him as credible. She talked about children being known
to lie and she couched her argument by saying perhaps he did not mean to tell such a lie:
EXTRACT 6az
“He may not have set out deliberately doing this, it takes courage to say you were
lying, imagine how hard it is for a child to admit to mum, school, grandmother,
aunts, that it wasn’t true.” (Defence, T5).
She then, however, continued to draw on her earlier ‘problem child’ narrative:
EXTRACT 6ba
“Very often in the experience of the court, perpetrators of child abuse will tell
children to keep it a secret, very often that's the reason genuine abuse victims
take so long to come forward. Here it was never suggested it was a secret, given
what we know about him, do you really think he wouldn’t have told anyone? For
all these years?” (Defence, T5)
It could be argued that presenting a monologue attacking a 9-year-old child would not be a
good look to a jury, therefore carefully couching it as outlined above lessens the severity
thereby protecting the argument from potentially repelling the jury. In this last extract the
defence was othering the child, seemingly simultaneously invoking an ‘ideal victim’ and a ‘real
child abuse’ stereotype. Whilst ‘secret keeping’ is a common tactic used by perpetrators (e.g.
Somer and Szwarcberg 2001), the absence of such a tactic is being used here to cast doubt
on the legitimacy of the child’s claims. Interestingly, in a review of transcripts from 133 child
sexual abuse trials in Victoria (Australia), Lewis et al. (2014) found that evidence of a child




              
              
              
            
    
          
             
            
             
              
             
               
             
              
            
           
               
             
      
   
           
         
         
          
    
              
              
             
noted above, the prosecution in T5 pointed out that the victim-survivor’s ‘acting out’ behaviour
began after the alleged assaults, therefore the defence’s reframing of the child’s behaviour as
an issue related to ‘bad’ mothering served to work against the prosecution’s narrative and
subvert any causal association jurors may have made between the victim-survivor’s behaviour
and the allegations.
6.3.2 Mental ill-health as an indicator of untrustworthiness and unreliability
Narratives about mental ill-health were another way in which defence barristers relied on
broader cultural narratives to undermine victim-survivors. In extract 6aa above, the defence
barrister in T1 described the victim-survivor’s reaction as “hysterical”. Two witnesses in the
trial also described her reaction as such. Studies have repeatedly found that the word
‘hysterical’ is associated both with femininity and with mental illness (Epting and Burchett,
2019). Indeed, Ussher (2013) noted that narratives about ‘hysteria’ can be traced as far back
as the ancient Greeks, with the narratives later becoming commonplace in the seventeenth
century. Though ‘hysteria’ was later broadened in diagnostic terms so that men too could
receive such a ‘diagnosis’, the cultural narratives surrounding it remained clearly gendered,
with women’s hysteria considered ‘natural’ and men’s hysteria considered ‘morbid’ (Ussher,
2013). In T1, the hysteria narrative fed into a wider narrative about the victim-survivor’s mental
health that was used to discredit her. The victim-survivor’s depression was first adduced
during her cross-examination through digital evidence:
EXTRACT 6bb
Defence <Reads messages> [You said that you had come back off
holiday feeling much more confident, that you were feeling
much better especially since] you had been taking happy
pills. I guess by that you don’t mean anything illegal?
Victim-survivor Anti-depressants. (T1)
Her anti-depressant use was also included in the toxicology report. According to the CPS,
“where it is alleged that the victim was incapable, through alcohol consumption or drug




              
               
             
              
    
   
              
            
             
               
           
              
             
            
   
       
          
          
         
               
             
               
             
              
             
               
               
           
consent” (CPS, undated, unpaginated). Since the substance at issue in this trial was alcohol,
it is unclear why the result pertaining to anti-depressants could not have been redacted from
the report provided to the jury. The victim-survivor’s anti-depressant use was also mentioned
by the defendant in his police interview when discussing what others characterised as the
victim-survivor’s “hysterical” reaction:
EXTRACT 6bc
“she’s on anti-depressants, you dunno what that can do to someone if like they,
like, haven’t taken their tablets or something” (Defendant, police interview, T1).
The defendant brought up the victim-survivor’s anti-depressants a further two times during his
interview in much the same manner. The assertion the defendant made here was that the
victim-survivor’s behaviour was unprovoked and must have occurred because of her
depression, insinuating that she behaved irrationally and that it was because she was on anti-
depressants (not because he had raped her). During cross-examination of the defendant, the
prosecution provided an avenue for this assertion to be made once again:
EXTRACT 6bd
Prosecution You were shouting at her.
Defendant I was trying to calm her down.
Prosecution …it’s not like she had mental problems.
Defendant Yes, she was on anti-depressants. (T1)
It is disappointing that the prosecutor opened such an avenue for the defendant to reinforce
his narrative. According to the testimony of multiple witnesses and the defendant’s police
interview, the defendant had in the immediate aftermath of the second alleged rape called the
victim-survivor “crazy”, “paranoid”, a “psycho”, and said she was “having a breakdown”. These
words demonstrate the reliance on this narrative as a tool for undermining the victim-survivor’s
credibility. Indeed, in the context of parental custody hearings, Zaccour (2017) found that
mental health labels are used in court to undermine women’s credibility. It has long been
recognised that defence barristers adduce mental health evidence in rape trials as a way of




              
                 
               
               
               
             
           
           
         
     
             
             
            
                 
                   
              
             
             
       
   
           
 
    
          
          
             
             
               
              
             
evidence is adduced with no relevance it infringes on victim-survivors’ right to privacy and
protection of medical details. A Court of Appeal ruling in R v Tine [2006] EWCA Crim 1788
upheld that psychiatric history was irrelevant to the credibility of the witness, although this was
in relation to burglary (Ellison, 2009). Helpfully, looking to Scots law, in relation to sexual
offences the appeal court in Branney v HM Advocate [2014] HCJAC 78 asserted that:
“It is by no means clear that…a bare statement that a complainer had
suffered from severe depression as a result of the appellant's conduct
would have provided legitimate ground for exploring her mental health in
evidence. We are unaware of any automatic association between
depression and lack of credibility.”
The usefulness of defence counsel adducing mental health evidence stems from the long
history of women’s distress being framed as madness (Busfield, 1996; Ussher, 2011). The
continued pervasiveness of such narratives can arguably be demonstrated by the worldwide
popularity of a song entitled ‘Sweet but Psycho’ which spent four weeks at number 1 and 12
weeks in the top 10 of the UK music singles chart over the time period of this trial (Official
Charts, undated). The lyrics of this song and accompanying video were widely criticised as
sexist and stigmatizing of mental illness (e.g. Meaney, 2018; Daily Mail, 2019). The
characterisation of the victim-survivor in T1 as ‘crazy’ was further galvanized by the
defendant’s following assertion during his cross-examination:
EXTRACT 6be
Prosecution Did you feel scared about telling her about what had
happened?
Defendant Yeah, course.
Prosecution …you were scared about how she would react?
Defendant Yeah cos she’s always had a temper. (T1)
This ‘crazy woman’ narrative draws on pervasive gendered stereotypes of women as overly
emotional (Shields, 2013) and irrational (MacCormick et al., 2016). Women are perceived to
be more emotional than men, with women often being viewed as being emotional as opposed
to men having emotions (MacCormick, et al., 2016). Similar trial narratives were found by




           
            
          
           
            
             
             
               
              
             
           
            
           
           
               
  
              
                
             
  
   
            
             
               
                
                  
         
untrustworthy. It is well-established that gendered stereotypes based on emotion impact
people’s assessment of other’s emotion (Shields, 2013), therefore these narratives are likely
to play a role in jurors’ assessments at trial.
As Gilmore (2017) argues, “women’s testimony is frequently associated with unreliability
because it is women’s testimony (p.19, emphasis added). Gilmore’s (2017) analysis explores
the intersections of race and class with gender, demonstrating that Black women’s emotions
and associated credibility are judged against different criteria than white women. All the victim-
survivors in the observed trials were white women, so the classed narratives present in the
trials demonstrates how they are both privileged and oppressed at the same time. Indeed,
Wingfield (2010) found that rules regarding what is considered appropriate ways of displaying
emotions are differently constructed for different racialised and classed groups. Wingfield
(2010) posits that white, middle-class ideals shape what is considered appropriate emotional
behaviour, characterised by calmness and congeniality. That the victim-survivor was framed
using cultural narratives about young white working-class women therefore bolstered this
narrative of her as being highly emotional because of mental ill-health rather than because of
trauma.
The gendered narratives about emotionality and mental ill-health were also present in T2, T4
and T6 to varying extents. For example, similarly to T1, the victim-survivor in T2 was referred
to as “paranoid” by the defendant and portrayed as behaving irrationally within their
relationship:
EXTRACT 6bf
“We were arguing all the time, she was paranoid about [defendant’s new
girlfriend] we had pathetic arguments…she had been having a go at me for
having a password on my phone even though she had loads and a thing where
it took a photo of whoever tries to unlock your phone… but she knows how to
wind me up, she would just dig, dig, dig, pushing me to the point when I feel like




                
              
                
     
   
                  
             
  
             
     
   
       
     
         
         
         
            
       
   
              
              
         
     
               
             
              
               
               
                 
            
In this trial there was contestation over whether the breakdown of the relationship was due to
the alleged rape, as was the prosecution’s position, or not. By portraying the victim-survivor
as irrational the defendant was able to refute that assertion and distance himself from his poor
behaviour within the relationship.
EXTRACT 6bg
“[I would always give her a kiss and a cuddle before I left for work no matter how
early it was because she would get upset when I didn’t].” (Defendant, police
interview, T2)
In the following example the prosecution cross-examined the defendant about the reasons for
the breakdown of the relationship:
EXTRACT 6bh
Defendant Arguments, just too many arguments.
Prosecution Like what?
Defendant [Woman who later became defendant’s new girlfriend], I
wasn’t doing the cleaning, wasn’t helping out around the
house, bills, silly little things like passwords on phones.
Prosecution Okay, so let’s take each of those things, not cleaning or
helping around the house, presumably that was
throughout the relationship?
Defendant [No cos I got the new job and was working silly hours and
she wanted me to clean when I’d get home, at like 3 or 4
in the morning she would want me to hoover].
Prosecution Right. (T2)
The intonation in the prosecution’s final word here seemed to be expressing disbelief at the
defendant’s explanation about the hoovering. In this same trial the prosecution made plain
that she did not accept some of his other explanations, including regarding an alleged
admission of harm relating to the rape allegation (see section 7.4.1). In her closing speech
she therefore twice told the jury that the defendant “insults your intelligence”, however the not
guilty verdict in this case suggests that the jury did not find his explanations as ludicrous as




              
         
                 
          
   
            
       
                 
               
              
              
                
                
            
       
  
               
            
             
           
               
               
            
             
         
mental health, the ‘crazy woman’ narrative employed by the defendant could well have had
an impact on the jurors’ assessments of credibility.
In contrast, the prosecution in T3 drew on this same stereotype as a means of bolstering the
credibility of the victim-survivor by contrasting her against that stereotype:
EXTRACT 6bi
“Unless mentally unhinged, you don’t go around making these things up. What
reason could there be?” (Prosecution closing, T3)
The implication in this extract is that ‘unhinged’ women do lie about rape and this is presented
as the only reason a woman would lie about rape. Furthermore, it produces a simplistic
dichotomy that says parties are either being wholly truthful or wholly dishonest (Smith and
Skinner, 2017), which does not allow for people holding differing interpretations of the same
facts and thus hold differing truths of the same situation (Smart 1989). Whilst perhaps not a
damaging remark with regards to this victim-survivor’s credibility in this trial, it is a remark that
nevertheless demonstrates the pervasiveness of damaging narratives at trial and serves to
generally reinforce these damaging social stereotypes.
6.4 Summary
This chapter has outlined ways in which rape myths were scaffolded by and interacted with
wider cultural narratives and systems of oppression. Classed narratives were underpinned by
subtle details that positioned witnesses in a working-class context. These were elicited through
micro-examinations and included, for example, irrelevant reference to state welfare. Sexism,
and to a lesser extent age, intersected with classism in narratives of respectability to scaffold
rape myths about who an ‘ideal victim’ is and how she should behave. These morality
judgements drew on middle-class femininity ideals that value chastity, calmness, and ‘good’
mothering, and were also deployed against victim-survivors’ mothers as a way to further




             
           
            
               
              
                 
             
            
           
            
          
             
        
             
             
           
             
            
             
   
Gendered cultural narratives further intersected with classism, and to a lesser extent ableism,
in narratives that constructed victim-survivors, and their mothers, as untrustworthy and
unreliable. These narratives drew on the common misconception that women routinely lie
about being raped. This was also evident for the boy child victim-survivor who was portrayed
as a lying ‘problem child’. Varying motives for lying were posed, including vengeance and
regret, and even where it was not possible for defence barristers to put forward such a motive,
the victim-survivor was characterised as unreliable as a means of undermining her. Drawing
on gendered cultural narratives related to emotionality and mental health enabled defence
barristers to characterise victim-survivors as unstable and manipulative. These narratives of
victim-survivors as dishonest also intersected with narratives of respectability, for example in
bolstering characterisations of victim-survivors, and their mothers, as untrustworthy through
reference to their sexual behaviour. Sexual history evidence can therefore be compounded by
cultural narratives as well as rape myths.
Overall, the findings discussed in this chapter support my thesis that broader cultural
narratives interact with rape myths to further undermine the credibility of victim-survivors. The
chapter has demonstrated how victim-survivors are undermined as credible ‘tellers’ through
systems of oppression including sexism, classism, ageism and ableism which frame them as
untrustworthy, unrespectable and unreliable. The following chapter will build on these findings





      
  
               
             
               
          
              
            
              
             
             
             
               
             
    
         
            
              
             
               
    
   
             
             
                 
  
Chapter 7 Defendants as credible storytellers
7.1 Introduction
Chapter Six explored the ways in which cultural narratives linked to gender, class and age
were used to undermine victim-survivors as the tellers of their experiences. This chapter
explores the other side of this: The ways in which defendants were constructed as credible
storytellers through cultural narratives. Whilst the victim-survivors’ credibility was largely
undermined by rape myths and cultural narratives, they were used to bolster the defendant’s
credibility. In the observations relating to defendants as storytellers, their privilege around
gender and class intersected at varying points. These narratives can be grouped into three
core themes: narratives that presented the defendant as being a respectable man, narratives
that garnered sympathy for the defendant, and narratives that provided excuses for the
defendant’s actions. This chapter therefore supports my overall thesis by building on the
findings outlined in the preceding three chapters to further delineate the ways in which broader
cultural narratives interact with rape myths to undermine victim-survivors and their stories of
rape and sexual assault.
7.2 Respectable masculinities: The ‘good men don’t rape’ fallacy
In contrast to the respectability narratives about victim-survivors (see section 6.2), narratives
that focused on defendants tended to portray them as ‘good men’ using notions of
respectability. For example, the defendant in T5 was portrayed as honest and courageous,
because he had presented himself to the police upon hearing the allegations directly from the
(child) victim-survivor’s mother:
EXTRACT 7a
“[He didn’t have to give evidence, he chose to give evidence. He presented
himself to police because his heart was broken over the allegations. He has





           
              
             
    
   
          
    
          
        
          
          
               
            
               
                 
             
            
              
             
    
                  
          
   
          
   
             
            
Here, the defence framed the defendant’s actions as commendable and self-sacrificial,
thereby positioning him as morally respectable. This defendant had also been cast by the
defence as a respectable father-figure who took on responsibility for another man’s children
(see also extract 6s):
EXTRACT 7b
Defence Ok, would you spend time with the boys?
Defendant Yeah.
Defence What would you do with [eldest child]?
Defendant Play football, games, computer games.
Defence And [victim-survivor], how did you get on?
Defendant Brilliantly, same as with [eldest child]. (T5)
These things combined to frame the defendant as a ‘good man’ and contrasted with the
defence’s characterisation of the victim-survivor as a ‘problem-child’ (see section 6.3.1.2) and
the child’s mother as a ‘bad mother’ (see section 6.2.3). Although the defendant had spent
years in the children’s lives as a co-parent, he was not subjected to the same narratives of
blame and condemnation as the mother was with regards to the children’s ‘problem’
behaviour. Rather, those narratives, combined with the ‘good man’ narratives, served to
absolve him. Indeed, this is reflective of Gathings and Parrotta’s (2013) observations in US
courts where they found ‘good man’, and particularly ‘good father’, narratives were associated
with lenient sentencing.
The narrative presenting the defendant as a ‘good man’ was far more overt in T3. In this trial,
the defence asked the victim-survivor directly about the defendant’s character:
EXTRACT 7c
Defence You wouldn’t describe what happened to you as good?
Victim-survivor No.
Defence [You wouldn’t say the person that did it was nice?]




                 
              
                
               
                 
             
               
            
                  
              
           
               
   
              
            
             
              
               
               
              
              
               
      
   
                 
         
              
           
        
Here the defence drew on a false dichotomy of people as either wholly good or wholly bad
(Nilsson, 2019). He implied that “nice” people do not perpetrate rape, which ignores the
complexity of human beings and that everyone is capable of doing both good and bad things.
This response and argument, that ‘good men don’t rape’, is what Jozkowski (2016) refers to
as a “cultural fallacy” (p.255) that stems from pervasive rape culture. That is, it is a logically
invalid argument. The defence continued with this narrative throughout the trial, with eight
character references for the defendant being read into evidence. This was the only trial in
which character references were used. The references referred to the defendant consistently
as “a family man”, as “a kind, caring and gentle man”, as a “helpful” and “happy” man. All
expressed their absolute shock at the allegations, with one saying that they trusted the
defendant “wholeheartedly”. The prosecution attempted to combat the portrayal of the
defendant as a ‘good, family man’ by demonstrating that his actions had clear sexual motives:
EXTRACT 7d
“He isn’t looking for a kindred spirit, someone to get on with, because he
squandered his opportunity for that. They have this unusual thing in common,
[both have autistic sons, the difficulties that caused, she opens her heart to
[defendant] about her son. His response is not to share], of course he doesn’t
have to tell her, but wouldn’t that have been a very good opportunity to say,
‘Goodness, I don’t believe it, we have this thing in common’. [So if chat and
connection was what he wanted then why didn’t he do that? The answer, quite
simply, is that was not his intent, his intent was sexual].” (Prosecution, T3).
The defence tried to resist the prosecution’s portrayal of the defendant by summing up the
character references in his closing speech:
EXTRACT 7e
“[perhaps he is] not the type of person in fact that the Crown seek to portray him
as…let’s remind ourselves about the character references, loudly and
consistently they say that this is a caring man, kind, <reads extracts picking out
the sentences that contain the positive adjectives>. All, you might conclude,




                
               
             
             
             
              
                
             
               
           
                 
                
           
              
              
            
              
             
    
                 
                   
             
             
               
              
                
               
              
The ‘good man’ portrayal in this trial was at odds with the defendant’s admitted acts of
deception. The type of deception he committed is colloquially known as ‘catfishing’ and has in
fact been legislated against in some jurisdictions (e.g. Derzakarian 2017). The ‘good man’
narrative drew on the damaging portrayals and stereotypes about rapists which position them
as a deviant ‘other’ (Jozkowski, 2016). These are portrayals which are persistently reinforced
through the media (Kitzinger, 2009; O’Hara, 2012; Haygarth 2018). Franiuk et al. (2008) have
argued that men’s endorsement of the ‘real rape’ myth is a way for them to distance
themselves from rapists, thus creating a counter-narrative of ‘good men don’t rape’. Pascoe
and Hollander (2016) argue that the ‘good men don’t rape’ narrative shifts focus away from
structural inequalities and problematic actions and attitudes. The narrative thereby attempts
to shift the focus onto individual characteristics. In the context of this trial then, the ‘good man’
narrative attempted to distinguish the defendant from the deviant ‘other’ of the ‘real rape’ myth.
The othering of rapists reinforces normative masculine hierarchies (Pascoe and Hollander,
2016; Messner 2016) and this othering often takes place along classed lines (Gavey 2019).
The ‘good man’ is constructed of white middle-class values and ideals of respectability based
on gendered and sexual behaviour (Skeggs, 1997). Although men’s sexual violence against
women occurs across society, it has commonly been positioned as an issue of the working-
classes and thereby acts as a means of distinguishing respectable, non-violent masculinity as
middle-class (Phipps, 2009).
The term ‘family man’ is frequently used to describe men who are devoted to their families and
who like to spend time with them. The term reflects a shift in values in the late twentieth century
to fathers becoming more orientated around family rather than being relatively uninvolved in
family life (Coltrane, 1996). Being a family man has become an increasingly valued
characteristic in society because it can be viewed as a sign of progress towards gender
equality (Meeussen et al., 2019). Characterising the defendant in T3 as a family man,
therefore, implied that he was a man who acts in support of gender equality. However, as
Pascoe and Hollander (2016) argue, attitudes and actions that appear on the surface to be




                 
               
            
              
              
             
                
            
             
             
         
               
                
             
       
            
            
         
            
             
              
              
           
              
             
               
               
               
Indeed, it is important to note that the cultural narrative of the ‘family man’ obscures that there
remains a significant imbalance in the time men and women spend on housework and child
rearing activities (Dush, Yavorsky and Schoppe-Sullivan, 2017; DeGroot and Vik, 2019; Vagni,
2019). Furthermore, because rape is constructed as a masculine crime and by definition can
only be committed by males, it may be advantageous to portray the defendant using
descriptors associated with femininity as a distancing tool (e.g., kind, gentle, caring, helpful).
This could also be true for the ‘family man’ descriptor, given that it somewhat distances men
from traditional masculinities. This is significant because, as Martinez et al. argued:
“It is difficult to hold men who perpetrate sexual violence accountable if guilt
is difficult to attribute to men who have good characteristics in other aspects
of their lives.” (Martinez et al., 2018, p.7)
Martinez et al. (2018) also pointed out that positive character references were noted by the
judge in the infamous Brock Turner case as a factor in his sentencing decision, which was
later acknowledged as too lenient and resulted in the introduction of mandatory minimum
sentencing (Associated Press, 2016; Edwards, 2016):
“And, also, I have considered the character letters that have been provided
by Mr. Turner’s friends, family, which indicate a period of, essentially, good
behavior [sic].” (Perksey, 2016, quoted in Levin, 2016)
This indicates that character references can and do influence people’s perceptions and
decision-making within the CJS. Indeed, that is the purpose of good character evidence
because such evidence is adduced in order to boost the jury’s presumption of innocence
regarding the defendant (Ross, 2004). Research in the US regarding the impact of defendant
character evidence on juror decision-making provided conflicting results, with Effron (2012)
suggesting that jurors can ‘soften’ towards a defendant on the basis of such evidence,
whereas mock jury has research suggested positive character evidence had little (Maeder and
Hunt, 2011) or no impact on jurors (Hunt and Budesheim, 2004). The use of character
evidence in the US is somewhat different to E&W; in the former, character witnesses give




                 
         
               
                  
                
             
              
               
                
                 
           
               
   
      
               
               
         
                
 
    
                 
   
                 
                
                 
                
for written statements to be read into evidence. There appears to be no research on the use
of good character witnesses or testimonials in E&W.
The Turner case was a high profile and controversial case and the judge was subsequently
held to account by the public when he was recalled by public vote in his state of California–
something which had not happened for over 80 years (Astor, 2018). There is no such check
or accountability for juror decision-making in E&W. Looking to other jurisdictions could provide
points for consideration with regards to jury accountability. For example, in Spain and Russia
juries are required to provide judges with a written justification for their verdicts (Martín and
Kaplan, 2006). Though this system is not unproblematic, it may offer insights as to how better
to ensure jurors’ verdicts are based on fact and correct application of the law. This is also
particularly pertinent when considered in conjunction with the continued pervasiveness and
reliance upon rape myths (see Chapters Four and Five) as well as the cultural narratives
discussed here.
7.3 Constructing sympathy for the defendant
In all trials, defence counsel attempted to construct sympathy for the defendants. In two cases
(T3 and T5), this built on the defence counsel’s narratives that sought to portray the
defendants as objectively ‘good’ men (see section 7.2).
In T5, the defence began her closing argument by encouraging the jury to identify with the
defendant:
EXTRACT 7f
“Any single one of you who has contact with a child could be sitting where he is
sitting.” (Defence, T5)
This urged the jury to empathise with the defendant, it asked them to ‘put themselves in his
shoes’ (see also extract 7g). Asking the jurors to imagine themselves in that position makes it
harder for them to deliver a guilty verdict because they see themselves in the dock. This type




                
                  
             
    
           
          
               
            
    
              
              
                
  
    
               
               
             
   
               
               
               
             
       
            
             
          
   
          
    
       
others as you would have them do unto you” (The Bible, Matthew 7:12). Urging jurors to
engage in such reasoning is a practice that has long (see Duchaine v Ray [1939] 110 Vt. 313)
been deemed improper in US courts because it encourages a departure from impartiality
(Conner, 2001; Mangrum, 2015):
“A golden rule argument—which asks ‘jurors to place themselves in the
position of a party’—is ‘universally condemned’ because it encourages the
jury to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal
interest and bias rather than on evidence.” (Caudle v District of Columbia
[2013] 707 F.3d 354)
In T5, the defence’s ‘Golden Rule’ argument also drew on the misconception that false
allegations are common, especially the ‘easy to make, hard to disprove’ trope (see section
6.3.1). Encouraging the jury to put themselves in the defendant’s shoes was also a tactic used
in T6:
EXTRACT 7g
“Put yourself in his shoes, you may think you would struggle to give an account
of what you were doing 10-15 years before, then imagine that in the pressure of
a police interview. Then four months later there are more allegations, a further
interview” (Defence, T6)
These appeals for empathy are in stark contrast to this defence barrister’s later claims that
“emotion plays no role” and “moral judgement plays no part” in reference to the prosecution’s
case. The jury were encouraged to consider emotions so that they can empathise with the
defendant, but then told that they should not consider emotion when assessing the victim-
survivors’ evidence or the prosecution’s case.
In other trials the narratives constructing sympathy were woven throughout using so-called
micro-examinations. For example, in T1 the defence elicited reference to low self-esteem from
the defendant on three occasions. To give one such example:
EXTRACT 7h
Defence Did you say anything to her about it?
Defendant No.




    
      
         
               
              
            
            
   
   
        
           
  
       
    
       
            
            
             
     
         
              
          
             
               
              
                
                
              
                
             
Defendant Yeah.
Defence Why didn’t you?
Defendant Cos I’ve got low confidence. (T1)
This narrative sought to elicit sympathy for the defendant. It was later expanded upon by
positioning the defendant as the victim of unrequited love who was having his feelings
knowingly hurt by the victim-survivor’s sociable behaviour, which had been implied as
flirtatious by the defence (see also section 4.3.2 regarding the victim-survivor’s perceived
sexual provocation):
EXTRACT 7i
Defence Where was [victim-survivor] throughout the night?
Defendant She kept disappearing, coming back with a boy or group
of boys.
Defence You weren’t with them?
Defendant No.
Defence You saw [victim-survivor] later?
Defendant Yeah she kept coming back to me and [friend].
Defence How did you feel seeing her with other boys?
Defendant I wasn’t happy about it, I didn’t wanna see that.
Defence And [friend]?
Defendant Not happy at all either. (T1)
The final question in this exchange asked what the defendant’s female friend’s feelings were
about the victim-survivor “disappearing”. This sought to bolster the defendant’s
characterisation of the behaviour as negative or morally improper. That the defence asked
how the defendant (and his friend) felt seeing the victim-survivor with other men, is significant
because earlier in the trial the judge had intervened when the prosecution asked the victim-
survivor a ‘how did that make you feel question’, saying: “How someone feels is not relevant”
(Judge, T1). The judge did not intervene in the above example in relation to the defendant
(and his friend), which demonstrates an imbalance in the application of practice rules. The
defence were allowed to garner sympathy for the defendant in ways that were not allowed for




               
            
                
  
   
                 
             
              
                
   
               
    
             
     
    
            
           
 
     
             
              
                     
               
             
              
            
             
             
       
“the way…boys and men who commit acts of sexual violence or engage on other misogynistic
behaviour often receive sympathy and concern over their female victims” (p.5).
Similarly, in T2, ‘himpathy’ was used to reframe the defendant as the victim of a capricious
woman:
EXTRACT 7j
“I don’t know why she’s done this to me, the girl I wanted to marry, she hasn’t
even said if we have broken up or not” (Defendant, police interview, T2)
Here the defendant employed a narrative that portrayed himself as being strung along and
hurt by the victim-survivor and this was built upon during his live evidence at trial:
EXTRACT 7k
Defence You refer to your head being a bit of a mess at the moment.
Defendant Yes.
Defence Were you clear in your mind whether she did or did not
want to be with you?
Defendant No.
Defence [So before, had there been times when she said she didn’t
want contact but then had been happy to have sex with
you?]
Defendant Yes. (T2)
Here, the defendant, who cried often throughout his testimony, exhibited remorse for his
admitted anger and aggression towards the victim-survivor, for example “then I shout and she
leaves and I sit and cry cos it’s not how I meant to be” (T2), and when asked how he would
feel afterwards: “Dreadful, I was ashamed of myself as well” (T2). Research has long shown
that when defendants display emotions such as sadness, distress and remorse, they elicit
more sympathy from the ‘guilt assessor’ (e.g. a jury) and improve their perceived credibility
(Savitsky and Sim 1974; Rumsey, 1976; Robinson, Smith-Lovin and Tsoudis, 1994; MacLin
et al. 2009). In T2, then, admitting aggression towards the victim-survivor whilst showing
remorse may have worked in the defendant’s favour. Indeed, this construction of sympathy




   
               
                 
                 
               
               
              
               
           
             
                 
                 
              
             
             
               
               
              
              
                
             
         
              
            
              
     
   
       
EXTRACT 7l
“His head was a mess. Of course it was. [If someone says they don’t want
anything to do with you but then 2 days later has sex with you, maybe your head
would be a mess, so to say ‘won’t take no for an answer’,] well that is one
interpretation, but bear in mind this is a young man, maybe not as bright as
[victim-survivor], [and this is an interpretation too]. He is not a young man who is
a sex pest, but a young man whose head is a mess.” (Defence, T2)
Here the defence barrister discredited the idea that the defendant was a ‘sex pest’, thus
distancing him from ‘deviant rapist’, whilst simultaneously constructing sympathy through the
use of a classed and gendered portrayal of the victim-survivor as ‘promiscuous’ and
capricious. The defence twice used the term “head is a mess”, which points to the notion of
not thinking straight and making mistakes, which is not part of the law on consent. The term
also has connotations of sadness and distress. As noted above, sadness and distress have
been shown to influence juror’s perception of defendants, which is important because this
defendant frequently displayed these emotions during his evidence and whilst sitting in the
dock, including crying and heavy breathing. Wessel et al. (2012) explored the effect of the
displays of emotion from men accused of rape and found that expressions of despair strongly
increased their perceived credibility. This seemed to benefit the defendant in T2 because he
was acquitted. The classed narratives within this trial may also have benefitted the defendant
in relation to this because Thompson et al. (2011) found that as well as displaying upset
emotions, being of low socioeconomic status made male defendants more likeable and more
trustworthy compared to those from a higher socioeconomic status.
The sympathy narrative was most prominent in T3, where the defence used multiple aspects
of the defendant’s personal life to construct an overarching sympathy narrative. These
included asking about the defendant’s disabled child, his troubles at work and the difficulties
in his marriage. For example:
EXTRACT 7m




           
          
           
             
  
              
   
   
         
           
     
       
           
     
                
            
 
   
       
          
           
   
       
   
              
           
             
    
Defendant [It was very hard, our relationship was affected, it affected
all aspects of my life including financial, we were living
together but it was like we were living separately, I was
trying to help her, but she was pushing me away and I felt
rejected]. (T3)
The defendant’s unsuccessful online dating experiences were added to this to expand on his
feelings of rejection:
EXTRACT 7n
Defendant [A lot of rejection, negative comments] some more
detrimental than others, [no interest at all], a lot of ‘you’re
not what I’m looking for’.
Defence Your response to that?
Defendant [It hurt, it was even more rejection, I felt worthless],
ugly...fat...completely worthless in myself. (T3)
The rejection added to an overall construction of a sympathy narrative and was then used to
excuse the defendant’s online deception (‘catfishing’) of the victim-survivor, first through his
evidence-in-chief:
EXTRACT 7o
Defence Why did you use those photos?
Defendant [Because of the first experience I had, complete rejection,
so I chose to use photos that might get more conversation
with people]. (T3)
Then in the defence barrister’s closing arguments:
EXTRACT 7p
“[Remember the space he was in in his life that year: demoted, wife redundant,
[disabled] child, and remember he was portrayed as a dreamer. Affirmation
perhaps.] He tried being himself and had been completely rejected [on the first




                
              
    
 
  
             
           
              
               
      
            
               
              
              
              
             
               
              
             
       
              
               
              
           
             
             
                
            
The defendant’s wife gave a character statement in this trial in which she stated that she
wanted to work on her marriage and took responsibility for causing the defendant’s actions
regarding the online dating:
EXTRACT 7q
“[I was not giving him enough attention when I was going through redundancy,
[defendant] had work stress. [Defendant] is a wonderful, loving father and
[volunteers in the community]. I realise we have taken each other for granted. I
do not want to give up on our marriage. I want to have couples counselling.]”
(Character statement, defendant’s wife, T3).
Her statement bolstered the sympathy narrative aimed at absolving or minimising the
defendant’s deceptive actions and thus attempted to make it seem less likely that he would
have sexually assaulted the victim-survivor. The narrative ties into the myth that men have
uncontrollable sex drives, which has been wrongly used to justify and explain men’s sexual
violence and aggression (Carabine, 1992; Bourke, 2008) and is a narrative that has been
prevalent in mock jury deliberations (Leverick, 2020). Whilst sexual aggression is not an
intrinsic element of maleness, narratives that position it as such form part of what Gavey
(2019) calls the ‘cultural scaffolding’ of rape. These are narratives rooted in patriarchal values
that prioritised men’s sexual desire and often denied ‘respectable’ women any sexual desire
at all (Seidman, 1991; Shorter, 1991).
Women were, and often continue to be, positioned as sexually passive objects that are
awaiting to fulfil men’s sexual urges rather than actively seeking to satisfy their own (Gavey,
2019). This situates women as gatekeepers to sex and excuses and minimises men’s sexual
aggression (Carabine, 1992). Positioning women as gatekeepers to sexual interactions is
reflective of the embedded gendered and classed narratives that value women’s chastity (see
section 6.3.1). This positioning of women as passive gatekeepers therefore also implies that
women who do not behave with sexual passivity and chastity are to blame for their sexual




             
                
             
   
      
               
            
              
               
                 
               
                
                
               
               
           
   
           
         
   
    
            
          
    
     
          
          
    
 
               
  
consequently provides a space for gendered and classed cultural narratives to intersect and
cast women against the idea of an ‘ideal victim’ (Christie, 1986). Narratives that draw on the
notion of ‘uncontrollable male urges’ therefore also seek to excuse defendants’ behaviour (see
section 7.4).
7.4 Excusing defendants’ admissions of harm
Over the course of the trials, most defendants admitted some level of harm to the victim-
survivors. In some instances, those admissions related to behaviour peripheral to the
allegations (T1, T2 and T4), such as aggression within an intimate relationship.19 This is
particularly true in T4 where the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge relating to domestic
abuse at the outset of the trial and coercion was central to the arguments about consent (see
section 4.3). In other instances, the admissions of harm related directly to the allegations of
sexual violence being put to the defendants (T2 and T3). The narratives used to excuse the
defendants and their admissions of harm drew on notions of youth and immaturity as well as
intelligence and a lack of educational attainment. For example, in T1 the defendant used his
youth as an excuse for his admitted bad behaviour towards the victim-survivor, in this case
photographing her without her consent while she slept in her bra:
EXTRACT 7r
Prosecution [In [month of second incident] you took photos, do you
agree that [victim-survivor] didn’t like you seeing her just
wearing a bra?]
Defendant No.
Judge [Wait, that’s unclear there are 2 ways that answer can be
interpreted. Did [victim-survivor] let you see her in a bra?]
Defendant No.
Judge Why?
Defendant She’s never changed in front of me.
Prosecution You knew she wouldn’t like you taking those photos?
Defendant Yeah.





         
             
 
             
        
   
                   
               
               
 
                
                 
              
        
                
            
            
             
           
           
              
               
              
                
             
           
   
Prosecution You knew you shouldn’t take them.
Defendant Not at the time, I was young then, I didn’t understand life.
(T1)
The prosecution later argued that this behaviour demonstrated a history of the defendant
violating the victim-survivor’s bodily autonomy while she slept:
EXTRACT 7s
“It is clear that she didn’t want him to see her in her bra. He does take photos of
her when she’s asleep knowing that she wouldn’t like it. There is a clear pattern
of him doing things to her that she wouldn’t like when she is asleep.” (Prosecution,
T1)
The defence did not mention this at all during his closing arguments, which reflects a tactic
Rosulek (2015) refers to as ‘silencing’. That is, omitting a topic in hopes the jury will forget
about it in their deliberations. This can be particularly effective because the defence speech
comes after the prosecution speech in E&W.
In T2 the prosecution asserted that immaturity “is not an excuse for being a rapist”. The
defence sought to deflect that assertion through excusing and minimising the defendant’s
admitted bad behaviour towards the victim-survivor. For example, in her closing speech,
defence counsel posited that the relationship deteriorated not because of the alleged rape,
but because the victim-survivor “outgrew” the defendant. That remark trivialised the
defendant’s admitted aggression towards and harassment of the victim-survivor, thereby also
attempting to excuse the alleged rape. The behaviour he had admitted to throughout the
course of the trial was that he was routinely aggressive and domineering in arguments, that
he was often angry towards the victim-survivor, that he would text the victim-survivor to
request she bring home a pair of her sister’s underwear, and that he had sent messages post-
break-up to the victim-survivor requesting sex 10-12 times a day. The defence barrister’s





               
                   
               
                 
                  
               
     
               
             
              
           
            
                
             
             
                
                
                
            
                  
         
      
                 
               
            
             
             
              
                
“but bear in mind this is a young man, maybe not as bright as [victim-survivor],
[and this is an interpretation too.] He is not a young man who is a sex pest, but a
young man whose head is a mess. [Is that an interpretation you could make of
his mindset and if it is, is that not something that can cast doubt?] He is probably
guilty of not behaving in the best way, what he is not guilty of is having sex with
her when she said no. He might be stupid and immature, but he is not [victim-
survivor’s] rapist.” (Defence, T2).
Firstly, the suggestion here that lack of consent requires a ‘no’ was misleading. Aside from
this, defence counsel repeatedly referenced the defendant’s youth and immaturity in such a
way as to minimise and excuse the defendant’s admitted and alleged actions. The defendant’s
admitted aggressive and harassing behaviour towards the victim-survivor was minimised and
excused. Focusing on these peripheral aspects of the defendant’s behaviour enabled the
defence to distance the defendant from the cultural image of ‘rapist’ shaped by the ‘real rape’
myth that positions rapists as ‘deviant other’. Furthermore, narratives that focus on a
defendant’s youth are useful to defence barristers because evidence suggests that juries are
reluctant to convict young men of rape, particularly those under the age of 25 (Topping and
Barr, 2018; see also section 2.3.1). In T2, the defendant was five years older than the victim-
survivor and in his late twenties at the time of the alleged rape. Therefore, highlighting the
defendant as young, and contrasting his ‘immaturity’ against the victim-survivor, invited the
jury to consider him a young man and aligned him more with the 18-24 age range than the
victim-survivor who was actually within that age range.
7.4.1 Defendants’ digital admissions of harm
In T2 and T3 there was digital messaging evidence of what could be read as admissions of
harm. In these trials the specific wording used by the defendants was thoroughly dissected by
both the prosecution and the defence, with the prosecution barristers characterising the
defendants’ explanations for the messages as ridiculous. The defence in both cases, however,
rationalised and excused the choice of words as being because the defendants were
uneducated and unintelligent, that their words were not intended as admissions to rape or




              
             
            
           
               
         
   
            
          
            
           
    
          
             
              
    
  
             
          
  
            
           
           
        
   
             
             
              
               
            
   
In T2, the victim-survivor had confronted the defendant about the alleged rape over digital
messaging. The jury were provided with a report containing some of the digital
communications between the victim-survivor and the defendant, which was handed to them
during the victim-survivor’s evidence-in-chief. The prosecution then drew their attention to
particular parts of it through questions put to the victim-survivor. The following extract sets out
the messages related to the defendant’s admission of harm.
EXTRACT 7u
Prosecution Then he messages you, ‘we can talk when we both get
home, I’ve told you I’m sorry about the other morning,
there’s nothing else I can do’, then he says ‘the text about
the underwear was to wind you up on purpose’. Were both
parts about the underwear?
Victim-survivor No, the first part is about the other morning.
Prosecution You said, ‘But you shouldn’t have done it in the first place,
you climbed on top of me when I said no’, is that in relation
to the other morning?
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Prosecution ‘Don’t ever do that to me again, you don’t have the right
[…]’, was that also in relation to the other morning?
Victim-survivor Yeah.
Prosecution ‘To be honest, you scare me, your anger towards me has
got worse, what happens next time I say no and you’re
angry? I’m not having it.’ [So that’s your effort to engage
him in conversation about it], did he reply?
Victim-survivor No. (T2)
The prosecution and victim-survivor presented the text exchange as being about rape, and
the prosecution’s supposition was that the defendant’s non-reply was an acceptance of what
the victim-survivor had put to him in those messages. The prosecution argued, therefore, that
this constituted an admission to the alleged rape by the defendant. To challenge this stance,





           
   
          
      
 
            
            
   
             
    
           
 
   
          
        
  
   
        
   
            
    
   
 
              
   
          
  
              
               
             
     
   
Defence …as far as you were concerned, what was ‘the other
morning’ referring to?
Defendant An argument me and [victim-survivor] had where I slapped
her phone out of her hand.
…
Defence …she says, ‘but you shouldn’t have done it in the first
place’, as far as you were concerned what do you think she
was talking about?
Defendant The argument with the phone, the way I argue with her and
stand over her. (T2)
The prosecution subsequently explored this alternative meaning in more depth during cross-
examination:
EXTRACT 7w
Prosecution [Victim-survivor] said, ‘you shouldn’t have done it in the
first place’. [Victim-survivor] very clearly knows what you’re
talking about.
Defendant Yeah.
Prosecution ‘You climbed on top of me…’
Defendant Yeah.
Prosecution [You say this is about an argument where you slapped her
phone from her hand]?
Defendant Yeah.
…
Prosecution You don’t need to climb on top of someone to do that.
Defendant No.
Prosecution It’s pretty obvious what ‘climbing on top of someone’
means. (T2)
The prosecution pointed out that the defendant’s explanation did not make sense and that
‘climbing on top of someone’ is a well-known colloquial term that refers to sexual intercourse.
The cross-examination continued in this way, with the two sides attributing entirely different





             
 
          
  
     
         
   
          
   
         
             
   
            
  
         
          
         
            
                  
       
   
             
   
            
            
           
        
          
            
   
   
             
     
          
   
Defendant [Yes, but I think these words are relating to the way I
argue.]
Prosecution These aren’t words used to describe being close to
someone’s face.
Defendant [Yes they were].
Prosecution [[Victim-survivor] has a good grasp of English].
Defendant Yes.
Prosecution She has no trouble expressing what she means.
Defendant No.
Prosecution So why did she use those words?
Defendant [Because of the way I am aggressive when I argue, how I
stand over her].
Prosecution Climbing is not what someone does when they stand over
another person.
Defendant [It was to do with the argument].
Prosecution [What do you mean by standing over her?]
Defendant Like, making myself the dominant one. (T2)
Prosecution counsel highlighted the victim-survivor’s intelligence and used this to argue that
the ‘climbing on top of me’ phrase was meant in the colloquial sense of sex, rather than ‘getting
in someone’s face’ as the defendant argued.
EXTRACT 7y
Prosecution When she said [‘climbed on top of me’] why didn’t you ask
what she meant?
Defendant I thought it was about the argument with the phone.
Prosecution She says, ‘what happens next time you’re angry and I say
no’, that’s not about a phone. You don’t ask someone for
permission to slap a phone from their hands.
Defendant It’s not about the phone, it’s my anger.
Prosecution She’s talking about something she had the right to say yes
or no to.
Defendant Yes.
Prosecution [Would it not ring any alarm bells when you read it?]
Defendant [I can’t remember].





           
    
               
        
  
             
   
      
              
        
              
          
      
        
               
             
              
                 
          
  
               
            
             
  
     
           
     
  
               
  
              
       
Prosecution You apologised and wanted her to forget about it.
Defendant No. (T2)
The prosecution had repeatedly pointed out the flaws in the defendant’s logic and in the
following extract emphasised the defendant’s lack of understanding:
EXTRACT 7z
Prosecution Climbing on top of someone sounds more like sex than a
slap doesn’t it?
Defendant I don’t understand.
Defence It is [defendant’s] testimony that it doesn’t refer to a slap,
no wonder he is confused by the question.
Prosecution I don’t think it’s confusing, but I’ll put it another way.
Climbing on top of someone sounds more like sex than
being in someone’s space, doesn’t it?
Defendant It can mean that. (T2)
In stating “I don’t think it’s confusing” the prosecution implied that the defendant should have
no difficulty answering the question. This could have pointed jurors towards concluding the
defendant was of lower intelligence or was acting as such. During re-examination, the defence
barrister drew attention to the defendant saying he is not good with words and linked this to
the messaging the prosecution said constituted an admission of harm:
EXTRACT 7aa
Defence [One final thing, in your interview, the officer is asking you
about who the aggressor was, and you admit it can be you
a lot of the time]. You also say that you’re not very good
with words.
Defendant Yes
Defence You’ve had trouble with this ‘climbing’ phrase
Defendant Yeah
…
Defence And what did you mean when you said you’re not good
with words?
Defendant I’m not good at explaining myself, I don’t understand big




               
     
     
         
                   
              
              
              
                
             
 
   
                
             
             
         
                
              
                 
             
            
             
     
               
             
                 
             
               
            
                
               
Defence Did you ever climb on top of [victim-survivor] and have sex
with her against her will.
Defendant No
Defence We close our case. (T2)
In linking this to the messages, the defence was able to cast doubt on the veracity of one of
the prosecution’s key pieces of evidence. The implication was that the defendant was not
admitting harm because he did not understand what the victim-survivor had said because he
was uneducated. This narrative about the defendant’s intelligence made it easier for the jury
to accept the new meaning given to the victim-survivor’s words by the defendant, which in turn
bolstered his claim to innocence. The prosecution resisted this narrative in her closing
remarks:
EXTRACT 7ab
“Of course, you will be told that the defence do not have to prove anything, which
is true, but if [defendant] gives an explanation that beggars belief, that perhaps
insults your intelligence, then you can take that into account. […] The messages
support [victim-survivor’s] claims, whereas his explanation doesn’t make any
sense. You have probably all got your own way of expressing ‘get out of my face’,
[*gives some examples*], but you would never say, even if you were stupid, even
if you’re not good with words, ‘don’t climb on top of me’ to express that. It is
perfectly clear what [victim-survivor] means, it is plain. […] You have heard here
that [defendant] is perfectly able to express himself with his limited vocabulary.
[He has shown himself to be arrogant, he insults your intelligence. His narrative
does not fit.]” (Prosecution, T2)
In her closing speech, the defence barrister continued to draw on the intelligence narrative by
making a direct comparison of intelligence between the defendant and the victim-survivor: “but
bear in mind this is a young man, maybe not as bright as [victim-survivor]” (see extract 7l).
The victim-survivor was portrayed by both prosecution and defence as bright and intelligent
with a good grasp of English. Contrasting the defendant’s level of intelligence against that of
the victim-survivor arguably played into gendered narratives of women as manipulative liars
and the myth that women often lie about rape. The implication being that women, and this




               
                
      
                
              
              
               
                    
             
                  
 
    
          
          
    
            
            
            
           
        
            
              
         
              
              
               
                
              
            
               
intelligent enough to lie convincingly to a jury. This narrative and the reinterpretation of the
meaning of ‘climbing on top’ of someone seemed to be convincing for the jury, as this
defendant was found not guilty.
Similarly to T2, the defendant in T3 had used a colloquial term associated with sexual activity
in his messages when the victim-survivor questioned him about the sexual assaults. In this
trial, the defendant had communicated with the victim-survivor online and via the phone having
made up an alternative identify for himself. He then went to the victim-survivor’s home under
the pretence of being a masseur that his first false identity had sent round to her as a gift. In
the messages after the assaults, the victim-survivor asked why the masseur had digitally
penetrated her, to which the defendant replied that he had asked for her to be given a “happy
ending”.
EXTRACT 7ac
Defence Later, <reads messages>, she asks ‘but why would he
massage inside my vagina?’, why do you respond in the
way that you do?
Defendant [I wasn’t really reading it properly, I was cooking, my son
was home and my wife was upstairs, so I fleetingly read it,
I thought ‘what’s she on about?’. I said in the messages to
her ‘I asked for a full body massage] with happy ending’
because I always leave a massage feeling happy.
Defence You say, ‘did he do it?’
Defendant Yeah cos I thought about it later like ‘well, did he do it?’
<surprised tone>, I thought she was being jovial. (T3)
As in T2, the defendant took a well-known colloquial phrase associated with sexual activity
and provided an alternative, non-sexual meaning to it. However, in contrast to T2, this
defendant was found guilty, which indicates that the jury did not accept his alterative meaning.
Whilst there were striking similarities in these two cases in terms of the digital admissions of
harm and the reinterpretation of colloquial phrases, there are any number of reasons that
could have contributed to the differing outcomes, including differences in case characteristics




                 
                
               
                  
                 
               
           
            
                
                
                
                
 
             
                
                  
              
    
   
            
    
       
             
        
         
              
         
           
           
 
age of the defendants, as the defendant in T2 was over a decade younger than the defendant
in T3 and had been consistently aligned with being ‘a young man’, which is of significance
because juries appear to be less willing to convict young men (Topping and Barr, 2018).
Another possible factor could have been the context of the rapes, in that T2 was in the context
of a relationship whereas the deception in T3 made it more akin to a ‘stranger rape’ scenario
which is more likely to result in conviction (Lovett and Kelly, 2009; Waterhouse, Reynolds and
Egan, 2016; Lundrigan, Dhami and Agudelo, 2019). Interestingly, Lundrigan, Dhami and
Agudelo’s (2019) study also found that chance of conviction increased with victim-survivor
age, and in T3 the victim-survivor was around 15 years older than the victim-survivor in T2.
The authors posited that this could be due to a perceived increase in credibility with increasing
age, and indeed this may also have been a factor in T3 because the victim-survivor aligned
quite closely with the ‘ideal victim’ stereotype in a number of ways (Christie, 1986; see section
6.3.1).
The defendant’s response in the above extract also drew on the sympathy narratives
discussed in section 7.3 by bringing his wife and child into his explanation, which returned to
this image of him as a ‘good, family man’ (see section 7.2) and reminded the jury of the
difficulties he had been having at home (see section 7.3). The prosecution later questioned
his explanation in cross-examination:
EXTRACT 7ad
Prosecution You said, ‘that’s what [he] paid for’ after you put your
fingers in her vagina.
Defendant No, I did not say that.
Prosecution So why then in the message did you imply that is exactly
what happened? [‘including happy ending, that’s what I
asked for’]. ‘Happy ending’, why did you say that?
Defendant At the time I was distracted. When I said that, I meant how
it makes me feel happy after having a massage.
Prosecution But you know what it means when someone says it.





    
   
       
  
          
     
              
                  
            
   
              
  
            
          
       
      
           
          
  
        
          
            
           
    
              
       
  
          
   
              
       
             
                  
               
Prosecution It means sex.
Defendant It can.
Prosecution So you know what it means.
Defendant Yes.
Prosecution So why would you choose to use that phrase?
Defendant I was distracted. (T3)
Just as in T2, the defendant acknowledged the common understanding of the phrase but
maintained that this was not what it meant to him. The prosecution went on to point out that
the messages could be read as a confession to the sexual assault:
EXTRACT 7ae
Prosecution You were trying to get her to see it as a good thing.
Defendant [No]…
Prosecution You’re trying to talk her round, ‘that’s what I asked for’.
Defendant I never put my fingers inside her, so no.
Prosecution You wouldn’t say that’s a confession?
Defendant It was not a confession.
Prosecution [It was a confession and you trying to justify it.]
Defendant No, it wasn’t a justification cos nothing happened except
the massage.
Prosecution [Page X, you are maintaining the charade].
Defendant Yes, I wanted to carry on talking to [victim-survivor].
Prosecution […] didn’t you think at this stage you should come clean?
Defendant [I was confused, didn’t know what to do, didn’t know
whether we’d continue talking].
Prosecution You could have said ‘it was me, but I was hoping you might
like me’, you didn’t think of that?
Defendant No.
Prosecution You continued the charade because you knew you had
done something wrong.
Defendant No, never, I just wanted to carry on talking to her cos it
makes me feel good about myself. (T3)
The defendant made further excuses for his intentional deception of the victim-survivor in
stating that he wanted to carry on talking to her because it made him feel good about himself.




             
             
                 
  
   
            
             
                  
             
                  
         
              
             
              
             
                
               
              
   
            
              
            
       
              
            
                
              
         
place men’s needs (including sexual urges) as of higher importance than women’s and
position women as responsible for nurturing men’s feelings (Hill and Fischer, 2001).
In his closing remarks, the prosecution relied on the digital admission of harm as a key piece
of evidence:
EXTRACT 7af
“[then we have the evidence he said ‘happy ending’, that he denied…But
significantly, why does he say ‘including happy ending, that’s what I asked for’?
If he didn’t say it at the scene, then why did he mention it after?] Well that’s easy,
he can’t hide from electronic messages, but he can deny saying something. So
what I want you to draw from that is that this is a feeble denial and attempt to
justify what he knows he has done.” (Prosecution, T3)
Here the prosecution barrister demonstrated the view that digital evidence can be useful in
strengthening cases against defendants because it cannot be ‘hidden from’. This reflects the
idea that digital evidence can act as a ‘model witness’ (Dodge, 2018) in supporting victim-
survivor’s reports of sexual violence (see also, Rumney and McPhee, 2020). The defendants’
creation of new meanings in both T2 and T3, however, demonstrate the ease with which digital
evidence can be moulded to fit opposing accounts at trial (Dodge, 2018; Hlavka and Mulla,
2018). Indeed, defence counsel in T3 overtly relied on this in his closing remarks:
EXTRACT 7ag
“Now, ‘happy ending’, [defendant] explained what he meant by that… The written
word is one dimensional, [defendant] says the question ‘did he do it?’ was a
question of surprise, not confirmatory. What do we know about [defendant], he’s
a man of good character.” (Defence, T3)
The defence barrister noted that “the written word is one dimensional” and read the
defendant’s message with the same intonation as the defendant had in cross-examination
(see extract 7ac). This is an example of what Hlavka and Mulla (2018) termed the ‘animation’
of digital evidence, whereby digital messages are given differing meanings by the manner in




      
              
            
              
                
           
   
          
     
              
             
               
     
   
               
                
           
               
              
               
                
               
              
              
           
                
              
            
7.4.1.1 (Re)interpreting victim-survivors’ digital responses
Indeed, this ‘animation’ was also evident in relation to messages sent by the victim-survivors
in both trials, where both defence barristers attached considerable meaning to single
characters. In T2, this character was a question mark, which the victim-survivor had sent
following a previous message she had sent which had not received a reply. In her closing
remarks, the defence asked the jury to consider the question mark:
EXTRACT 7ah
“[[victim-survivor] doesn’t get a reply, she sends another message, clearly
agitated and frustrated].” (Defence, T2)
The defence said that the sending of a question mark “clearly” signified agitation and
frustration, giving a sense of certainty to something that was actually very ambiguous.
Similarly, in T3, defence counsel asked the jury to consider a message in which the victim-
survivor sent two emojis:
EXTRACT 7ai
“Can I ask you to consider very carefully what [prosecution] has asked you to do.
[He read the last messages, I just invite you to consider the very last one]: a
laughing emoji followed by a monkey covering its eyes.” (Defence, T3)
This was in the aftermath of the sexual assault where the victim-survivor had confronted the
defendant about the digital penetration (what the defendant had referred to as a “happy
ending”). The defence was therefore asking the jury to read a suspicious meaning of those
two emojis, implying that a ‘true’ victim-survivor would not have sent such a message to the
person who had sexually assaulted them. Again, the defence ignored that it is not uncommon
for victim-survivors to exhibit a ‘friend’ response (Lodrick, 2007; see also section 5.2.2) and
that this victim-survivor had been subjected to a drawn out deception that undoubtedly caused
her confusion in her untangling the events that had occurred.
Both T2 and T3 provided examples of how easily digital evidence can be manipulated at trial
to suit two completely opposing stories. In both trials, not only were defendants’ digital




           
              
            
              
            
              
   
               
             
            
           
      
            
                 
            
              
           
           
             
               
             
           
           
                 
              
      
suspicious based upon single characters. Furthermore, the defendants were given opportunity
to present their alternate meanings as the messages were put to them in cross-examination,
whereas the aspersions cast against victim-survivors were saved for closing remarks. This
had the effect of silencing victim-survivors, depriving them of the opportunity to offer their
explanations or for prosecution to counter the defence’s narrative. This imbalance arguably
represents yet another double standard by which women and men are differentially judged.
7.5 Chapter summary
This chapter has built on the findings in preceding chapters, and in particular has provided
insight into the contrasting ways in which defendants are portrayed in comparison to victim-
survivors. Gendered and classed narratives intersected to bolster the credibility of defendants
as storytellers of counter-accounts to victim-survivors’ allegations, often relying on fallacies,
false dichotomies and double standards.
In stark contrast to narratives about victim-survivors, narratives about defendants sought to
rely on the ‘good men don’t rape’ fallacy. This was relied upon even in cases where defendants
had admitted harmful behaviour towards the victim-survivors, which demonstrates the low bar
that is set for defendants credibility in comparison with the incredibly high bar for victim-
survivors. These narratives were strengthened by the contrasting narratives constructed about
victim-survivors which relied on gendered and classed notions of respectability and
trustworthiness. Furthermore, the ‘good men don’t rape’ narrative provides an easy tool for
defence barristers to use to distance defendants from the ‘deviant’ other of ‘rapist’ that is
constructed through the ‘real rape’ myth. Defendants were distanced from ‘rapist’ through the
use of gendered and classed cultural narratives about respectable masculinities and
narratives that garner sympathy and provide excuses for harmful behaviour. Character
references were a useful tool for this in one particular trial, where the defence sought to rely
on an abundance of descriptors associated with femininity in order to distance the defendant




            
              
           
                
            
              
            
              
               
           
           
            
              
            
             
              
              
             
 
 
In addition to the narratives relying on notions of respectable masculinities, narratives
constructing sympathy for the defendants were also used to distance them from ‘rapist’. Often
formed through micro-examinations, these narratives aimed to elicit empathy for the
defendants with the jury, in some cases through directly urging the jury to put themselves ‘in
the defendants’ shoes’. These narratives often relied on gendered double standards whereby
women are more harshly judged than men in relation to behaviour and emotions. Furthermore,
narratives drew on myths about uncontrollable male sexual urges, immaturity, and intelligence
to minimise and excuse the admitted and alleged harmful behaviour of defendants. This was
particularly evident in relation to digital admissions of harm, where the meaning of words was
extensively scrutinised by both defence and prosecution. Additionally, this digital evidence
presented another double standard whereby victim-survivors were cast as suspicious without
opportunity to provide an alternative explanation, whereas defendants were indulged in being
allowed to offer ‘new’ meanings to their own words and the words of victim-survivors.
Overall, these narratives that focused on defendants’ credibility were bolstered by the
pervasive reliance on rape myths, particularly through drawing on the ‘real rape’ stereotype
and the misconception that women often lie about rape. This chapter therefore supports my
thesis that rape myths and wider cultural narratives interact to undermine the credibility of





     
  
              
             
                
             
              
               
               
             
          
             
             
             
               
             
              
              
       
              
         
            
           
                
           
 
                 
              
      
Chapter 8 Implications and Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
My research has evidenced that rape myths remain prevalent in courtroom narratives and that
they interact with broader cultural narratives to undermine the credibility of victim-survivors of
sexual violence. This challenges claims that rape myths are not a problem in rape trials and
provides a deeper, more nuanced understanding of why some groups of victim-survivors are
more likely to see a conviction than others. Structural inequalities and systems of oppression
are reflected in the narratives deployed by barristers at trial and thus the credibility of victim-
survivors is undermined in relation to how they are perceived and portrayed (regardless of any
incongruence with who they are in reality). Narratives reflecting sexism, classism, ageism and
ablism20 were found to undermine victim-survivors whilst simultaneously working towards
bolstering defendants’ claims to innocence. This study has therefore addressed the gap in
existing knowledge identified in Chapter 2 and offers a unique contribution to knowledge.
This chapter delineates how these findings relate to the research objectives, which are
reiterated below. The implications of the research are set out, then the limitations of the
research are discussed and future directions for research are outlined. Finally, the chapter
ends by reasserting my thesis argument that rape myths and wider cultural narratives interact
within sexual violence trials to undermine the credibility of victim-survivors and their stories.
The objectives of this study were to:
 Identify whether legal practitioners use rape myths in serious sexual offences trials and
if so, the context in which these are used.
 Identify whether legal practitioners use cultural narratives in serious sexual offences
trials and if so, the context in which these are used.
 Analyse if and how the use of cultural narratives and rape myths reinforce one another.
 Outline potential avenues for improving the trial experience of victim-survivors.
20 The data sampling did not appear to be ethnically or racially diverse, therefore narratives relating to
racially or ethnically minoritised victim-survivors were not observed, but this does not mean such




     
            
             
               
            
         
             
                
               
              
            
             
                 
                
        
             
               
              
               
                
                
              
              
               
                 
               
8.2 Summary of Key Findings
8.2.1 Rape myths remain prevalent in courtroom narratives in sexual offences trials
My research has provided fresh evidence of legal practitioners’ continued reliance on rape
myths when making their legal arguments. The context in which these were used was largely
reflective of the previous literature. That is, courtroom narratives reflected myths about
consent, including defendants’ ‘reasonable’ belief in consent, victim-survivors’ post-assault
behaviour and the expected consistency of their stories. Importantly, in addition to evidencing
that these ‘tried and tested’ tactics are still in use, my observations also uncovered new ways
in which some rape myths are deployed. For example, that even prompt reporting (i.e., within
24 hours of the assault) was constructed as suspicious by defence barristers through drawing
on myths about what counts as ‘reasonable’ post-assault behaviour. The worrying dilemma
this presents for victim-survivors, that their behaviour can always be portrayed as suspicious
no matter what they do, could have serious implications for their faith in the CJS. So many
‘traps’ have been set for them, through inaccurate beliefs of what is rational, that it becomes
near impossible to be seen as credible.
This fresh evidence demonstrates that despite decades of reform, rape myths are still
pervasive in sexual offences trials. This is particularly important in light of new research that
claims that jurors do not believe rape myths (Thomas, 2020). Thomas’ (2020) research asked
jurors directly about rape myths, which is problematic because, as my evidence shows, this is
not how rape myths are presented to juries in sexual offences trials; they are referenced with
far more subtlety than they are in rape myth acceptance scales. It is well established that
asking people whether they believe rape myths in the abstract produces different results to
asking people about them in an applied context (McMahon and Farmer, 2011). This is
significant because my research, which was carried out at the same time as Thomas’, shows
that the way in which jurors in Thomas’ study were asked about rape myths was not reflective




              
 
       
            
             
             
           
              
            
            
                 
             
              
              
             
     
           
            
              
               
             
                
           
              
             
               
             
previous research that says rape myths are mutably deployed and are problematic in the
courtroom.
8.2.2 Oppressive cultural narratives permeate courtroom narratives
Cultural narratives that reflected structural inequalities and systems of oppression were used
by barristers throughout trial narratives. These most commonly related to gender and social
class, but also intersected with age and ableism, and framed victim-survivors as untrustworthy,
unrespectable and unreliable. These references were made in constructing narratives about
the respectability and honesty of victim-survivors as a means of undermining them as credible
‘tellers’, whilst simultaneously being used in attempts to bolster defendants’ credibility. The
presence of cultural narratives reflecting structural inequalities and systems of oppression are
not unique to sexual offences, and they likely permeate trials for a wide range of crimes. For
example, Hodson et al. (2005) found that subtle racism permeates the courtroom despite
procedures aimed at creating fair treatment. However, what is key in my observations of
sexual offences trials is that oppressive cultural narratives interact with rape myths, and thus
prejudices are reproduced and compounded in an established and specific way directly related
to the alleged crimes.
8.2.3 Rape myths and oppressive cultural narratives interact in courtroom narratives
My observations highlighted ways in which cultural narratives that reflect structural inequalities
and systems of oppression produce and reproduce rape myths in courtroom narratives. It is
well established within the literature that the function of rape myths is to blame women,
undermine their stories, and excuse or minimise perpetrators (Eyssel and Bohner, 2008). This
was clear in my observations, most especially in the interaction of rape myths and the broader
cultural narratives that reflected structural inequalities and systems of oppression. The
scrutiny of women’s behaviour in the observed trials, including the sexual behaviour of both
victim-survivors and their mothers, was clearly linked to the historic and continued tendency
of our patriarchal society to police women’s behaviour in ways in which men’s behaviour is




           
             
                 
              
              
                
              
               
           
              
            
            
           
           
               
            
              
           
           
           
           
          
          
             
            
           
               
unstable and untrustworthy, and these portrayals were further transformed through classed,
ageist and ableist narratives. Digital evidence provided a key mechanism for these narratives
to be introduced and bolstered and it appeared that not enough scrutiny had been given to the
records adduced to the court, consistent with findings elsewhere (Smith and Daly, 2020).
Oppressive cultural narratives reinforced the myths that some women are more to blame than
others for their assault and that women routinely lie about being raped, and these were usually
articulated in the form of narratives of respectability and honesty. Not only were narratives
about victim-survivors constructed and deployed in this way, but in some cases so too were
narratives about their mothers. That victim-survivors can be undermined through narratives
that attack the character of other witnesses has important implications for research and policy,
especially in relation to child sex offences trials (see section 8.3).
Gendered and classed narratives intersected to bolster the credibility of defendants as
storytellers of counter-accounts to victim-survivors’ allegations, often relying on fallacies, false
dichotomies and double standards. Respectability narratives subtly reinforced the ‘real rape’
stereotype by seeking to distance defendants from the image of a rapist as ‘deviant other’,
producing and reproducing the problematic fallacy that ‘good men don’t rape’. Defendants
were distanced from ‘rapist’ through the use of gendered and classed cultural narratives about
respectable masculinities and narratives that garner sympathy and provide excuses for
harmful behaviour. Therefore, narratives of respectability served to undermine the credibility
of victim-survivors whilst simultaneously serving to bolster defendants’ claims to innocence.
Furthermore, gendered, classed and aged narratives were used to excuse defendants’
admitted and alleged harmful and aggressive behaviour towards victim-survivors through
drawing on the fallacy that ‘good men don’t rape’.
My observations of the re/production of rape myths through oppressive cultural narratives in
sexual offences trials demonstrate how Gavey’s (2005, 2019) concept of cultural scaffolding
operates in the courtroom. Micro-examinations were a specific mechanism through which




                
           
               
             
              
                
                
              
              
                 
               
             
               
            
               
                
               
                 
      
      
            
              
              
 
             
                   
isolation, rather it is about the pattern of questions and the overall pictures these help build
up, which culminate in character assassination in the closing arguments.
The nuance within my research with regards to the reliance on cultural narratives that reflect
structural inequalities and systems of oppression, and their interaction with rape myths, further
rebut claims that jurors do not believe rape myths (Thomas, 2020). Thomas’ research, which
claims that jurors do not believe rape myths, asked direct questions of jurors, most of whom
had not been in sexual offences trials so had not been exposed to narratives which contained
said myths. My research shows that rape myths are reinforced by broader cultural narratives
that subtly infuse trial narratives. Therefore, overtly asking about rape myths fails to account
for the subtlety and nuance with which they are produced and deployed in practice at trial and
does not account for the reinforcing cultural narratives (see also Willmott et al., 2018)
Legal practitioners relied on fallacies, faulty logic, false dichotomies and double standards that
were rooted in prejudicial cultural narratives. The current rules and procedures do not go far
enough to protect victim-survivors, as is evidenced through the continued irrelevant reliance
on rape myths and broader cultural narratives with no probative value other than to impugn
their character. Overall, my findings make plain the low bar that is set for defendants’ credibility
in comparison with the incredibly high bar for victim-survivors. It is crucial that future policy,
practice and research look at the whole picture, not just ‘rape myths’. This is discussed in the
following section and section 8.5.
8.3 Implications for Policy and Practice
The research findings have several key implications for existing knowledge and policy
debates, which are set out in this section. The discussion outlines potential avenues for
improving the trial experience of victim-survivors, and thus fulfils the final objective of the
study.
Before setting out some specific implications and recommendations for reform, it is important




                
                 
                
            
              
                
               
             
               
               
              
                
          
             
                
            
               
          
             
              
             
            
             
              
                
            
              
                 
range of reforms to policy and practice with regards to criminal justice responses to rape and
the efficacy of those reforms is often questioned. In E&W and beyond it seems clear that policy
reform in and of itself will remain largely ineffective as long as the underlying cultures and
structures remain unchanged (Jordan, 2015; Carline and Gunby, 2017; Smith, 2018). As
critiques of carceral feminism rightly point out, the whole system must be changed. However,
this does not mean that shorter term fixes should not be sought. Whole system change does
not happen quickly and there are thousands of victim-survivors choosing to report to the police
every year—these victim-survivors deserve to feel confident in the system that they are
engaging with and feel assured that it will not needlessly cause them additional harm. Two
recent national surveys of victim-survivors found that faith in the CJS is incredibly low (Molina
and Poppleton, 2020; Smith and Daly, 2020). Whilst a radical overhaul is needed, immediate
change is also therefore crucial because to wait for whole system change would be a great
disservice and injustice to those choosing to report now.
8.3.1 The importance of including an analysis of cultural narratives in future reforms
As noted above, policy reform is likely to remain ineffective so long as the underlying cultures
and structures remain unchanged. Carline and Gunby (2017) found that barristers believed
reforms have been ineffective because they do not account for the reality of the courtroom.
Indeed, my findings demonstrate that simply understanding poor treatment and
retraumatisation of victim-survivors as caused by the influence of rape myths is overly
simplistic and ignores the wider social context. This is reflective of Gavey’s (2005) cultural
scaffolding and Jordan’s (2015) argument that cultural and structural change is required to
dismantle the underlying systems of oppression that produce and reproduce rape myths
across society. Whilst Jordan is talking of patriarchy, her argument viewed through an
intersectional lens tells us that all systems of oppression and domination must be considered
and addressed. This is why it is essential to include an analysis of broader oppressive cultural
narratives in any future reforms. The poor treatment and retraumatisation of victim-survivors
stems from more than just patriarchy and sexism. As my findings have shown, courtroom




             
             
                
   
              
               
            
               
               
           
              
               
                  
             
                
            
            
              
      
                
              
                 
             
                
                
              
                   
               
reforms solely on gendered analysis of patriarchy ignores and obscures the mechanisms that
work to undermine victim-survivors based on their (perceived) background or identity and fails
to address how and why some groups of victim-survivors are more likely to see a conviction
than others.
8.3.2 Implications for section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999
Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 prohibits the use of victim-
survivors’ sexual history evidence except in exceptional circumstances. The findings set out
in section 4.2.1 have several implications in relation to this. Despite some clear instances of
good practice, my observations support a growing body of evidence that shows that s.41 is
not working effectively. My observations notably came after procedural changes introduced
by Criminal Practice Directions 2015 (Amendment No. 6) [2018] EWCA Crim 516 which came
into force in April 2018 and therefore reflect current practice. Whilst there has been ongoing
debate as to whether s.41 is effective and works in the interests of fair justice for both the
victim-survivors and the defendants (see section 2.4.1.1), there is agreement from those that
oppose feminist critiques of the legislation that it is unwieldy and complex in its current form
(Stark, 2017; Thomason, 2018; Hoyano, 2019). My observations demonstrate that despite the
tightening of procedures, victim-survivors were still questioned about irrelevant aspects of their
sexual history seemingly with the purpose of impugning their character. A renewed look at
reforming s.41 is therefore justified.
There are also calls for further training and guidance for judges and barristers to ensure that
s.41 applications are treated with appropriate scrutiny and not as a formality (Smith, 2018).
My findings support the need for this. In particular, there is a need to consider sexual history
evidence specifically in the context of digital communications evidence. Whilst the CPS are
clear that digital evidence is subject to s.41, it would be beneficial for clear guidance and
training that addresses what this may look like in practice. Digital evidence is often thought of
as being neutral, however it is open to manipulation and careful consideration therefore needs
to be given as to how conversations of a sexual nature may subvert s.41 and be used in an




               
             
              
           
              
        
         
     
             
             
              
              
                
                  
              
                 
             
                 
               
              
     
                
               
             
             
              
                 
              
               
given the amount of digital evidence that is obtained from the routine downloads of many
victim-survivors’ entire mobile phone and social media data. There have been some promising
developments during 2020 in relation to digital downloads, such as the ruling in Bater-James
and Mohammed v R [2020] EWCA Crim 790 which stated that:
“It is not a ‘reasonable’ line of inquiry if the investigator pursues fanciful or
inherently speculative researches…There is no presumption that a
complainant’s mobile telephone or other devices should be inspected,
retained or downloaded.” (para.70, 78)
An ICO report (2020) similarly pointed to the problematic practice of routinely downloading
mobile phone data and stated that requests must be “strictly necessary”, highlighting that
investigators “must fully consider the challenge of the high threshold, i.e. ‘strictly necessary’ is
more than ‘necessary’” (ICO, 2020, p.37). Whilst these two developments led to the withdrawal
of a national ‘consent’ form for mobile phone downloads, it is worth noting that earlier similar
rulings in R v E [2018] EWCA Crim 2426 and R v McPartland and another [2019] EWCA Crim
1782, which found that digital devices are not automatically relevant to sexual offences, did
not translate to a change in practice (Smith and Daly, 2020). It is therefore still important to
give particular consideration to the ways in which evidence related to sexual behaviour
appears in digital communications and how s.41 is applied to it. It may even be that the
developments during 2020 lead to sexual behaviour being used as a justification for access to
digital communications, making it all the more important to specifically address the issue with
clear and robust guidance.
There have long been calls to tighten the remit of s.41 (McGlynn, 2017, 2018; Smith, 2018;
see also Burman, 2009 and Cowan, 2020 for similar calls in Scotland). Sexual history evidence
is subject to stricter restrictions in some other adversarial jurisdictions, including Canada, New
South Wales (Australia) and Michigan (United States), which demonstrates that there is room
for workable reform in E&W (McGlynn, 2018). The view from the legal profession, however,
seems to be that the legislation itself is adequate and does not need to be made stricter
(Hoyano, 2019; Gillen, 2019). There have been suggestions to require the prosecution to have




             
              
          
             
                
             
                
           
             
              
         
             
               
             
                 
              
               
            
               
     
               
              
                  
            
                 
             
   
This would aim to encourage more careful consideration of the contents of prosecution
evidence, for example the editing of ABEs, to remove erroneous references to sexual history
that inevitably arise from proper police investigation (Smith, 2018).
Scotland introduced this approach in 2002, however an evaluation study highlighted a number
of lessons that can be learnt from this change. For example, the evaluation found that the
measure actually increased the number of applications and that they cannot be attributed
solely to a change in procedure (Burman et al. 2007). Burman (2009) detailed a ‘scatter gun’
approach being taken to applications in Scotland, whereby defence counsel included
applications on multiple aspects of sexual history and expanded greatly on them during
questioning. Again, lessons can be learnt from this regarding the scrutiny given to s.41
applications and the adherence to them at trial.
The findings outlined in section 4.2.1.1 demonstrate that it was not only victim-survivors’
sexual behaviour that was scrutinised, but also, in some cases, that of their mothers. Whilst
the sexual history of victim-survivors may be relevant in some circumstances, the sexual
history of their mothers is rarely likely to be relevant and only serves to attack their character
and credibility, and by extension that of the victim-survivor. Further research is needed to
determine whether this is a widespread problem and if so, discussions should be had about
extending the prohibition of sexual history evidence to all witnesses. Victim-survivors should
not be able to be undermined based on the character assassination of their parents.
8.3.3 Implications for ‘myth-busting’ measures
It is clear that rape myths persistently permeate serious sexual offences trials despite a variety
of measures, such as the previously discussed s.41, put in place. Judicial directions are
another measure that were put in place in an attempt to mitigate the impact of rape myths on
jury deliberations. Whilst the introduction of ‘myth-busting’ directions marked a positive step
forward, it is clear that they are not enough to tackle the problem. For example, research has





            
              
                
                 
             
              
               
                  
              
            
          
              
     
             
               
               
                 
              
               
               
       
                 
               
             
               
                
             
          
Furthermore, reflecting findings from previous court observations from 2012 (Smith, 2018), my
observations have shown that it remains easy for defence barristers to subvert these directions
through, for example, acknowledging that a rape myth exists but then going on to explain why
the case is question is an exception to it. This can be particularly effective where judges have
delivered a split summing-up, whereby the judicial directions are delivered before the closing
speeches and the summing-up of the evidence given afterwards. This means that the specific
‘myth-busting’ directions given by the judge can be addressed by the defence in their closing
arguments and this would be the final thing the jurors heard about it. Whilst judges are free to
repeat myth-busting directions at any point in the trial, in my observations, where split
summing-up was given the ‘myth-busting’ directions were not repeated after the closing
speeches. The interaction with broader cultural narratives suggests that myth-busting
measures are unlikely to have the desired effect without taking account of broader structural
inequalities and systems of oppression.
Looking to other jurisdictions could provide points for consideration. For example, in Spain
and Russia juries are required to provide judges with a written justification for their verdicts
(Martín and Kaplan, 2006). Though this system is not unproblematic, it may offer insights as
to how better to ensure fair verdicts based on facts and correct application of the law are
returned. There is no accountability for juries and looking to processes in other jurisdictions
demonstrate alternative ways of doing things that may provide a useful basis for discussion of
reform. Although not unproblematic, the notion of juries having to justify their verdicts to the
trial judge is an interesting one.
Consideration should also be given as to how to reduce the prevalence of rape myths in trial
narratives, rather than attempts to mediate their impact. Whilst elements of rape myths do in
some circumstances have legitimate relevance, they very often have no relevance and are
used as a means of impugning the character of victim-survivors. Barristers who draw on rape
myths to bolster their cases should be required to justify why and how their argument is
relevant. This could ensure fairness for victim-survivors and the upholding of public interests




      
             
              
              
            
            
           
          
           
           
            
                 
               
            
                
               
             
             
           
              
              
               
               
              
                
     
8.3.4 Independent legal representation for victim-survivors
There have been growing calls for the introduction of independent legal representation for
victim-survivors in E&W (Smith, 2018). Whilst it is commonly argued that this is incompatible
with an adversarial legal system, the majority of adversarial systems do have models of
representation for victim-survivors (Daly and Smith, 2020). These models vary and rarely
reach levels comparable with representation and participation available in the majority of
European jurisdictions, which are based largely on inquisitorial principles rather than
adversarial principles. Nevertheless, adversarial systems are moving towards providing some
sort of representation for victim-survivors, particularly in our closest jurisdictions.
For example, in Ireland victim-survivors are entitled to legal representation regarding
applications to introduce sexual history evidence and counselling records, although there are
a number of problems in the structure and delivery of this model (Iliadis, 2019). A rape review
in Ireland recently recommended a move to a more extensive model (O’Malley, 2020) and the
Gillen Review in Northern Ireland (Gillen, 2019) recommended the introduction of independent
legal representation and this is due to be piloted in 2021 (Daly and Smith, 2020).
In Scotland there have long been calls for the introduction of legal representation (Raitt, 2010),
most recently with a fresh report recommending the introduction of legal representation for
victim-survivors in relation to sexual history and bad character evidence (Keane and Convery,
2020). Furthermore, a pilot scheme of independent legal representation for rape victim-
survivors was evaluated in Northumbria (Smith and Daly, 2020) and found that it increased
victim-survivors’ confidence in the CJS, gave better protection of their rights, and resulted in
improved practice within the police and the CPS in relation to the collection of victim-survivors’
private data. It is clear then that legal representation for victim-survivors is seen as a
necessary and important element in achieving fair justice in the majority of jurisdictions, and
that there is renewed appetite in E&W. This and all other policy implications deserve full and




     
               
            
               
                 
              
               
             
            
               
               
         
           
             
               
              
              
            
              
                  
             
               
                
           
             
              
               
             
8.4 Limitations of the Research
It is important to recognise and discuss the limitations to this research project. The court
observation method provided several notable benefits over other methods, as discussed in
Chapter 3, however there were also some limitations associated with this choice of method in
relation to the research objectives. I was unable to predict or control who was in the trials
which meant my intersectional analysis was limited to the systems of oppression reflected in
those trials. That is, I was for example unable to analyse narratives deployed against racially
or ethnically minoritised women. This means that some key intersections identified within the
literature remain unexplored and thus presents important avenues for future research (see
section 8.5). A further limitation of the court observation method in terms of the intersectional
aims of the research was that observations are limited in the way they can analyse
intersectionally, because victim-survivors’ voices and experiences are missing. Nevertheless,
understanding how problematic cultural narratives formed from sexism, classism, ageism and
ablism are reflected through courtroom narratives goes some way to exploring how some
groups of victim-survivors are less likely than others to see a conviction at trial.
Relatedly, choosing to use observations in isolation meant I could not triangulate my findings
with, for example, interview data from victim-survivors to explore the extent of their awareness
of the narratives and any impacts on their trial experience. However, victim-survivor
experiences of trial have been covered elsewhere by the existing literature, though not in
relation to the narratives found in this research. That said, for the aims of this research, it was
not necessary to understand victim-survivors’ awareness of the narratives, or any impacts of
them, as the purpose was to highlight mechanisms which may be disadvantaging them in the
courtroom; victim-survivors do not need to be aware of it for it be present or effective.
Understanding jurors’ awareness of narratives would however have been useful in
understanding the efficacy of the narratives deployed by barristers, however this is not
possible because research with real jurors is prohibited in the UK. Similarly, court observations
could not examine the attitudes and beliefs of the legal professionals involved in the trials,




            
              
     
                  
               
               
             
            
              
               
                
               
            
             
                
                
                 
             
            
               
              
                  
              
              
                 
                
              
             
interested in whether practitioners actually hold or believe problematic myths or attitudes,
rather it was concerned with how practitioners deploy and reference rape myths and cultural
narratives in the courtroom.
The small sample size also presents a limitation to this research in that it is not possible to
make generalisations or claim that the findings are reflective of what happens in courts across
E&W. It cannot be assumed that the narratives identified in this research are present across
all courts, although the findings regarding rape myths bare a remarkable consistency with
other observation research from regions across England which have remained consistent over
time. Similarly, although my sample was derived from three separate sites, these were all
within the South Eastern circuit and therefore my findings could be influenced by a unique
culture within that circuit. That said, the aim of the study was not to make generalisations,
rather it was intersectional in its aims and thus required in-depth exploration in order to
establish nuanced understandings and new perspectives on an already large evidence base
(i.e., rape myths). Small samples sizes are acceptable in intersectional research and indeed
large samples can become unwieldy with little or no added benefit (Cuadraz and Uttal, 1999).
I had originally intended to sample from a broader geographic range as a means of diversifying
the sample with the hopes of being able to analyse a wider range of intersections. A change
in personal circumstances meant this was no longer feasible and has highlighted the
importance of incorporating contingency plans into research design. The original design relied
on a personal network to make long-distance travel possible, however this was not a robust
strategy and resulted in an overestimation of what could be achieved geographically in the
original design. Whilst I was able to make adaptations to the sampling strategy to try to gain a
larger sample size in light of the change in personal circumstances, these attempts were
compounded by falling prosecution rates during 2019. Though in some ways I would have
preferred a larger sample, there is in fact a wealth of data within the transcripts produced from
the six trials, with many remaining avenues for further analysis beyond the scope of this thesis.
This includes, for example: how the impacts of court practicalities have changed since Smith’s




                
               
              
     
             
              
                
             
             
           
              
              
              
            
 
              
                
             
              
        
              
       
                
               
  
cuts in the intervening years manifested, a focused analysis of the role of digital evidence in
trial, and an analysis of the practice of special measures. Further directions for future research
related to the findings within this thesis are delineated in the following section.
8.5 Future Directions for Research
Several areas for further research have been highlighted through this project. Firstly, court
observation research in general is crucial for uncovering what is happening in practice and
ensuring a level of public accountability and will be especially important in light of any reforms
that may come from the Government’s end-to-end rape review. More specifically, further court
observation research to explore other crucial intersections is needed, including but not limited
to race, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, gender from a male victim-survivor
perspective, as well further exploration of class, age, and ableism. Such studies, including the
present study, must be triangulated with research directly with victim-survivors as well as legal
professionals. Whilst the existing literature does address this, it is important that research also
specifically addresses oppressive cultural narratives in the courtroom, rather than solely rape
myths.
The findings relating to victim-survivors’ mothers also highlight the need for an exploration of
the role of parent-witnesses in sexual offences trials as there does not appear to be any
existing research that addresses this. Such an exploration could provide crucial insights with
regards to child sexual offences in particular because of the protections offered to child
witnesses during cross-examination. Future research should investigate whether parent-
witnesses of child victim-survivors are used as a proxy for the character assignation often
faced by adult victim-survivors in the courtroom.
Further research is also needed to further explore how digital evidence is used in practice in





              
               
              
                
              
              
               
   
                  
                
          
              
                 
           
               
                
        
Finally, research with real jurors would prove incredibly useful in exploring the impact of
oppressive cultural narratives and rape myths in the ways they are articulated in trial, as
opposed to through questions from a rape myth acceptance scale. This would enable an
opportunity to build on the one study that has been allowed to undertake research with real
jurors (Thomas, 2020). Failing this, mock jury research should be carried out with these
specific aims in mind. Whilst mock jury research has its limitations, methods have advanced
to enable a very realistic substitute to real jurors (e.g., Willmott et al. 2018).
8.6 Concluding Remarks
Reforms are a sticking plaster on a system that is not fit for purpose and much more thought
is needed on what justice means to victim-survivors and how this can be accomplished in a
meaningful way without processes that retraumatise and cause further injustices.
Understanding the subtlety and nuance presented in this thesis is key in understanding what
is going wrong, that is, why so few victim-survivors get the justice they seek through the CJS.
Developing an understanding of the mechanisms that undermine victim-survivors and impede
their attempts to seek justice through the CJS is therefore crucial. The findings presented in
this thesis add a unique contribution to knowledge in this regard by setting out the re/producing
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Appendix A: Common rape myths
Table adapted from Temkin (2010), Eyssel and Bohner (2008) and Burrowes (2013).
Myth Function
Rape is rare and is usually committed by strangers outside
or in public places. It involves physical force and violence,
or threats thereof.
Expresses disbelief
It cannot be rape if someone does not scream and attempt
to fight back or if they do not have physical injuries as a
result of the rape.
Expresses disbelief
Someone who is drunk or has taken drugs has put
themselves in a dangerous situation and is at least partly to
blame for being raped.
Blames the victim
If someone has consented to sex previously or has
consented to other sexual acts, it was not rape.
Exonerates the perpetrator
Women are asking to be raped by the way they dress or act. Blames the victim
Women expect men to take the lead in sexual interactions
so they say ‘no’ when they really mean ‘yes’.
Exonerates the perpetrator
If a woman invites a man over to her house it means she
wants sex.
Exonerates the perpetrator
Pressuring a partner for sex isn’t rape. Exonerates the perpetrator
People working in prostitution cannot be raped. Blames the victim
Rape happens because men cannot help themselves once
they are sexually aroused.
Exonerates the perpetrator
Only deviant men are rapists. Men from certain
backgrounds are more likely to be rapists.
Expresses disbelief
False allegations of rape are common. Women often lie
because they regret having sex or they want revenge or
attention.
Expresses disbelief
People who have been raped report it immediately. They Expresses disbelief
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